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Abstract
The Flashix project is a team effort to develop a functionally correct, crash-safe and concurrent
file system for flash memory. The approach is based on encapsulated, modular components
and their incremental refinement towards a realistic and executable implementation. Scala
and C code is derived from the models. The file system provides strong guarantees in the
presence of hardware failures and can tolerate crashes. It also performs internal operations
in a concurrent thread of execution.
This thesis emerged from this large-scale verification effort and reports on the verification
methodology and its practical application to the file system.
Crashes & Caching The first contribution is a modular approach for the specification and
verification of crash-aware components. A component is crash-aware if it provides guarantees
in the event of a power failure and subsequent recovery. A refinement theory is presented that
facilitates increasing the atomicity of a component with respect to power failures incrementally.
The semantics of the components capture the effect on a power failure of order-preserving
write-back caches succinctly. This type of cache is common in journaling file systems. The
semantics thereby ease the burden of specification significantly and the effect of a power
failure propagates upwards a component hierarchy over every refinement step implicitly.
Lock-based Concurrency The second contribution is an extension of this theory to
concurrent, crash-aware components. This allows clients of a component to call interface
operations concurrently as well as the component itself to perform internal operations in
another thread of execution in the background. Lipton reduction is used to merge several
steps into one block that is executed atomically. The approach ensures that not only atomicity
with respect to concurrent threads is achieved, but also atomicity with respect to the crash
behavior of the component. Opportunities for Lipton reductions are applied automatically
based on annotations of ownership. The ownership discipline ensures that access to a data
structure is possible only if the possession of sufficient permissions is proven. Permissions to
a data structure are acquired by locking the mutex or reader-writer lock that synchronizes
access to the data structure and relinquished by unlocking.
Flashix File System The third contribution consists of the specification and verification
of several components of the Flashix file system. The models include an erase block manager,
a journal with transactions and garbage collection, a persistence layer with serialization and
write-back caching for the journal and a component responsible for the atomicity of commits.
The erase block manager hides the specific write characteristics of flash hardware and its
error-prone nature from the rest of the file system. It performs wear-leveling concurrently in
a background thread. For all components strong guarantees in the event of a power failure
are proven. All proofs are mechanized in the tool KIV. Together the components comprise a
coherent and working file system.
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Summary. This chapter motivates the use of formal techniques for the verification of
large, concurrent and crash-aware software systems. A system must be aware of crashes
if guarantees in the event of a sudden power failure are critical. This thesis contributes
formal techniques that facilitate the incremental and modular development of such
systems by refinement of components. The approach is applied to a large-scale case
study, namely the Flashix file system for flash memory. The file system provides strong
guarantees in the presence of power failures and performs wear-leveling concurrently.
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1.1 Motivation
The context of this thesis is the development of correct and reliable software systems with
formal methods. Usually in software development, the software quality is increased by
thorough and complete requirements engineering and rigorous testing. A different approach
is to prove with mathematical methods that a software system is correct and fulfills certain
reliability criteria. The idea is to develop a software product that is correct by construction.
Using this approach, some classes of bugs are excluded by the specification mechanism. For
example a strong type system guarantees that only valid instances of a class exist. In order
to exclude other classes of bugs an additional proof is necessary. Problems in the software
are discovered earlier in the software lifecycle and are therefore less costly [85, 95]. According
to [85, Ch. 1] the cost of quality assurance exceeds the cost of programming by a factor of
three for large projects (37% vs. 12% of the development effort). With the increasing size
and complexity of software systems, the need for rigorous methods for the development of
software therefore increases as well.
The Mars Rover Spirit [113] is an example of a system where a software bug almost
led to the failure of the entire mission. The rover got stuck in a reset cycle due to a bug
in its flash file system implementation. It was only recovered by clever use of some built-in
debugging facilities. The incident prompted the proposal to build a verified file system for flash
memory [74, 51] as a pilot project for Hoare’s Grand Challenge for computing research [65].
1
1.2. CHALLENGES Chapter 1
The Mars Rover Curiosity also experienced a bug in its file system in 2013 triggering a switch
to safe mode.
Other examples of critical software systems with bugs include the THERAC 25 medical
electron accelerator [84], which led to several deaths, and the Ariane 5 rocket [86, 15], which
crashed during launch. [72] argues that the latter incident could have been prevented with a
more rigorous use of design-by-contract [93], where specifications of components are extended
with preconditions, invariants, assertions and postconditions.
The motivating example for this thesis and the Flashix project as a whole is the incident
with the Mars Rover Spirit. The Flashix project aims to answer the challenge [74, 51] and
develop a verified flash file system. The project is a team effort, and this thesis therefore only
considers and contributes a part of the file system. Several other parts of the file system are
contributed by Gidon Ernst [43].
For algorithmic problems, the UBIFS file system [67] and the erase block manager UBI [55]
are used as a blueprint. Together, UBIFS and UBI are a state-of-the-art file system with
garbage collection and wear-leveling and are integrated into the Linux kernel. However,
UBIFS and UBI are not verified. The formal verification of Flashix showed that there was a
bug in the implementation of UBI, which could lead to loss of data in the event of a power
failure (see Sec. 10.11).
1.2 Challenges
The challenges of developing a file system with formal methods fall into four categories. File
systems must provide strong guarantees in the presence of power failures or other crashes.
In order to increase performance file systems usually use concurrency. From a verification
perspective, the scale of the project and the combination of power failures and concurrent
operations requires effective methods for incremental and modular development of the file
system and proper tool support. Finally, the characteristics of flash hardware permeate
the entire design, implementation and verification of the file system for flash memory, and
increase the difficulty of handling power failures correctly significantly.
1. Every file system must be crash-aware and provide strong guarantees in the event of a
power failure. A correct recovery from after a reboot is the distinguishing factor of a file
system from data structures in main memory. The Flashix file system employs several
data structures and algorithms to guarantee that the recovery operation restores a
state as close to the state prior to the power failure as possible. However, certain effects
are visible to the user, because an implementation usually uses write-back caches. Such
a cache delays a write access until it is necessary or enforced by the user. On the level
of POSIX a flush of the caches can be requested by the user via a call to the operation
sync. Not only user data is cached, but internal data structures as well.
2. Another aspect critical to the performance of modern file systems is concurrency. This
is especially relevant for flash file systems, where garbage collection, wear-leveling and
block erasure are necessary and should be performed in the background. Verification of
concurrent systems is challenging because all potential interleavings of threads need
to be considered and each thread must be able to cope with the interference of other
threads. An additional challenge is ensuring that individual threads and the system as
a whole make progress. Finally, it is critical to choose a correctness criterion that also
considers crashes.
3. A file system is a large software product. Therefore the specification and verification
approach needs to scale as well. The challenge is to isolate individual concerns of a
file system into separate modules with well-defined interfaces and clear requirements
and guarantees with respect to concurrency and power failures. Such a specification of
a module is then used for the verification of its clients, facilitating their verification
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significantly. The methodology must then ensure that the specification of a module
may be replaced by its implementation in the context of a client, without jeopardizing
the correctness of the client. Only then a modular and incremental development of a
large file system is possible.
4. The fourth challenge is dealing with the specific characteristics of flash hardware.
Flash memory cannot be overwritten directly. It needs to be erased first. However, the
granularity of writes and erase operations differs. Individual pages may be programmed
by a write operation, but only whole blocks can be erased. Therefore, updates to file
system objects and internal data structures are cached and performed out-of-place.
Memory is reclaimed by performing garbage collection. Flash hardware is also inherently
prone to errors, such as partial writes and bit flips. Therefore, additional techniques







Figure 1.1: Component Hierarchies &
Code Generation
The approach taken in the Flashix project
is one of incremental refinement of crash-
aware, concurrent components. We start out
with a specification of the POSIX specifi-
cation [3], which formalizes the guarantees
of the file system, and incrementally split
off concepts and provide an implementation.
After several steps, the entire file system is
implemented based on a specification of its
assumptions about the underlying flash hard-
ware.
Fig. 1.1 depicts the general situation,
starting from an abstract, top-level specifi-
cation component A, e.g. the POSIX spec-
ification in the case of Flashix. Each rectangle is a component, i.e., a model in a simple
while- and recursion-based programming language with data types. The assumptions of used
libraries or the hardware are given by the lowest specification component A′′, which is a
model of flash hardware in the case of Flashix. The specifications A and A′′ constitute the
system’s boundaries. In the figure part of the implementation of the top-level specification A
resides in the concrete component C . The component relies on the functionality of another
component A′, which is then implemented by the component C ′ based on component A′′.
The specification components A, A′ and A′′ provide strong and easily understood guaran-
tees with respect to concurrent threads and with respect to power failures. Correctness of an
implementation C is proven locally, by considering its specification A and the specification
of its subcomponent A′ only. We usually say that an implementation refines its specification
or that the implementation is a refinement of its specification if a proof of correctness was
conducted. The blue, dotted lines in the figure denote this refinement relation.
If a system part C ′ A′′ refines its specification A′, then it may be substituted for its
specification in any context without a change in the correctness of the context. This means
that the system C C ′ A′′ behaves the same way that the system C A′ does. If
C A′ is a refinement of the top-level specification A, then so is C C ′ A′′. We
have therefore shown that the running system composed of all implementations is correct
with respect to the top-level specification.
This approach ensures that we can incrementally and modularly develop a large system
and at the end substitute all implementations for their specifications without affecting
correctness. Such a verification methodology scales, since proofs only have to consider a small,
well-defined part of the entire, complex implementation.
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The approach also facilitates code generation. From the implementation models C and
C ′ in the figure code in the C and Scala programming language is generated (red arrows)
that provides the interface of A and uses the interface A′′.
1.4 Contributions of this Thesis
This thesis contributes a specification and verification methodology for large, crash-aware
and concurrent systems, a large part of the specification and verification of the Flashix file
system and the actual, running file system. In the following the contributions in each part
are highlighted.
Specification Methodology for Crash-Aware, Concurrent Components From a
theoretical perspective, this thesis contributes a novel semantics for crash-aware, concurrent
components. Components are modular units of software with a hidden state and a clearly
defined interface. They are used as a mechanism for the specification as well as the imple-
mentation of system parts. The semantics of components is compositional and facilitates the
modular and incremental development of larger systems.
A power failure is visible in the semantics as an additional transition from any intermediate
state of an operation. There are two specification mechanisms to describe the effect of this
transition. First, there is the state-based approach, where all variables in volatile memory
are set to arbitrary values, and (an abstraction of) the persistent state is modified according
to the crash predicate. Afterwards, the recover operation of the component is run. Only
after recovery, the component can service requests by its client components again. This
state-based specification mechanism corresponds naturally to the effect of a power failure.
From a specification perspective, it is used for minor, local effects of a power failure that are
visible to client components. In the Flashix case study the state-base view is mainly used to
propagate the effects that write-back caching of several internal data structures has on part
of the component hierarchy.
The second approach is operations-based. The effects of several operations before a power
failure are retracted and some operations may be completed with a different output. In
order to limit the number of operations that may be retracted, synchronized states are used,
i.e., an operation that yields a synchronized state is never retracted as an effect of a power
failure. This specification mechanism is useful for effects that are visible over a hierarchy of
several components. The advantage is twofold. First, it is much easier to understand from
the perspective of the user. Second, the effect propagates upwards a refinement hierarchy
implicitly with only trivial additional proof obligations. In this thesis this view is used to
propagate the effect of write-back caching of user data.
The implicit, operations-based approach is completely novel. The crash-aware, concurrent
components contributed by this thesis support the state-based as well as the operations-based
specification mechanism.
Verification Methodology for Crash-Aware Components As a criterion for correct-
ness of an implementation crash linearizability with respect to a sequential specification
component is introduced in this thesis. Incremental refinement towards a sequential specifi-
cation is used as a verification methodology. Refinement preserves termination and crash
linearizability. In this thesis it is proven that refinement allows for the substitution of an
implementation component for its specification in a context while preserving the correctness
of the context.
For sequential, crash-aware components three types of refinement are used: atomicity
refinement, data refinement and crash refinement. Atomicity refinement facilitates composing
large atomic blocks that guarantee atomicity with respect to power failures. This reduces
the number of states power failures have to be considered in. This thesis contributes a novel
calculus to determine whether a sequential program may be replaced by an atomic block.
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This thesis also contributes a variant of data refinement that propagates the operations-based
view on a power failure implicitly. The notion of crash refinement is also completely novel
and facilitates switching from the state-based to the operations-based view of a power failure.
For concurrent, crash-aware components, atomicity refinement is extended by and in-
tegrated with Lipton reductions [87]. A Lipton reduction facilitates substituting a critical
region protected by a mutex or reader/writer lock with an atomic block that guarantees
atomicity with respect to concurrent threads. This thesis contributes a variant of Lipton
reductions that take atomicity with respect to power failures into account as well.
Verification of Flash File Systems This thesis contributes several components critical
to a state-of-the-art flash file system. For each component correctness is proven using the
verification methodology of incremental refinement. The aspect that permeates all models
is atomicity of some concepts with respect to power failures and write-back caching of user
data or internal data structures.
This thesis contributes the following components, concepts, and their verification:
• A model of flash hardware compliant with the industry standard ONFI [4] (Open
NAND Flash Interface), which formalizes the assumptions about the hardware.
• An erase block manager that performs wear-leveling and asynchronous erasure of blocks
concurrently in the background. The component increases the reliability of the file
system by managing bad blocks transparently and moving contents when errors are
detected. The mapping from logical to physical blocks maintained by the erase block
manager is write-back cached.
• A write-buffer that caches file system objects until a full flash page can be written.
• Serialization and deserialization of individual file system objects and detection of
partially written file system objects.
• Journaling with atomic transactions, each of which consists of modifications to several
file system objects, and garbage collection of obsolete versions of file system objects.
• Atomicity of the file system commit, where several internal data structures are persisted.
Updates to the internal data structures are also write-back cached up to a commit.
The individual components are described in Ch. 6 in more detail.
Flashix File System The final contribution of this thesis and the thesis of the author’s
colleague Gidon Ernst [43] is the working C code of the Flashix file system. The code is
generated from the implementation components and integrated into the Linux kernel. Ch. 2
provides more detail on the code and its integration.
Publications The work in this thesis has led to and contributed to the following publica-
tions.
1. J. Pfähler, G. Ernst, G. Schellhorn, D. Haneberg, and W. Reif. Formal specification of an
Erase Block Management Layer for Flash Memory. In Haifa Verification Conference (HVC),
volume 8244 of LNCS, pages 214–229. Springer, 2013
2. G. Ernst, G. Schellhorn, D. Haneberg, J. Pfähler, and W. Reif. A Formal Model of a Virtual
Filesystem Switch. In Proc. of Software and Systems Modeling (SSV), EPTCS, pages 33–45,
2012
3. G. Ernst, G. Schellhorn, D. Haneberg, J. Pfähler, and W. Reif. Verification of a Virtual
Filesystem Switch. In Proc. of Verified Software: Theories, Tools, Experiments (VSTTE),
volume 8164 of LNCS, pages 242–261. Springer, 2013
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4. G. Schellhorn, G. Ernst, J. Pfähler, D. Haneberg, and W. Reif. Development of a Verified
Flash File System. In Proc. of Alloy, ASM, B, TLA, VDM, and Z (ABZ), volume 8477 of
LNCS, pages 9–24. Springer, 2014. Invited Paper
5. G. Ernst, J. Pfähler, G. Schellhorn, and W. Reif. Modular Refinement for Submachines of
ASMs. In Proc. of Alloy, ASM, B, TLA, VDM, and Z (ABZ), pages 188–203. Springer, 2014
6. G. Ernst, J. Pfähler, G. Schellhorn, D. Haneberg, and W. Reif. KIV - Overview and VerifyThis
Competition. Software Tools for Techn. Transfer, 17(6):677–694, 2015
7. G. Schellhorn, B. Tofan, G. Ernst, J. Pfähler, and W. Reif. RGITL: A temporal logic framework
for compositional reasoning about interleaved programs. Annals of Mathematics and Artificial
Intelligence, 71(1):131–174, 2014
8. G. Ernst, J. Pfähler, G. Schellhorn, and W. Reif. Inside a Verified Flash File System: Trans-
actions & Garbage Collection. In Proc. of Verified Software: Theories, Tools, Experiments
(VSTTE), volume 9593 of LNCS, pages 73–93. Springer, 2015
9. G. Ernst, J. Pfähler, G. Schellhorn, and W. Reif. Modular, Crash-Safe Refinement for ASMs
with Submachines. Science of Computer Programming (SCP), 2016
10. J. Pfähler, G. Ernst, S. Bodenmüller, G. Schellhorn, and W. Reif. Modular Verification of Order-
Preserving Write-Back Caches. In IFM: 13th International Conference, 2017, Proceedings,
pages 375–390. Springer, 2017
1.5 Outline
Fig. 1.2 shows an overview over the chapters of this thesis and their interdependencies. In
the following the above contributions are connected to the corresponding chapters.
Ch. 2 provides an overview over the case study, namely the Flashix file system, and Ch. 3
provides the theoretical background that forms the basis of the verification methodology.
Ch. 4 provides details on the syntax and semantics of crash-aware, concurrent components.
Furthermore, a compositionality result is proven, i.e., it is proven that an implementation
can be substituted for its specification in a context.
In Ch. 5, three types of refinement for sequential, crash-aware components are discussed.
We usually first perform an atomicity refinement to increase the atomicity of a component with
respect to power failures. Afterwards, a data refinement is used to change the representation
of data structures. Finally, a crash refinement facilitates switching from the state-based to
the operations-based view for power failures.
Ch. 6 gives an overview over the components of the Flashix file system and how the
verification methodology for sequential, crash-aware components is applied to the case study.
The focus of the chapter is that crash-safety of a file system is a cross-cutting concern, which
permeates the entire file system and each level of abstraction has to deal with and recover
from power failures in the middle of an operation.
Chapters 7 and 8 present the system boundaries of the Flashix file system formally as
components. The component POSIX formalizes the guarantees of the file system, whereas
the component Flash encodes the assumptions about the flash hardware and its driver.
Ch. 9 briefly explains how serialization and deserialization procedures are integrated into
the formal development and the process of code generation.
Ch. 10 shows an abstract specification and implementation of an erase block manager.
An erase block manager increases the reliability of the flash hardware by retrying operations
and moving data if errors are detected. It also implements wear-leveling, which ensures that
blocks are erased evenly and further increases the reliability and lifespan of flash hardware.
For performance reasons, the erase block manager erases blocks asynchronously. The chapter
provides some detail on the invariants of the erase block manager and its verification.
In Chapter 11, the core concepts of a flash file system are presented, namely journaling
with transactions consisting of modifications to multiple file system objects and garbage
collection of obsolete versions of file system objects. The integration with an efficient index
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Figure 1.2: Overview over the Structure of the Chapters and their Dependencies: The chapters
describing parts of the Flashix file system are depicted in blue.
to locate the current version of a file system object is discussed. It is proven that transactions
are atomic, and that garbage collection is correct and picks a suitable block.
Individual file system objects are serialized to bytes in Ch. 12. It is proven that the
byte representation ensures that partially written nodes are detected and discarded. This
guarantees that individual file system objects are written atomically. Writes of the file system
objects are cached by a write-buffer to increase performance and to deal with the write
characteristics of flash hardware. For this component a crash refinement is used to switch
to the operations-based view on a power failure. This facilitates propagating the effect of
this write-back cache upwards the entire refinement hierarchy. The chapter also proves the
correctness and atomicity of the file system commit, when several internal data structures
such as the index are written to flash memory.
Ch. 13 extends the specification and verification methodology introduced in Ch. 5 to
concurrent components. It is proven that with a variant of Lipton reductions it is possible to
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increase the atomicity of a component with respect to concurrent threads as well as power
failures.
In Ch. 14 the verification methodology is applied to the erase block manager, which shows
that wear-leveling and asynchronous erasure of blocks can be performed concurrently by a
separate thread.
Ch. 15 summarizes the results and contributions of this thesis, discusses some lessons
learned and gives an outlook for the Flashix project.
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Flashix: A Verified Flash File System
Summary. This chapter gives an overview over the Flashix file system, which is a
verified file system for flash memory. The file system is functionally correct and crash-
safe with respect to the POSIX specification. Wear-leveling and asynchronous erasure
of blocks are performed concurrently in the background. Crash-Safety means that the
file system deals with power cuts in a guaranteed and predictable way. Although the
development is based on models, final C code is generated and is integrated as a Linux
kernel module.
Publications. This Chapter is based on the overview over the Flashix project
published in [118].
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Figure 2.1: The Flashix Project:
A Verified File System for
Flash Memory
The Flashix file system is a file system for flash memory.
It provides the POSIX interface [3] to client programs
and uses the MTD (= Memory Technology Devices)
interface to interact with flash hardware as shown
in Fig. 2.1. MTD is the standard interface for flash
devices in Linux-based operating systems. MTD is
implemented by drivers for raw flash devices, usually
found in embedded systems.
Solid State Drives (= SSDs) are outside the scope
of the project, although SSDs are now more common
than raw flash devices in consumer electronics. A Flash
Translation Layer (= FTL) that simulates the interface
of a normal magnetic disk is usually used for SSDs in
conjunction with a traditional file system. As observed
by Yang et al. [139] the direct approach of a flash
file system provides performance benefits. In mission-
critical system, such as the Mars Rover Spirit, usually
raw flash is used, because SSDs need a lot of additional
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electronics and logic on-chip.
Flashix is developed with the interactive verifier KIV1 [44] by incremental refinement
of the POSIX specification. The correctness of the file system is ensured by construction.
For the specification and implementation models crash-aware, concurrent components are
used. Ch. 4 provides more detail on the formalism. From each of the implementation models
executable C and Scala code is generated and integrated into Linux-based operating systems.
Flashix is therefore usable as a normal file system on Linux.
The formal development of Flashix encompasses a lot of concepts that are independent of
the concrete file system and many aspects of general interest to any flash file system. Fig. 2.2
depicts the concepts and aspects that are considered. The rectangles do not immediately
correspond to a crash-aware component. The hierarchy of components is shown in Ch. 6 (see
Fig. 6.1 on page 66) after the formalism and approach is explained in more detail.
System Boundaries The POSIX specification at the top of the figure specifies the syntactic
interface, i.e., the operations with input and output parameters, provided by the Flashix file
system. A syntactic interface, however, is not enough. The POSIX specification also formalizes
the semantics of each of the operations, i.e., the allowed inputs and more importantly all
allowed outputs. Essentially, the specification is a formalization of the guarantees given
by the Flashix file system, or any other correct file system. The most important part of
the specification is the effect of power failures on the state of the file system and on the
visible behavior after the recovery from the crash. The crucial correctness criteria for a file
system, and the distinguishing factor from any implementation that only uses main memory
to store the directory structure and file contents, is that it implements this crash behavior
correctly. At the lowest level, the flash driver specification MTD formally defines the syntactic
interface expected from a flash driver as well as all assumptions about the behavior of flash
hardware the Flashix file system and its correctness relies on. The formal models of the
system boundaries are presented in Ch. 7 and Ch. 8.
Guarantees Informally, the Flashix file system guarantees that operations terminate and
implement the POSIX standard faithfully. With respect to power failures, the file system
guarantees that operations are executed atomically. Since write-back caches are employed,
not all of the completed operations already had a persistent effect. As an effect of a power
failure therefore several of the last operations are retracted and one may be re-executed
completely. This yields an alternative execution of the file system up to the power failure
that is consistent with the observable behavior after the power failure, but has executed
several operations less and one operation differently. The file system also guarantees that
a successful call to the POSIX operation sync is never retracted or re-executed, because it
yields a synchronized state. The file system may only be called from one thread currently.
However, internally Flashix performs wear-leveling and asynchronous erases in a background
thread concurrently, without disturbing other file system operations.
Assumptions The assumptions about flash hardware are essentially that errors are detected
and reported faithfully by the flash driver and the underlying hardware. This means that an
error is returned when reading or writing fails, and no error is returned if it does not fail. The
hardware may always fail to perform an operation without modifying the state. For writes
Flashix assumes that only page-aligned partial writes are possible, to be able to reliably
detect partially written headers and file system objects. With respect to power failures, the
assumption is that no additional effect on the state is visible, i.e., that the raw flash device
does not employ any additional caches.
Concepts & Layers The Virtual File System Switch provides all file system independent
functionality, such as path lookup, handling of opened files with the current offset for reads
1http://www.isse.uni-augsburg.de/software/kiv/
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POSIX Specification
specification of the interface, input/output behavior and crash-safety guarantees
Virtual File System Switch
path lookup, access right checking and paging
Flash File System Core
orchestration of journal and index and high-level recovery from crashes
Transactional Journal





(de-)serialization of journal transactions and B+-tree nodes and mapping to block structure,
write-back caching of byte representation
Superblock, Device Layout & Commit Atomicity
superblock and several internal data structures are written during a commit
Erase Block Manager
bad block management and wear-leveling
Flash Driver Specification
assumptions about hardware characteristics and failures
Figure 2.2: High-level Overview over the Flashix File System: At the highest level the POSIX
Specification formalizes the guarantees given by Flashix. At the lowest level the Flash Driver
Specification precisely expresses the assumptions about the hardware.
and writes, and segmentation of files into individual pages. Path lookup traverses the directory
structure of the file system until the requested file or directory is found. The VFS communicates
with the Flash File System Core and requests information about individual file system objects.
A file system object is either an inode, a directory entry or a page of a file. An inode holds
meta data, such as access times or permissions, about one specific file or directory. A directory
entry forms the edge of the directory tree. It stores the name of the directory entry and
connects the inode of the parent directory with the child inode.
The Flash File System Core implements a journaling and log-structured file system [116]
in order to cope with power failures and with the write characteristics of flash hardware.
Updates of file system objects are written out-of-place, i.e., the old version of a file system
object is not overwritten, but a new version is written to a sequential journal. The journal
essentially stores all updates to file system objects since the last commit. The current version
of a file system object is located with an index, implemented as a wandering B+-tree. The
operations of a file system usually do not only modify a single file system object. The creation
of a file for example updates the parent directory inode, and adds a new directory entry and
a new file inode. Atomicity of these three updates with respect to crashes is guaranteed by
employing a transactional journal.
The transactional journal ensures that transactions are indeed atomic with respect to
power failures, i.e., partially written transactions need to be detected and discarded. The
layer also performs garbage collection of blocks with a lot of obsolete versions of file system
objects.
The persistence layer serializes individual file system objects and ensures that partially
written file system objects are detected. It employs a page-sized write-back cache, the write-
buffer, to write serialized file system objects to a flash block. This buffer is necessary, because
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flash hardware allows page-aligned writes within a block only. The buffer increases memory
utilization and performance by around a factor of two. However, the effect of losing a part
of the data is visible across the entire file system. At each level above the write-buffer, the
effect of a power failure corresponds to a retraction of several operations and a re-execution
of one operation up to the level of the POSIX specification. Such a write-buffer is used in
most journaling file systems and is therefore not unique to flash memory or Flashix. Its effect
is the main motivation for the component semantics of Ch. 4, which implicitly propagate the
effect of a power failure of an order-preserving, write-back cache upwards an entire hierarchy
of components. An order-preserving cache writes data to persistent storage in the order of
the client’s requests.
Conceptually below the write-buffer component, the first few blocks of the flash device
are reserved for the superblock and two versions of the commit data structures. The commit
data structures are written during a file system commit and consist of an on-flash version of
the index and several other internal data structures. Atomicity of the commit is guaranteed
by provisioning space for two versions of the data structures. The data structures are written
out-of-place and if successful, then a final, atomic write to the superblock switches from the
old version of the commit data structures to the new version. The commit data structures
are also write-back cached, since all updates are first performed in main memory and only
during a commit a new version is persisted.
The lowest layer is the erase block manager. It manages bad blocks, erases blocks asyn-
chronously in the background and performs wear-leveling. In case of errors during writing
or reading, the layer tries to move the contents of an erase block to a new location. The
erase block manager thereby increases the reliability of flash hardware significantly and forms
the basis of a robust flash file system. In order to transparently move blocks and perform
wear-leveling, an abstraction of logical erase blocks is presented to clients. Internally, a
mapping from logical to physical erase blocks is maintained. This mapping is also write-back
cached, i.e., updates to the version of the mapping in main memory are not immediately
persisted. The in-RAM and on-flash version of the mapping correspond only once all blocks
where an asynchronous erasure was requested are actually erased.
The Flashix project is a team effort and this thesis does not contribute the implementation
and verification of all the concepts and aspects shown in Fig. 2.2. Specifically, the POSIX
specification, the implementation of VFS, the wandering B+-tree as an index and the Flash
File System Core are contributed by the author’s colleagues Gidon Ernst [43] and Andreas
Schierl [121]. Ch. 6 details the specific components that form the contribution of this thesis
with respect to the Flashix file system.
2.2 Code Generation & Linux Integration
The components are modeled in KIV as abstract programs over algebraic data types and are
not immediately executable on normal hardware. Code is generated from the models and
integrated into Linux-based operating systems. For initial testing and debugging Scala [103]
code is generated, which provides built-in support for algebraic data types and runs on the
Java Virtual Machine (= JVM). The generated code is then integrated via the File System in
Userspace (= FUSE, [125]) Linux kernel module, which facilitates developing file systems as
an application outside of the Linux kernel. FUSE is usable from Scala with the Java bindings
called FUSE-j [83]. The left-hand side of Fig. 2.3 shows the FUSE integration. The generated
code of Flashix itself is around 7.3kLoC, and the integration with FUSE accounts for an
additional 0.7kLoC.
However, Scala is obviously a bit slower and not suited for small embedded devices, which
is usually targeted by a file system for raw flash. Therefore, C code is generated for the
Flashix file system, too. It is integrated via FUSE similarly to the Scala integration as well
as directly into Linux as a kernel module. The right-hand side of Fig. 2.3 shows the direct
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Figure 2.3: FUSE-based (left) and Direct Integration (right) of Flashix into Linux-based
Operating Systems: The dotted line represents address space boundaries. The FUSE-based
implementation is path-based and therefore the Virtual File System Switch model (= VFS)
is used. The direct integration is inode-based and uses the Flash File System Core (= FFSC).
integration. In the direct integration one of the components of Flashix, namely the Virtual
File System Switch, is replaced by the corresponding implementation of the Linux kernel.
The C code for the file system itself has around 13.4kLoC, the FUSE-based integration and
kernel integration add an additional 1.9kLoC and 2.5kLoC, respectively.
According to the developers of FUSE, the integration of a file system via FUSE is
significantly slower compared to a direct integration as e.g. observed by [112] and our own
measurements. Note that this depends on the workload and on whether hardware latency is
the problem or memory bandwidth, e.g. if a flash device is only simulated in memory then
hardware latency obviously plays no role and FUSE becomes significantly slower due to a lot
more context switches and memory copying operations.
As already shown in Ernst [43], the Flashix file system is comparable to UBIFS with respect
to performance for microbenchmarks. However, in benchmark tools such as iozone2 [100]
Flashix is still an order of magnitude slower than UBIFS. The reason is that it does not
yet use the write-back cache of the VFS of Linux, or a comparable write-back cache. Initial
experiments with a modified kernel integration, which additionally uses the VFS cache but is
not yet complete, suggest that the performance is then en par with UBIFS. These write-back
caches are, however, not in the scope of this thesis, but are currently being modeled and
proven correct. A detailed performance analysis of Flashix therefore remains future work.
2.3 Related Work
An empiric study of Linux file system bugs of Lu et al. [88] shows that most errors in file
systems (around 90%) are either categorized as semantic, concurrency or memory management.
In a correctness by construction approach most of these errors are impossible. The fourth
kind of error, namely the return of wrong error codes, however, is still possible, because an
abstract specification usually allows for all low-level errors, such as ENOSPC, to be returned.
Log-structured file systems first appeared in Rosenblum et al. [116]. A log-structure has
since been integrated in several file systems. Most notably the flash file systems JFFS [135],
JFFS2 and UBIFS [67] use a log-structure to deal with the write characteristics of flash
hardware and as a measure for the recovery from power failures. The more general form of a
2http://www.iozone.org/
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journaling file system is quite prevalent in file system for hard disk. For example NTFS and
Ext3 [130] both employ the technique.
Prabhakaran et al. [111] have tested several traditional file systems with respect to
failures by injecting disk failures and found that most file systems handle recovery from
failure inadequately and inconsistently. With their gained experience, they developed the
file system ixt3 based on ext3 with improved robustness. Ridge et al. [115] developed the
model-based testing framework SibylFS for POSIX-compliant file systems.
With model checking Yang et al. [140] could find 32 bugs in several Linux file system in
total, all of which could lead to unrecoverable loss of data. Model checking is also applied to
the Virtual File System Switch of Linux in [54] by manually extracting a model from the C
code and applying SPIN [66]. The approach ensures that the model maintains certain integrity
properties with respect to its internal data structures and that the model is dead-lock free.
In [97] static analysis is applied to the compiled code of the Linux VFS, which proves the
absence of memory management related bugs, such as dereferencing of invalid pointers, for
several of its operations. Koskinen et al [80] use model checking to ensure that a system is
crash recoverable. They apply the tool to large database system such as PostgreSQL and
inject several faults.
Marić and Sprenger [90] model crashes as exceptions, where the exception handler performs
a recovery of the system. The system they consider is a sequential, transactional memory
manager. The interrupt operator in CSP [92] could be used for this purpose. In [92] algebraic
laws for the interrupt operator are proven correct.
In [101] a variant of separation logic [114] is introduced that facilitates reasoning about
volatile and durable memory by using a separate formula for each. In [124] a logic for file
systems is introduced. The logic also separates formulas that refer to the volatile state
from formulas about the durable state. This allows them to express data integrity at a very
high-level of abstraction.
In [123] the Yggdrasil tool is introduced, which automatically checks whether a file system
is a crash refinement of their file system specification. The approach employs SMT solvers as
a reasoning engine. An asynchronous disk model, which potentially re-order writes, is used.
The top-level specification does not allow for write-back caching across several operations.
With the tool they verify their file system Yxv6.
Bornhold et al. [18] provides a model for POSIX that includes a specification of power
failures. Several correctness criteria, termed crash-consistency models, are introduced. They de-
veloped the Ferrite tool, which facilitates checking Linux file system against crash-consistency
models. [110] presents an overview over the problems associated with crashes and re-ordering
of modern file systems from the perspective of application writers.
Several other projects produced a verified file system, too.
FSCQ [27, 28, 26] is a file system for hard disks and is proven functionally correct and
crash-safe in the Coq proof assistant [17]. Its design follows the xv6 file system [35]. A novel
form of Hoare logic, termed Crash Hoare logic, is used and augments standard Hoare triples
with crash conditions. Via Coq’s code extraction Haskell code is automatically derived from
the specifications.
Amani et al. [77, 11, 9] develop the Bilbyfs file system. The file system is for flash memory,
and uses a design similar to Flashix. Bilbyfs also employs a write-buffer to deal with the write
characteristics of flash hardware. The focus of the research is the correctness of the C code
generation. Their approach to specification facilitates the automatic generation of C code and
the generation of an accompanying proof of correctness with the tool Cogent [10, 102]. The
specification and verification is conducted in the interactive proof assistant Isabelle/HOL [99].
Crash-safety is outside the scope of the verification.
Damchoom et al. [39, 37, 36] use Event-B [7] to develop a verified flash file system
with incremental refinement and machine decomposition. Concurrency of read and write
operations on the level of AFS is covered by the verification. Their idea is to split a read
and write operation into several concurrent read and write operations of smaller sizes. The
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synchronization between threads is implicitly performed by the semantics of Event-B models.
Java code is derived manually from the Event-B models.
There are several other large-scale verification efforts. Leroy [82] proved that the C compiler
CompCert, which translates a subset of the C programming language to PowerPC, is correct.
The CakeML project3 [81, 126] provides a verified compiler for a subset of StandardML to
several processor instruction sets. NICTA has produced a verified operating system kernel [78].








Summary. This Chapter summarizes the theoretical basis for this thesis. The syntax
and semantics of programs is presented and the utilized logics and tooling are introduced.
The logics are supported by the interactive proof assistant KIV.
Publications. The description of the KIV verification system and its support for
algebraic specifications, data types and sequential programs is based on [44]. The
Chapter extends the logic RGITL [120] with atomic sections and assertions.
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3.1 Interval Temporal Logic
The logic RGITL [120, 127] integrates rely/guarantee reasoning and interval temporal
logic [25]. It is implemented in the interactive proof assistant KIV [44] and has been used
successfully to verify lock-free and linearizable algorithms and data structures.
The logic is based on intervals with system and environment steps with static variables x
and flexible variables X. Static variables are written lowercase and flexible variables start
with an uppercase letter. Static variables are used to capture the value of a flexible variable
at some point in time. An interval I = (I(0), Ib(0), I(0)′, I(1), . . .) is a finite or infinite
sequence of alternating system and environment steps. A system transition starts in state
I(i) and yields state I(i)′. It is blocked if Ib(i) is tt. The transitions from I(i)′ to I(i+ 1) are
performed by the environment. The last transition is always an environment transition. Each
state of the interval assigns a value to each static and flexible variable. For static variables
the value of a variable is the same in every state of the interval. The length of an interval I
is denoted by # I and defined as the number of system transitions if the number of states is
finite. Therefore an interval with n system steps has 2 · n+ 1 states. The first state of an
interval is often written as I.first. If the interval I is finite then I.last denotes its last state,
i.e., the state I(# I).
The concatenation of two intervals I0 and I1 is written I0 o9I1. For finite I0, concatenation
is possible only if I1.first = I0.last holds. If I0 is infinite, then I0 o9I1 is equal to I0. The suffix
after n system and environment steps of an interval I is written I[n..]. Similarly, the prefix up
to and including the n-th and environment step is denoted by I|n. The infix I[n..m] is defined
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as (I|m)[n..] for n ≤ m.
The expressions and formulas of RGITL include the standard constructs of predicate
logic and interval temporal logic, such as □φ and ⋄φ. Flexible variables can be unprimed,
primed and double primed, i.e., X, X ′ and X ′′ are valid formulas. The expressions X and X ′
refer to the value of the variable after resp. after the system step, and X ′′ evaluates to the
value after the environment transition. For example the formula □
(
X ′ = X + 1 ∧X ′′ = X
)
states that the system steps always increase the value of X by one. The environment steps
leave the value of X unmodified.
Substitution of the variable x by the term t in a formula φ is written φtx. Substitution
of a static variable x with a value v in an entire interval I is denoted by I(x ↦→ v). The
value of a flexible variable X in some state I(i) and I ′(i) of the interval is written I(i)(X)
and I ′(i)(X), respectively. Evaluation of a predicate logic expression e in a state I(i) of
the interval is written JeK(I(i)). Evaluation of a temporal logic formula φ over an interval
I is written I |= φ. For predicate logic formulas φ evaluation in a state I(i) is denoted by
I(i) |= φ.
Definition 3.1 (Empty Environment). An interval has an empty environment if all environ-
ment steps leave all variables unmodified, i.e., if I ′(n) = I(n+ 1) holds for all n < # I.
Tuples are written with angle brackets ⟨_⟩ in the following. The empty tuple is ⟨⟩. A
variable x of tuple type is indicated by an underline and its individual components are
referred to as xi.
3.2 Program Syntax & Semantics
This section first defines the syntax of programs. The semantics of a program p is given by
the set of intervals of the previous section where the system steps satisfy the changes to
variables made by p.
Definition 3.2 (Program Syntax). A program follows the syntax given by the following
grammar.
p, q := X := t simultaneous assignment
| p; q sequential composition
| choose* X with φ in p ifnone q nondeterministic choice
| if* φ then p else q if-then-else
| while φ do { p } while
| Proc(t; X) procedure call
| atomic φ { p } atomic block





| p∗ finite or infinite iteration
All expression contained in programs are predicate logic expressions that do not contain
primed or double-primed variables or temporal logic constructs. The condition φ ≡ true may
be omitted from the nondeterministic choice and atomic program constructs.
The usual program constructs of an imperative programming language are part of the
syntax as defined by Def. 3.2 with a few alterations and additions.
Assignments might assign several variables simultaneously.
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A choose*-program introduces several local variables X , which satisfy the condition φ,
and executes p. If no such variables exist then q is executed. Note that the asterisk (*) in
choose* denotes that choosing the variables requires no extra step before p or q is executed.
This is useful for specification purposes and is e.g. required for the semantics of components as
discussed in Ch. 4 and 13. We will define a corresponding version choose as an abbreviation.
Atomic blocks atomic φ { p } serve two purposes. Firstly, the program blocks until the
condition φ is satisfied. We call φ the guard of the atomic block. Afterwards, the program
p is executed in a single, indivisible step. This facilitates modeling mutexes for example.
Locking a mutex blocks until the mutex is free and immediately afterwards locks the mutex.
Atomic blocks with a waiting condition are also composable into larger atomic blocks in
order to move from a very fine-grained verification to a sequential verification if only a single
atomic block is left. This technique is discussed in Ch. 5 where atomicity with respect to
power failures is proven and in Ch. 13 where atomicity in the context of concurrent threads
is examined.
A call to the procedure Proc with input parameters t and reference parameters X is
written Proc(t; X). The value parameters may be arbitrary expressions, but the reference
parameters must be variables. Modifications of input variables by the procedure are invisible
to the caller, only changes to reference variables can be observed. The types of the actual
parameters of the call must match the types of the formal parameters in the declaration of the
procedure. Every procedure Proc has a declaration of the form Proc(Y ; Z ) { p } with disjoint
lists of variables Y and Z , where p is a program with free(p) ⊆ Y ∪Z . The free variables of a
program p, written free(p), are all variables of p that are not bound by a choose*-statement.
Thus, there is no global state that is implicitly passed to a procedure and (potential) effects
of a procedure call are syntactically visible at the call site.
An assertion assert φ ensures that φ holds before a next statement p is executed. If φ
is not satisfied then the program does not terminate and stutters. The aim of assertions is
to ensure that they are guaranteed to hold in every execution. Then φ may be used as an
assumption for further steps in the verification. This is employed in Ch. 4 and 13 to prove
some property about the program p, where p is a small part of an procedure of an entire
component, using φ as an assumption and then infer that p may be replaced by atomic { p }
in the context of the entire component. We will ensure that assertions hold by verifying




p of n threads for a fixed number n, interleaves the execution
of several programs p with free, unassigned variable Tid. The interleaving is weakly fair, i.e.,
it is assumed that the scheduler will run a thread that does not block persistently, eventually.
The precise definition of interleaving of intervals is given in [120].1
Iteration p∗ finitely or infinitely often executes p in sequence. The constructs is only used
to specify the semantics of a component precisely, but are not used in regular programs.
Notation (Program Substitution). The substitution of variables X by variables Y is denoted
by p{X ↦→ Y }. Standard rules for renaming of local variables apply, i.e., the capture of any
of the variables Y by choose*-statements needs to be avoided. Similarly, p{q ↦→ q′} denotes
the program p where all subprograms q are syntactically substituted by q′.
Definition 3.3 (Extended Program Syntax). In addition to the program constructs of
1Technically, [120] gives semantics for the interleaving of two intervals. However, the procedure spawnn
can be used to construct a system of n interleaved threads with corresponding thread identifiers.
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Def. 3.2 the left-hand side of
skip ≡ ⟨⟩ := ⟨⟩
choose X with φ in p ifnone q ≡ choose* X with φ in { skip; p } ifnone { skip; q }
let* X = t in p ≡ choose* X with X = t in p
let X = t in p ≡ choose X with X = t in p
p ∨ q ≡ choose* B : B in if* B then p else q
if φ then p else q ≡ if* φ then { skip; p } else { skip; q }
if φ then p ≡ if φ then p else skip
abort ≡ while true do { skip }
may also be used as an abbreviation for the right-hand side.
Note that for the let and let* abbreviations an additional, omitted renaming of variables
is necessary to avoid capture of variables in the expressions t.
Definition 3.4 (Regular and Sequential Programs). A program that does not use the
iteration construct of Def. 3.2 and uses if and choose instead of if* and choose* is a regular
program. A regular program that does not use the fair interleaving is sequential.
The semantics of programs is based on the intervals of Sec. 3.1.
Definition 3.5 (Program Semantics). The semantics of programs I |= [p]X is given by
the largest fixpoint of the derivation system depicted in Fig. 3.1. The variables X are the
frame assumption of the program. All variables outside of the frame assumption are modified
arbitrarily in system steps. The variables of the frame are assigned according to the program.
In following chapters the frame assumption is usually omitted, since all variables of a
component with input and output variables are usually used as a frame assumption.
The largest fixpoint is chosen to capture infinite runs of while loops and recursive calls.
Note that all rules are productive, i.e., at least one state is added either directly or indirectly
(e.g. calls and while) by every rule.
Remark 3.6. In our previous work [120] a shallow embedding of programs into temporal
logic is used, by giving a temporal logic formula that defines the semantics of every program
construct. Fig. 3.1 depicts a direct, deep embedding of programs with the same semantics.
This is more appropriate in the context of this thesis, since its focus are components expressed
as programs.
Assignments (3.1) in Fig. 3.1 set the values of the assigned variables Y to the values on
the left-hand side. All variables X \Y of the frame assumption are left unchanged and all
other variables may change arbitrarily.
The rule for sequential composition of programs (3.2) just reduces to the sequential
composition of the individual intervals.
The rule (3.3) for the choose*-statement chooses a sequence of values σ for each of the
variables Y and for each state of the interval. In the initial state the sequence of values σ
must satisfy the condition φ. The changes to the local variables Y are therefore invisible in
the global interval. If no values that satisfy φ exists, then the ifnone-branch is executed.
The rules (3.5) for if* either executes the if-branch or the else-branch, depending on the
evaluation of the condition φ.
Iteration (3.7) either terminates immediately or unfolds the program once. While loops (3.7)
are defined similarly. Fair interleaving (3.10) reduces to fair interleaving of the respective
intervals.
A procedure call (3.8) unfolds the definition of the procedure, binds the input variables to
local variables and substitutes the reference parameters in the body of the procedure. Note
that before and after the body is executed an additional stuttering step is added. These steps
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# I = 1, I(0)′(Y ) = JeK(I(0)),
I(0)′(X \Y ) = I(0)(X \Y ) and
Ib(0) = ffI |= [Y := e]X (3.1)
I0 |= [p]X I1 |= [q]X
I1.first = I0.last or # I0 =∞
I0 o9I1 |= [p; q]X (3.2)
I(Y ↦→ σ) |= [p]X,Y
I(Y ↦→ σ).first |= φ
I |= [choose* Y with φ in p ifnone q]X (3.3)
I |= [q]X
I.first |= ∀Y .¬φ
I |= [choose* Y with φ in p ifnone q]X (3.4)
I |= [p]X
I(0) |= φ
I |= [if* φ then p else q]X
I |= [q]X
I(0) ̸|= φ
I |= [if* φ then p else q]X (3.5)
# I = 0
I |= [p∗]X
I |= [p; p∗]X
I |= [p∗]X (3.6)
I |= [skip; p; while φ do { p }]X
I(0) |= φ
I |= [while φ do { p }]X
I |= [skip]X
I(0) ̸|= φ
I |= [while φ do { p }]X (3.7)
I |= [let Y = t in p{Z ↦→ X}; skip]X Procedure Call
Proc(Y ; Z ) { p }I |= [Proc(t; X)]X (3.8)
# I = 0, I(0) |= φ
I |= [assert φ]X
I |= [abort]X
I(0) ̸|= φ
I |= [assert φ]X
(3.9)










I[1..] |= [atomic φ { p }]X I(0) ̸|= φ, Ib(0) = tt,
I(0) = I(0)′I |= [atomic φ { p }]X (3.11)
I0 |= [p]X I(0) |= φ,# I0 ̸=∞,# I = 1
I(0) = I0.first, Ib(0) = ff, I ′(0) = I ′0(# I0− 1)
I0 with empty environmentI |= [atomic φ { p }]X (3.12)
I0 |= [p]X I |= [p]X I0(0) |= φ,# I0 =∞,
I0 with empty
environmentI |= [atomic φ { p }]X (3.13)
Figure 3.1: Derivation System for the Program Semantics I |= [p]X
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Γ, ψ ⊢ [p; q]φ,∆
Γ ⊢ [atomic ψ { p }; q]φ,∆
Γ ⊢ ψ,∆ Γ, ψ ⊢ (|p; q|)φ,∆
Γ ⊢ (|atomic ψ { p }; q|)φ,∆
Γ, ψ ⊢ [p]φ,∆
Γ ⊢ [assert ψ; p]φ,∆
Γ ⊢ ψ,∆ Γ, ψ ⊢ (|p|)φ,∆
Γ ⊢ (|assert ψ; p|)φ,∆
Figure 3.2: Dynamic Logic Rules for Atomic Blocks and Assertions
with (|_|) _ ∈ {⟨_⟩_, ⟨|_|⟩_}
are used in Ch. 4 as a trigger for invocation and return events. Note that variables might
need to be renamed to avoid capture of variables.
An assertion (3.9) either immediately terminates if the condition φ holds, or stutters
infinitely.
The semantics of atomic is given by the rules (3.11), (3.12) and (3.13). The idea is that
atomic φ { p } blocks until φ is satisfied, then a terminating, sequential run of p is condensed
into one system step. If p has non-terminating sequential runs, then the semantics allows
arbitrary, runs of p as runs of atomic φ { p } if φ is satisfied. The intuition is that such
atomic blocks are essentially ill-used if the inner program has non-terminating runs in the
initial state. However, there are several properties of interest for non-termination: First, a
non-terminating atomic block should make intermediate states observable, otherwise the
atomic block could omit behavior in the event of power failures. Secondly, a non-terminating
atomic block should not allow arbitrary behavior.
In order to consider crashes we use the prefix semantics of programs as given by Def. 3.7.
Definition 3.7 (Prefix Semantics). The prefix semantics JpK of program p for some given
frame assumption X are defined by
I ∈ JpK ⇔ I o9I ′ |= [p]X for some interval I
′.
3.3 Dynamic Logic
The three standard modalities from Dynamic Logic [58] [p]φ (partial correctness), ⟨p⟩φ
(trace existence) and ⟨|p|⟩φ (total correctness) can be defined over the semantics of the
previous Sec. 3.2 by considering intervals with empty environment only. Note that only static
variables x are allowed in the program p of any dynamic logic formula (|p|)φ. However, in
the post-condition arbitrary formulas are permitted.
I |= [p]φ ⇐⇒ ∀I0. I0 finite with empty environment, I0(X) = I(x), I0 |= [p{x ↦→ X}]X
implies I(x ↦→ I0.last(X)) |= φ
I |= ⟨p⟩φ ⇐⇒ ∃I0. I0 finite with empty environment, I0(X) = I(x), I0 |= [p{x ↦→ X}]X
and I(x ↦→ I0.last(X)) |= φ
I |= ⟨|p|⟩φ ⇐⇒ ∀I0. I0 with empty environment with I0(X) = I(x), I0 |= [p{x ↦→ X}]X
implies I0 finite and I(x ↦→ I0.last(X)) |= φ
The variables of the program p are x and X are fresh, corresponding flexible variables.
Note that the postcondition is evaluated over an interval, namely the interval where the
values of the static variables x are replaced by their values after executing p. Thus, the
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ΓxX , rely(x,X), runs(X) ⊢ ψ,∆
x
X
ΓxX , rely(X , x)
⊢ ⟨|p{X ↦→ y}|⟩
(
⟨rely(X ′,X ′′), guar(X ,X ′), inv(X), runs(X), X := y; q⟩X φ
)
,∆xX
Γ ⊢ ⟨rely(X ′,X ′′), guar(X ,X ′), inv(X), runs(X), atomic ψ { p }; q⟩X φ,∆
Γ ⊢ ψ,∆ Γ ⊢ ⟨rely(X ′,X ′′), guar(X ,X ′), inv(X), runs(X), p⟩X φ,∆
Γ ⊢ ⟨rely(X ′,X ′′), guar(X ,X ′), inv(X), runs(X), assert ψ; p⟩X φ,∆
Figure 3.3: R/G Rules for Atomic Blocks and Assertions
postcondition is not restricted to pure predicate logic, but can again contain dynamic logic
formulas, temporal logic formulas and the rely/guarantee formulas introduced in Sec. 3.4.
Assertions and atomic blocks play a key role in the verification methodology of Ch. 5 and
Ch. 13. Therefore, Fig. 3.2 depicts the dynamic logic rules for each of the three modalities
and the two program constructs. The rules of dynamic logic essentially perform symbolic
execution of the program, which transforms the entire program into predicate logic formulas.
A proof of the postcondition is then performed in pure predicate logic.
3.4 Rely/Guarantee Reasoning & Calculus
This section introduces rely/guarantee reasoning and presents a calculus for it for the programs
of Def. 3.2. Rely/Guarantee reasoning was first introduced by Jones [73] and later on extended
by Xu et al. [138] to cover deadlock-freedom and divergence-freedom.
Rely/guarantee reasoning is embedded into the temporal logic of Sec. 3.1 via the R/G
formula[
rely(X ′,X ′′), guar(X ,X ′), inv(X), p
]
X φ
for partial correctness. The formula states that as long as the environment steps satisfy
the rely condition rely(X ′,X ′′), the program p satisfies its guarantee condition guar(X ,X ′).
Furthermore, the environment as well as the program p propagate the invariant inv(X). If
the program p terminates, then the post-condition φ holds.
The rely/guarantee for (a variant of) total correctness is
⟨rely(X ′,X ′′), guar(X ,X ′), inv(X), runs(X), p⟩X φ
and ensures, in addition to partial correctness as above, that when all environment steps
satisfy the rely condition, then steps of p only block if the runs condition runs(X) is violated,
and that then there are only finitely many non-blocked steps in an execution of p.
If runs(X) ≡ false is chosen, then the formula ensures divergence-freedom of p, i.e., the
property that the program p only performs finitely many non-blocked steps, but might block
arbitrarily.
Similar to dynamic logic, the rely/guarantee calculus also performs symbolic execution of
the program with additional intermediate proof obligations for the guarantee and invariant.
Fig. 3.3 depicts the rules of the R/G calculus for atomic blocks and assertions. For atomic
blocks the current assumptions Γ and ∆ about flexible variables X are replaced with static
variables x and now refer to the state x before arbitrarily many blocked steps. It is only known
that these steps were rely steps, since the system steps only blocked and the rely is reflexive
and transitive. The atomic block itself is executed in the dynamic logic and calculates a new
state y. The actual step in the interval is performed by the assignment X := y.
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⊢ rely(tid, x, x)
⊢ rely(tid, x0, x1) ∧ rely(tid, x1, x2)→ rely(tid, x0, x2)
Γ ⊢ pre(Tid,X),∆
⊢ pre(tid, x0) ∧ rely(tid, x0, x1)→ pre(tid, x1)
⊢ tid0 ̸= tid1 ∧ guar(tid0, x0, x1)→ rely(tid1, x0, x1)
pre(Tid,X) ⊢ ⟨rely(Tid,X ′,X ′′), guar(Tid,X ,X ′), inv(X), false, p⟩X true




Figure 3.4: R/G Decomposition Rule for a Concurrent System
The rule facilitates the use and reuse of lemmas about (sub)programs expressed in dynamic
logic, which are by far easier to prove.
The rule for assertions in the figure just ensures that the assertion holds before the
program p is executed.
In order to decompose a parallel system with an empty environment into proof obligations
for individual threads, the rule depicted in Fig. 3.4 is used. The rule ensures that the system
is divergence-free. The premises state that the rely condition must be reflexive and transitive,
the precondition must hold initially and must be stable over steps of other threads, the
guarantee condition of one thread must imply the rely of any other thread, and the program
p itself sustains the guarantee and invariant. In Ch. 4 we will only show divergence-freedom




Concurrent & Sequential, Crash-Aware Components
Summary. This Chapter introduces a specification mechanism for concurrent and
sequential components that are aware of and affected by power cuts or other fatal,
system-wide crashes. The components are state-based. The state is encapsulated and
hidden from the clients of the component. A correctness criterion for crash-aware
components with respect to a sequential specification is given. The criterion facilitates
refinement of components and admits component substitution to construct large
crash-aware systems, such as file systems, in a modular fashion.
Publications. This Chapter is based on the publications [109, 45, 47, 107]. It extends
the semantics that we give in [107] to concurrency and adds internal operations with
guards.
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4.1 Crash-Aware Components
This Chapter introduces a formalism that facilitates developing large systems that need to
provide guarantees in the event of a power cut or other fatal crashes.
File systems as well as database management systems are an example of this. They both
need to ensure that a consistent state is recovered after a power failure or system crash. For
performance, however, these systems routinely cache parts of the data. Only eventually the
data is persisted to the storage medium. These systems therefore are not able to recover the
state prior to a crash completely. From a verification perspective it is therefore necessary to
be able to express what exactly happens in the event of a power failure, i.e., which information
exactly is lost. This is not only a problem of expressive power, it is also important that the
employed specification mechanism is understandable to users and that it makes verification
tractable or at least facilitates it. The effect of a power failure is modeled as two distinct parts:
First the effect of the crash is applied, and afterwards the component’s recovery operation is
run.
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A second aspect that is crucial for the development of large systems, is that they can be
composed in a modular fashion from smaller building blocks: We want to abstract from a part
A of the system and only use a (much simpler) specification ASpec of A for the verification
of a property P of another part M that uses A. We express the notion that M uses A as
M A. Compositionality of the verification method means that if
1. ASpec is a specification of A, written ASpec ⊑ A (A refines ASpec), and
2. M ASpec has property φ
then the actual system of interest M A has property φ, too.
We use components in order to implement system parts such as A and M and to specify
them, i.e., ASpec is also expressed as a component. Composing several components again
yields another component. Thus, components are used in this thesis as an implementation
and specification mechanism for individual parts of a large systems and for a composition of
such parts.
The remainder of this section defines the syntax of components. Then in Sec. 4.2 several
small examples are discussed that highlight the two specification mechanisms for crashes.
Section 4.3 presents the semantics of a component in detail. Section 4.4 defines the correctness
criterion we prove for components and Sec. 4.5 ensures that a specification component can
be replaced by a correct implementation component. Finally, Sec. 4.6 shows how we ensure
that invariants hold for a component and its subcomponents.
A component consists of several interface and internal operations over a common state.
The state itself is hidden from clients.
Definition 4.1 (Interface and Internal Operations). An interface operation
Op(in : In; x : St, out : Out) pre φ(in, x) { p }
over the state variables x consists of a precondition given as a formula φ and an implementation
p that takes the variables in of types In and the state x as input and produces an output in
the variables out of types Out and updates the state x. An internal operation
IOp(; x : St) guard φ(x) { p }
consists of a guard φ and a program p that is triggered only if the guard is satisfied.
Interface as well as internal operations are just procedures with preconditions and guards.
The program that corresponds to the interface operation Op is {assert φ(in, x); p }. For the
internal operation the program is { if* guard(x) then p }. Preconditions and guards are only
treated specially in the semantics of Sec. 4.3, the verification in Sec. 4.6 will always ensure
that preconditions are met by the caller.
Definition 4.2 (Crash-Aware Component). A crash-aware component C is a tuple
C =
(
xC : StC , initC , {OpCi }i∈I, {IOpCk }k∈K, syncC , crash




• state variables xC of types StC ,
• an initialization operation initC ,
• interface operations OpCi for i ∈ I,
• internal operations IOpCk for k ∈ K,
• a predicate sync(xC ) characterizing synchronized states,
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• a predicate crash(xC0 , xC1 ) characterizing the effect of a power cut,
• a recovery operation recover that reconstructs a desirable state after a crash, and
• a (possibly empty) set of direct subcomponents Cl with a state disjoint from x and
pairwise disjoint from each other.
The program associated with all operations must be regular and sequential. All operations
operate over and preconditions are defined over the combined state space of C and all its
direct subcomponents Cl (and so on recursively). However, guards may only refer to the
state variables xC .
Notation (_C and _̂C ). We refer to the state, operations, predicate and subcomponents of a
component C by adding a superscript _C , if the referred component C is not clear from the
context. For example initC refers to the initialization operation of component C .
We refer to the variables and predicates of the combination of the component C with its
subcomponents (recursively) by _̂C . For example x̂C refers to the disjoint union of the state
variables of component C and all of its subcomponents. For predicates p the notation p̂C
refers to the logical conjunction of the individual predicates of the component C and all its
subcomponents. If the component is clear from context we write _̂.
A component can be thought of an extension of standard data types [60, 40] and concurrent
objects [62] with crash behavior and a recovery operation. It provides an interface of operations
with input and output to a client. Before using a component the initialization operation
needs to be called. In between calls to interface operations the component might trigger
internal operations when their guard is satisfied. An example for such an operation that
needs to be executed in the background is garbage collection and wear-level in the context of
a file system for flash memory.
At every point in the execution of an operation a power cut or fatal crash might happen.
The immediate effect is described by the two predicates sync and crash: The basic idea is
that sync describes synchronized states, which are almost immune to power failures. In the
event of a power failure the component is then taken back to a previous synchronized state,
which rescinds or retracts several of the operations before the power failure. Afterwards
only a residual effect characterized by the predicate crash is visible. We allow that the
predicate crash is partial, which means that a power failure only needs to be considered in or
is observable in a desirable and more easily understood set of states. At a later point when
the system restarts the component has a chance to recover its internal state via the recover
operation. Afterwards the component can again be used by a client calling its operations.
The exact workings of a power failure and the relationship between the two predicates are
discussed in more detail in Sec. 4.3.
C Cl
Figure 4.1: Component C
with Subcomponents Cl
In order to perform its task a component C may use its
subcomponents Cl. A component C and its subcomponents
Cl are in the following visualized as shown in Fig. 4.1. The
notation is similar to UML component diagrams [5]: The gripper
symbol denotes the required interface of the component C
and the lollipop symbol denotes the provided interface of
Cl. Both interfaces may be connected if they match, denoted
by the combined symbol with the restriction detailed in Def. 4.3 on what constitutes
a weakly admissible composition of components. A stronger version of admissibility that
admits substitution of the subcomponents Cl is defined in Sec. 4.5. The composition then
provides the interface of C .
The component hierarchy forms a tree, because every subcomponent is part of the
surrounding component. Sharing a subcomponent across several client components is therefore
not possible. This would also require showing that the two clients’ use of the subcomponent do
not interfere with each other. In contrast to object-oriented design the component hierarchy
is statically known. It is not possible to add additional instances of components during the
system’s runtime.
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Definition 4.3 (Weak Admissibility). A component C is weakly admissible if and only if
1. no state variable of any subcomponent Cl is read from or written to directly in any of
the operations of C and vice versa (information hiding),
2. operations of C only call interface operations of its subcomponents or other auxiliary
operations of C ,
3. states after initialization and recovery must be synchronized states,
4. initialization and recovery of component C must call the corresponding operations of
all its subcomponents before any of their interface operations,
5. the synchronized states must be in the domain of the (potentially partial) crash
predicate, and
6. each subcomponent Cl is weakly admissible for each l ∈ L.
All of these properties except (3.) and (5.) can be checked statically. The property (3.) is
ensured by the invariant proofs of Sec. 4.6. For (5.) a simple predicate logic proof obligation
suffices.
If access to a state variable of a subcomponent is desired, then an operation providing
such access is required. Indirect access to the state of subcomponents therefore is possible. If
access to the state of a surrounding component is required, the state variable must be passed
as a regular input/output parameter to the subcomponent’s operation. Encapsulating the
state in this form is necessary to be able to replace components. Otherwise, substitution of
components depends on assignments to the state variables from the context (in this case the
surrounding component).
Note that Def. 4.3 implicitly prohibits callbacks, since C cannot call operations from its
surrounding component. Therefore, Cl cannot call C either.
We distinguish retracting from non-retracting components, only the latter make use of
the specification mechanism of synchronized states. The naming will be more apparent once
the semantics is discussed in more detail in Sec. 4.3.
Definition 4.4 ((Non-)Retracting Components). A component C is non-retracting if the
synchronized predicate syncC is equivalent to true. A component is called retracting otherwise.
Implementations are always non-retracting components and must allow power failures in
any intermediate state.
Definition 4.5 (Implementation Component). A component C is an implementation if and
only if it is non-retracting and the crash predicate crashC is total.
Specifications on the other hand must be atomic and may never block.
Definition 4.6 (Specification Component). A component A is a specification if and only if
each of its interface and internal operations consists of an atomic block, where the guard of
the atomic block is equivalent to true, and always terminates within the precondition.
The invariant proofs in Sec. 4.6 will ensure that a component is indeed a specification
component.
An easy way of understanding the crash predicate of implementation components C is
considering whether a state variable is modeled as if it resides in volatile memory. A state
variable therefore is part of the RAM state if and only if it may have an arbitrary value after
a crash and before the recovery.
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{ Storage.init(n); cnt := n }
interface operations
inc() { cnt := cnt + 1 }














Figure 4.2: Counter Component
CachedCounter
Counter Storage






init(n: N) { pcnt := n }
interface operations
store(n: N) { pcnt := n }






recover() { skip }
Figure 4.4: Storage Component
Definition 4.7 (RAM State of an Implementation). A state variable xCi is part of the RAM
state of an implementation component C with state variables xC = ⟨xC1 , . . . , xCn ⟩ if and only
if
∀xC , yC. crashC (xC , yC )→ ∀zCi . crashC (xC , yC0 , . . . , yCi−1, zCi , yCi+1, . . . , yCn )
holds.
Definition 4.8 (RAM Component). An implementation component C is a RAM component
if and only if the RAM state of C comprises the entire state of C.
Note that a component C is a RAM component if and only if the crash predicate crashC
is equivalent to true. A RAM component may contain a subcomponent that is not entirely
in RAM.
4.2 A Cached Counter as an Example
Before delving into the semantics of components in Sec. 4.3 this section shows several
simple sequential components as examples to further intuition. Fig. 4.3 depicts a sequential
system consisting of a component Counter that implements a counter that is persisted in the
component Storage in the background. The component CachedCounter is an abstraction of
the system, i.e., Counter Storage implements or refines the specification CachedCounter .
Refinement is indicated with the two blue dotted lines.
Storage The specification of the persistent storage is shown by Fig. 4.4. It features a state
variable pcnt for the value of the persisted counter. Two interface operations store and load
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are provided in order to access the stored counter. Initially, the persistent counter is set to a
given value. The effect of a power cut is characterized by the crash predicate
crash
pcnt′ = pcnt
which relates the state immediately after the power cut, denoted by pcnt′, to the state pcnt
right before the power cut. In this case the counter is unchanged by a power cut, which is
characteristic for persistent data. Recovery after a power cut then has to restore or repair
nothing.
The following component specification will just omit recover and initialization operations
with the body skip and predicates that are true, such as the synchronized predicate of
Storage.
Counter The component Counter of Fig. 4.2 uses the storage component and augments
it with a cached version of the counter (state cnt). It provides an increment operation inc,
which only increments the cached counter, and an operation get to read the value of the
cached counter. In the background (internal operation persist) the component persists
the cached counter to storage from time to time. On a power cut the value of the cached
counter is lost, i.e., set to an arbitrary value and the recovery has to restore the value from
the component Storage.
It might be useful or necessary to hold back on persisting a value until a condition φ(cnt),
shown in red in Fig. 4.2, is satisfied. This could increase performance or it might be inevitable
due to hardware limitations. For hard disks and flash memory writing is only allowed at
a certain granularity, namely at the level of sectors and pages, respectively. Note that the
precondition or guard does not imply that every value of cnt that satisfies φ(cnt) is persisted.
It just means that if persist is triggered then φ(cnt) is satisfied. If initially φ(cnt) also
holds then after every power cut we recover a state where φ(cnt) also holds.
The component Storage obviously is an abstract specification of a storage device. A real
implementation would need to serialize the counter to some byte representation before storing
it and deserialize the counter value from its byte representation after loading it. However,
this shows the strength of an approach that uses the same mechanism for specification
and implementation. We can later on provide another component that implements the
same functionality as Storage based on a real, byte-based storage medium and plug this
implementation into the component Counter without affecting its functionality or jeopardizing
its correctness.
CachedCounter (state-based) One possible way to abstract both components is shown
by the component CachedCounter in Fig. 4.5. The interface is the same as that of the Counter
with an operation for incrementing and reading the cached counter. The state collapses
both counters of the implementation into one state variable (code in black only). Whether
such a simplification of the state is adequate depends on what guarantees a client of the
CachedCounter expects in the event of a power failure.
If for example the client does not care at all what value the counter has after a crash, a
crash predicate of true is obviously sufficient. This would not even guarantee that the value
afterwards is in between the initial value of the counter and the value right before the power
failure. If on the other hand it is sufficient that the value after a crash is not greater than
before, the crash predicate given in Fig. 4.5 (black part only) can be used. The guarantee
that the counter after a power failure is in between its initial and last value requires the
additional state variable icnt for the initial value of the counter and the code depicted in
green to keep track of it.
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component CachedCounter
state




{ ccnt := n, icnt := n }
interface operations
inc() { ccnt := ccnt + 1 }
get(; n: N) { n := ccnt }
crash
icnt ≤ ccnt′ ≤ ccnt
∧ icnt′ = ccnt′
∧ φ(ccnt′)








{ ccnt := n, synced := true }
interface operations
inc() { ccnt := ccnt + 1, synced := false }








ccnt′ = ccnt ∧ synced ∧ φ(ccnt)
Figure 4.6: Cached Counter Component
(Operations-based)
If the precondition φ(cnt) of the internal operation persist in Fig. 4.2 is used, then the
abstraction can also ensure that a crash yields a state where this condition holds, as shown
in red in Fig. 4.5.
The approach we take here to specifying the behavior on a power cut is state-based, i.e., we
try to express the state transition undertaken during a crash by the state before and after
the crash. What is usually lost is how the state reached afterwards relates to the history
of the system. A second concern is that such a specification is usually quite difficult to
understand in a realistic setting with more complex components. Finally, in a verification
such an effect must be propagated upwards a component hierarchy explicitly at every step.
For these reasons, we now look at a different, more abstract method of specification for the
example component.
CachedCounter (operations-based) Another approach to specify a crash is in terms of
the operations executed before the power failure. A component may retract several of the last
operations up until a synchronized state is encountered, which is then used as the state after
the power failure. The idea is not that the system actively rolls back an operation, which is
usually associated with aborting a transaction of a database system, rather the state after
the power failure looks as if some operations did not take effect before the power failure in
the first place. This gives an alternative run of the component with fewer operations that
explain the state of the component after a power failure. This view on the effect of a power
failure is termed operations-based in the following.
Fig. 4.6 uses this specification paradigm for the cached counter. An additional state
variable synced is used to characterize synchronized states that are written to storage by
the internal operation persist. This guarantees that in the event of a power failure several
of the last executed operations are retracted but never persisted. The crash predicate then
leaves ccnt unaltered, since the entire effect of a power failure is captured by the synchronized
states.
Again, if the implementation persists the counter only if φ(cnt) holds, i.e., if the operation
persist has guard φ(cnt) as in the figure, then additionally in Fig. 4.6 we may assume that
the crash predicate is only applied in states where φ(ccnt) holds.
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A critical part of the semantics is that both specification mechanism are supported via the
crash and synchronized predicates. For implementations the state-based view is natural,
because all RAM-state is just assigned arbitrarily and reversing the effect of operations
does not correspond to its actual behavior. However, for a specification the state-based view
usually has the drawback that a lot of auxiliary state is needed to express the power cut
suitably. This impedes the understandability of specifications and hampers the verification
of clients. There an operations-based view is more convenient and under certain conditions
the operations-based view can be propagated upwards a component hierarchy implicitly, i.e.,
with only minimal effort during verification.
4.3 Semantics of Components
We use standard notations from the concurrency literature [62] to express the behavior and
runs of concurrent and sequential crash-aware components. Histories capture the input and
output behavior of a component and are extended with reset events. A reset describes the
entire process of the retraction of several operations, and the crash transition with subsequent
recovery.
Definition 4.9 (Events & Histories). A history h is a finite sequence of events. An event is
either
1. an invocation event invCTid(j, in) of the operation j of the component C by thread Tid
with input values in, or
2. a return event retCTid(j, out) of the operation j of the component C by thread Tid with
output values out, or
3. a reset event reset
where j is a valid index for internal or interface operations of the respective component C .
The input and output values must match the type of input and output variables of operation
OpCj . A history is reset-free if it does not contain a reset event.
Definition 4.10 (Sequential History). A history h is sequential if and only if
• the first event is an invocation, and
• every invocation invCTid(j, in) is followed by a matching return event retCTid(j, out) for
some output out or a reset event, or it is the last event of the history, and
• return events are always preceded by a matching invocation event.
We denote with h⇂Tid the sequence of events of thread Tid including reset events. For
two histories h0 and h1, h0 · h1 denotes their concatenation.
Definition 4.11 (Well-formed History). A history h is well-formed if and only if h⇂Tid is
sequential for every thread Tid.
All histories considered in this thesis are well-formed since well-formed histories arise
naturally from standard program semantics, where one thread can only execute one operation
at any time.
Definition 4.12 (Completed Histories). The completed part of a reset-free history h, denoted
by completed(h) is the sequence of all invocations with matching return events in h.
Definition 4.13 (Pending Operations). An execution of an operation is pending in a
reset-free history h if there is no matching return event for the invocation event.
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Definition 4.14 (Real-Time Order). The real-time order <h of operation executions op
and op′ induced by a reset-free history h is defined by
op <h op′ iff the return event of op precedes the invocation of op′ in h.
Two operation executions not ordered by the real-time order <h are executed concurrently
in h.
Definition 4.15 (Linearization). A reset-free history h is linearizable if it is possible to
extend h with return events to a history h′ and completed(h′) is equivalent to a well-formed,
sequential history h′′ that respects the real-time order of events of h′, i.e., <h⊆<h′′ holds.
The history h′′ is called a linearization of h.
Respecting the real-time order of events means that only operations with overlapping
execution may be re-ordered by its linearization. Equivalent histories contain the same
invocation and return events with the same inputs and outputs.
Def. 4.16 extends the program semantics of Ch. 3 such that histories of calls to interface
and internal operations are generated, see our previous work [47] for details about the extended
derivation system.
Definition 4.16 (Program Semantics with Histories). The judgment I, h |= p extends I |= p
with the history generated by the program p, i.e., it records invocation and return events of
calls to interface and internal operations of each component. We associate the invocation
event of a call to Op with the first, stuttering step of the call and the return event with the
last, stuttering step of the call.
Histories h with I, h |= p correspond to the observable behavior of the execution I of
the program p. Given an interval and a history with I, h |= p, we write I|n and h|n for the
interval and corresponding history of the first n system steps.1
The state space S of the component
C =
(
xC : StC , initC , {OpCi }i∈I, {IOpCk }k∈K, syncC , crash
C , recoverC , {Cl}l∈L
)
.
is given by the cartesian product of the carrier sets (in some given algebra) for the types
Ŝt
C of all state variables.
First, interface operation steps and internal operation steps are defined by Def. 4.17 and
Def. 4.18.
Definition 4.17 (Interface Operation Execution). An interval I with history h is an interface
operation execution of the component C , written I, h |= OpC , if there is an interface operation
Opi with i ∈ I and with declaration
Opi(in; x̂
C , out) pre φ(in, x̂C ) { p }
and either
• I(0) |= φ(in, x̂C ) and I, h |= Opi(in; x̂
C , out), or
• I(0) ̸|= φ(in, x̂C ) and the interval I is arbitrary for the state variables x of component
C and the history contains the corresponding invoke and response events, i.e., the first
event is always the event invC (I(0)(in), I(0)(x̂C )) and if the interval is finite then the
second and final event is the corresponding return event for the operation
holds.
1Note that technically it is necessary to add additional τ events to the history in order to be able to split
off the corresponding prefix of the history, however, we will omit this technical detail in the following.
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Note that in the case of Def. 4.17 where the precondition holds the history h automatically
records the corresponding events of the call according to Def. 4.16. The semantics of procedure
calls (Fig. 3.1 on page 21) with one additional stuttering step in between the time the event
is added to the history and the body of the procedure is executed, ensure that it is always
possible for a reset event to occur directly after the invocation event and directly before the
return event, even if the body of the procedure is already atomic.
Definition 4.18 (Internal Operation Execution). An interval I with history h is an internal
operation execution of the component C , written I, h |= ÎOp
C
, if there is an internal operation
IOp of the component C or any of its (recursive) subcomponents with
IOpk(; x̃) guard φ(x̃) { p }
for the state x̃ of the corresponding (sub)component and
I(0) |= φ(x̃) and I, h |= IOp(; x̃)
holds.
Def. 4.17 and Def. 4.18 correspond to the intuition that if a precondition of an interface
operation is violated then arbitrary behavior may follow and that internal operations are
only triggered if their guard is satisfied.
Notation. In the following intervals with stuttering environment steps and unblocked system
steps are written as a sequence of states (s0, . . . , sn), i.e., the stuttering environment steps and
the blocked flag are omitted. As a shorthand for the invoke and return events of a sequential
component we write s0
Op(in,out)
sn for a complete operation execution starting in state
s0 with input values in, finishing in state sn with output values out. This is equivalent to
(s0, . . . , sn) |= Op(in; x̂, out) where x̂ is the (hidden) state of the corresponding component. If
the operation is atomic we use a straight arrow as in s0
Op(in,out)
s1. We write s0
Op(in, )
sn
if the operation is interrupted by a power cut in an intermediate state sn of its execution and
a reset occurs afterwards. Then no actual output is visible, i.e., the return event is missing
and the invocation event is followed by a reset event and a Reset transition.
For sequential crash-aware components the system System ≡ Systemseq is executed and
for concurrent crash-aware components the system System ≡ Systemcon is chosen as defined
by equations (System).












The semantics of crash-aware components is the set of its runs. Each run consists of an
interval I and the corresponding history h, which are the result of executing System with
intermittent reset transitions.
Definition 4.19 (Semantics of Crash-Aware Components). An interval I with empty envi-
ronment over the variables x̂C and with corresponding history h is a run of component C ,
written (I, h) ∈ runs(C ), if I and h satisfy the following properties.
1. There is an interval I ′ satisfying I ′ |= init(; x̂C ) and I.first = I ′.last
2. There exist finitely many intervals with corresponding histories
(Ĩ0, h̃0), . . . , (Ĩn, h̃n) with (Ĩj , h̃j) |= System for all 0 ≤ j ≤ n.
Each interval Ĩj and history h̃j corresponds to a complete execution of the system.
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Opi0(in0, out0) Opi1(in1, ) Reset Opi2(in2, ) Reset
I0 = (s0, . . . , si, . . . , sj)
h0 = ⟨inv(i0, in0), ret (i0, out0), inv(i1, in1)⟩
I1 = (ŝ0, . . . , ŝk)
h1 = ⟨inv(i1, in1)⟩
Ĩ0 = (s0, . . . , si, . . . , sj , . . . , sm)
h̃0 = ⟨inv(i0, in0), ret (i0, out0), inv(i1, in1), ret (i1, out1)⟩
Ĩ1 = (ŝ0, . . . , ŝk, . . . , ŝn)
h̃1 = ⟨inv(i1, in1), ret (i2, out2)⟩
Figure 4.7: Example Run with two Power Failures
3. For all except the last interval there is a number of system steps ni for 0 ≤ j < n
that are actually executed up to the reset transition. We denote with Ij ≡ Ĩj |nj and
hj ≡ h̃j |nj these system steps with their corresponding history for 0 ≤ j < n.
4. It is possible to construct a reset transition Ij .last Reset Ij+1.first based on Ij and hj
for each j as given by Def. 4.20 below.
The interval I is then the sequential composition
I = I0 o9 (I0.last, I1.first) o9I1 o9 . . . o9In−1 o9 (In−1.last, In.first) o9 Ĩn
with one intermediate system step for the reset transition between the individual intervals Ij .
The history h is the sequential composition
h = h0 · ⟨reset⟩ · h1 · . . . · hn−1 · ⟨reset⟩ · hn
with reset events in between the individual history segments hj .
Fig. 4.7 shows an example run of a sequential crash-aware component with two power
failures, interrupting the operations Opi1 and Opi2 in intermediate states. The figure also
shows the intervals and histories of Def. 4.19. The intervals Ĩj and histories h̃j are depicted at
the top and the final intervals Ij and histories hj at the bottom. The complete execution of
the operations Opi0 and Opi1 consists of the interval Ĩ0 with corresponding history h̃0. In the
figure this execution is interrupted by a power failure in state sj . The reset transition then
starts in state sj and yields a new state ŝ0. The third operation Opi+2 is also interrupted
in an intermediate state ŝk. The observable behavior, i.e., the history, of the entire run is
therefore
h = h0 · ⟨reset⟩ · h1 · ⟨reset⟩,
which contains an invocation for all three operations, but a return event for the first operation,
only.
We point out some aspects of Def. 4.19 before formally defining reset transitions.
Power cuts during the initialization of a component are not captured by this semantics.
The reasoning is that crashes in intermediate states of the initialization are not really of any
interest. Recovery in such a state is not possible and initialization, which usually formats the
storage device in a file system, has to be run again, which must be triggered explicitly by the
user.
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or stutter crash recover Reset
Reset
Figure 4.8: Constructing a Reset Transition and an Alternative Execution for a Sequential
Component with only one Pending Operations
A non-terminating execution of an operation is recognized in a run according to Def. 4.19
if the history has an invocation event without a matching return event or an interrupting
reset event.
The reset transitions are given by Def. 4.20, which should be followed alongside Fig. 4.8.
Note that the figure again depicts the sequential case, where there is only one pending
operation at any time. The general idea is that we first revert several operations and then
allow a re-execution of pending operations until a state is reached where the partial predicate
crash and recovery are applied. Retractions may not cross synchronizes states, though.
Definition 4.20 (Reset Transitions). A reset transition I.last Reset sn+1 of component C
based on interval I = (s0, . . . , sn) with corresponding history h is constructed in four steps
visualized by the four red transitions in Fig. 4.8.
1. The original execution I is split into two intervals I0 o9I1 with corresponding histories
h0 · h1 and with the property that I1 does not contain any synchronized states after its
system steps, i.e., I1(k)′ ̸|= ŝync(x̂) holds for all k with 0 ≤ k ≤ # I1. All steps of I1
are retracted.
2. The system may re-execute part of the operations pending in h0 and crash afterwards,
i.e., there exist intervals I2 and I3 and corresponding histories h2 and h3 with
I0 o9I2 o9I3, h0 · h2 · h3 |= System and I2.last |= ∃x̂1. ĉrash(x̂, x̂1)
and history h2 only contains return events (for pending invocations in h0). The interval
I3 and corresponding history h3 are removed, i.e., interval I2 and history h2 are a
partial or complete (re-)execution of all pending operations of the component.
3. The effect of the crash is applied to the state I2.last and yields a state s̃n, i.e., a state
s̃n must exist with (I2.last, s̃n) |= ĉrash(x̂, x̂ ′).
4. The recovery routine reconstructs the final, synchronized state sn+1, i.e., there is an
interval I4 with I4.first = s̃n and I4 |= recover(; x̂), and the final state is given by
sn+1 = I4.last.
One crucial insight into Def. 4.20 is that the re-execution yields an alternative run of the
system according to Remark 4.21.
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Remark 4.21. The semantics of the reset transition give an alternative run of the component.
Assume that the i-th reset transitions yields the intervals Ii0 and Ii2 and histories hi0 and hi2
in step (2.) of Def. 4.20. Then the interval
I ′ = I00 o9I02 o9
(









I12 .last, I20 .first
)
o
9 · · ·
with history
h′ = h00 · h02 · ⟨reset⟩ · h10 · h12 · ⟨reset⟩ · · ·
is an alternative run of the component that could also have happened. For each individual
fragment in between two crashes Fig. 4.8 shows the corresponding fragment of the run. Note
that I2.last Reset sn+1 holds for the states in the figure, because the reset transition can
always retract no state at all and re-execute no operation.
Several other aspects of Def. 4.20 are pointed out next.
Re-execution is optional and only permitted when at least one operation is pending. The
state sn+1 will be synchronized according to the definition of weakly admissible components
(Def. 4.3 on page 28), implying that another crash does not go back further in the history.
Therefore, the split in individual segments in between crashes in Def. 4.19 is valid.
State I2.last must fall into the domain of the crash predicate. This corresponds to the
intuition that a power cut can be observed in or needs to be considered in states in the
domain of the crash predicate only. Expressing the crash predicate on a selected subset of
states is easier for the given component and its clients as we have motivated with Sec. 4.2
and come back to in Ch. 6 and Ch. 12.
The definition of the reset transition implies the existence of a different run without a
retraction, that ends in the same state sn+1 as visualized by Fig. 4.8.
Def. 4.20 implicitly assumes that the recovery operation of a composed component calls
the recovery operations of its subcomponents only and no other operations, since other calls
are missing from the history. This is not an essential limitation, it just saves notation.
A component where all states are synchronized (ŝync ≡ true) neither retracts nor re-
executes operations. This view is used for the lowest level of specification, where the distinction
between volatile and persistent memory is explicit, and the effect of a power cut is expressed
as just forgetting data in volatile memory.
Def. 4.22 defines the observable behavior of a crash-aware component, which removes
the operation invocations and return events of subcomponents. We denote with h⇂C the
sequence of events on component C including reset events
Definition 4.22 (Observable Behavior). The observable behavior Obs(C ) of the component
C consists of the restriction h⇂C to the events of C of a history h with (I, h) ∈ runs(C ) for
some interval I.
Note that the observable behavior of a specification component still contains concurrent
operation executions, because the procedure call introduces an additional step before and
after the body. Nontermination or infinite blocking is visible in the observable behavior,
because only then a matching return event is missing for an invocation event, assuming that
no (interrupting) reset event follows afterwards and assuming the scheduler is fair.
4.4 Correctness of Components
Linearizability and the extension crash linearizability is expressed in terms of an easily
understandable, sequential specification. We use specification components according to
Def. 4.6 on page 28 for this purpose and make sure that only compatible components are
compared.
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Definition 4.23 (Compatible Components). Two components C and A are compatible if
and only if the index set I of interface operations, their input and output parameters, and
the index set K of internal operations are the same.2
The concurrent and crash behavior of a specification component is easily understood in
terms of its sequential behavior according to Lem. 4.24. Intuitively, each operation takes
effect at a specific point in the interval, called the linearization point. The other two steps of
the procedure call are just stuttering steps and may be re-ordered arbitrarily.
Lemma 4.24 (Specification Components & Crash Linearization). Given a history h with
h ∈ Obs(A) of a specification component A, the history has the form
h = h0 · ⟨reset⟩ · h1 · . . . · ⟨reset⟩ · hn
where hj is crash-free for all 0 ≤ j ≤ n. Then there exist linearizations h′′j of hj and the
combined history
h′′ = h′′0 · ⟨reset⟩ · h′′1 · . . . · ⟨reset⟩ · h′′n
satisfies h′′ ∈ Obs(A). We call h′′ the crash linearization of h.
Proof. Given a history hj and the corresponding interval Ij , we add return events for all
pending invocations if and only if the atomic body is already executed in Ij , resulting in
a history h′. The history completed(h′) is equivalent to the sequential history h′′j where all
events of completed(h′) are ordered according to the point in time in Ij when the atomic
block of the operation is executed. This only reorders concurrent operations and therefore
respects the real-time order of completed(h′) and therefore h′′j is a linearization of hj .
The combination of all so constructed histories into history h′′ as by the lemma, is also
part of the observable behavior, because for each fragment Ij of the original execution, there
is an interval I ′′j with # Ij = # I ′′j , Ij .first = I ′′J .first, Ij .last = I ′′J .last constructed by moving
the invocation and return steps before and after the procedure body right before and after the
step of the procedure body, respectively. Note that this re-arranging of these steps does not
change the crash behavior, i.e., the same states can be targeted by the retraction transition,
although at a different index in the interval, and re-execution can reach the exact same state
Ij+1.first for the crash in interval Ij . The combined interval I ′′ and combined history h′′
then satisfy (I ′′, h′′) ∈ Obs(A).
Lem. 4.24 essentially states that for each concurrent execution with crashes there is a
sequential execution with the same observable behavior.
For standard linearizability proofs of concurrent objects [62] the linearization point is
identified, it is proven that all program steps before and after the linearization point have no
externally visible effect on the object and the linearization point itself corresponds to the
entire externally visible effect of the operation.
Def. 4.25 gives a correctness criterion for a concurrent, crash-aware component C based
on the relation of its observable behavior to a specification component A. This definition
facilitates incremental refinement and abstraction of components as discussed in Sec. 4.5.
Definition 4.25 (Crash Linearizability & Total Correctness). A component C is crash
linearizable with respect to a compatible specification component A if and only if for each
h ∈ Obs(C ) there is a crash linearization h′ with h′ ∈ Obs(A). If Obs(C ) ⊆ Obs(A) holds,
then C is totally correct with respect to A.
The general idea is that although the component C may have a complex concurrent
implementation with many intermediate steps where crashes may occur, it can be reasoned
2In practice, we allow that A has less internal operations than C . All omitted internal operations have to
refine the program skip and are therefore not observable by clients.
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about in purely sequential terms. A client of C only needs to consider the runs of the component
C that are sequential, because for any concurrent run the combination of Def. 4.25 and
Lem. 4.24 guarantees a sequential one with the same behavior.
Note that crash linearizability itself is a safety property only, because the abstract system
may always choose a completion of a nonterminating operation of C . Standard linearizability
is also defined as a safety property only and liveness is defined separately, for example as
lock-freedom or deadlock-freedom. Total correctness additionally ensures that the system does
not block globally, i.e., is deadlock free, and has no infinite computations. The latter property
is called divergence freedom in [12]. In the context of this thesis and lock-based algorithms
under weak-fair scheduling, total correctness is used as the criterion for the correctness of a
component, instead of crash linearizability.
4.5 Refinement, Compositionality & Substitution
This section first defines refinement of components and then discusses substitution of im-
plementation components C for their specification components A in a composed system
M A with potentially additional subcomponents. A compositionality result is achieved
under certain conditions.
Refinement is defined based on preserving observable behavior and therefore total cor-
rectness.
Definition 4.26 (Refinement). A component C refines a compatible component A, written
A ⊑ C , if and only if the observable behavior of the component C is a subset of the observable
behavior of the component A, i.e., Obs(C ) ⊆ Obs(A) holds.
Refinement is a preorder on components, i.e., refinement is reflexive and transitive.
A weaker version of refinement that only preserves crash linearizability is possible, too.3
In the context of this thesis, however, the focus is on sequential components in the first part
and on lock-based synchronization under weak-fair scheduling in the second part and there
total correctness is more appropriate.
In Ch. 5 and Ch. 13 we will incrementally refine a component A towards an implementation
C or, equivalently, abstract an implementation C towards the desired specification A in
several steps. We will construct several intermediate components C1, . . . ,Cn and A1, . . . ,Am
with the properties (1.) to (3.).
1. Cn ⊑ · · · ⊑ C1 ⊑ C , (Atomicity Refinement)
2. A ⊑ Am ⊑ · · · ⊑ A1, and (Crash Refinement)
3. A1 ⊑ Cn (Data Refinement / Linearizability)
Transitivity of refinement then guarantees that the original implementation C refines the
final specification A, i.e., that A ⊑ C holds, and therefore implies correctness of the approach.
In step (1.) the atomicity of the component with respect to power failures and concurrent
threads is increased by gradually collapsing several program statements into atomic blocks
and is termed atomicity refinement. Step (3.) changes the data representation and therefore
constitutes a standard data refinement (for sequential components) or a standard proof of
linearizability (for concurrent components). The specification of the crash behavior is modified
in step (2.) by reducing the set of synchronized states from all states in component A0 to
a more desirable subset in component A. We will usually only need one step for this crash
refinement, i.e., m is one.
3Note that then an unfair interleaving should be chosen for the component semantics, because a weak-fair
interleaving forces the sequential specification to complete its pending operations for every thread. Technically,
the difference between weak-fair and unfair scheduling occurs in the proof of Thm. 1 below, where for a
nonterminating run of a component the abstract specification cannot stall the completion of the operation
infinitely long. Under unfair scheduling, however, this is not an issue.
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inc1(; n) { A1.inc(; n); }
inc2(; n) { A2.inc(; n); }
recovery recover() { A1.recover();A2.recover() }
component A1





if cnt1 even then
pcnt1 := cnt1;
synchronized states cnt1 even
crash pcnt1 even ∧ pcnt′1 = pcnt1
recovery recover() { cnt1 := pcnt1 }
component C1





if cnt1 even then
pcnt1 := cnt1;
crash pcnt′1 = pcnt1
recovery recover() { cnt1 := pcnt1 }
Figure 4.9: Counterexample to a General Compositionality Theorem where A2 and C2 is a
renaming of A1 and C1, respectively.
We denote with M{A ↦→ C} the substitution of the subcomponent A of component M
with C if C refines A and is therefore syntactically compatible. Compositionality is the
property that if component C refines its specification A, then M{A ↦→ C} refines M for any
component M . Or more informally, the notion that substitution of specifications by their
implementations in any context preserves the behavior of the context.
A ⊑ C =⇒ M ⊑ M{A ↦→ C} (Compositionality)
A general compositionality result, however, is impossible.
This can be demonstrated by looking at a sequential component M with two retracting
subcomponents A1 and A2. During a power failure the implementation C1 of A1 and the
implementation C2 of A2 may choose an arbitrary prior state of their execution and re-execute
several pending operations with a different outcome. There is no guarantee that C1 and C2
chose consistent states and that the individual re-executions yield a composed execution of
C that is consistent with C ’s program order.
Example 4.27 (Counterexample to General Compositionality). Fig. 4.9 shows a simple
counterexample for a general compositionality result using sequential components only. The
component M uses two counters A1 and A2, each persisting only even values of the counter.
The operations of component M just expose the increment operations of both components
individually.
The semantics of the implementation C1 and specification A1 are identical, although A1
expresses a crash as a retraction and a partial crash predicate whereas C1 expresses it with a
total crash predicate. To see this note that A1 is forced to retract increments starting in an
even value and re-execution of them is impossible, because no state in the domain of the
crash predicate is reached.
The system M{A1,A2 ↦→ C1,C2} has the run (example-run) where the first and second
element of the pair denotes the counter cnt1 of A1 and cnt2 of A2, respectively.
(0,0) (1,0) (1,1) (1,2) (0,2)
inc1(0) inc2(0) inc2(1) Reset
(example-run)
The synchronized predicate of M{A1,A2 ↦→ C1,C2} is equivalent to true. Therefore no
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retractions and re-executions are possible and the state (0, 2) is the only state reachable by a
reset transition from state (1, 2).
The system M now has to be able to construct the same state with a reset transition
starting in state (1, 2). Only the state (0, 0) is synchronized for the component M and
therefore all states before (1, 2) could be targeted by a retraction. However, only a retraction
to the initial state (0, 0) can yield a value of 0 for cnt1. This precludes re-execution of the two
inc2 operations that are necessary to reach a value of 2 for cnt2. Thus, we conclude that the
transition (1, 2) Reset (0, 2) is not feasible in the component M and M ̸⊑ M{A1,A2 ↦→ C1,C2}
holds.
Ex. 4.27 shows that two synchronized predicates that are not equivalent to true in a
composition of components M poses a problem for compositionality. However, an retracting
subcomponent of M and another subcomponent with a crash predicate that is not equivalent
to true is another problem as shown by Ex. 4.28.
Example 4.28 (Counterexample to General Compositionality). We reuse the components
from the previous example and Fig. 4.9. Consider the component M ′ ≡ M{A2 ↦→ C2} where
C2 is already substituted for its implementation C2. Component M ′ has one non-retracting
and one retracting subcomponent. The run (example-run) given for Ex. 4.27 is also a run of
M ′. If we then substitute the implementation C1 for the retracting subcomponent A1 in M ′
we also get the component M ′{A1 ↦→ C1} ≡ M{A1,A2 ↦→ C1,C2} as in Ex. 4.27 and this
component does not have the run. We have therefore shown that M ′ ̸⊑ M ′{A1 ↦→ C1} for an
example component M ′ with only one retracting subcomponent.
The insight provided by Ex. 4.27 and 4.28 is that a retracting subcomponent coerces
its context into a specific behavior during a power failure. Therefore, the context may not
further limit the reset transition. This should not come as a surprise, because the point
of synchronized states is to have an implicit mechanism for the propagation of the crash
behavior.
Def. 4.29 details restrictions on the context that admit compositionality.
Definition 4.29 (Strong Admissibility). A component M is strongly admissible if
1. it is weakly admissible according to Def. 4.3 on page 28,
2. no subcomponent call is performed inside an atomic block,
3. only one leaf component A of C may be a retracting components according to Def. 4.6
on page 28,
4. if there is a retracting leaf component A, then all other components must have a crash
predicate equivalent to true, and
5. if all components are non-retracting, then the crash predicate of all components must
be total.
Restriction (2.) of Def. 4.29 ensures that the client component M does not presume a
stricter order on the linearization points by for example assuming that two calls to the same
subcomponent can be performed atomically without any interruption.
An intuitive way of stating restriction (4.) of Def. 4.29 is that if one subcomponent is
retracting, the state variables of all other components are in volatile main memory. This
applies to a file system where (an abstraction of) the storage device is at each step part of
only one subcomponent as shown in Ch. 6 for the Flashix file system.
Restriction (5.) of Def. 4.29 ensures that one component does not interfere with the crash
behavior of the other components by for example choosing a crash predicate equivalent to
false. Technically, this is not required for a compositionality result, however, it is undesirable
from a modeling perspective if one component can preclude certain crash behaviors of another
component.
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Refinement is compatible with this restricted form of hierarchical composition, i.e., total
correctness of a component is preserved by the substitution of its subcomponents according
to Thm. 1.
Theorem 1 (Compositionality). Given a non-retracting component C that is totally correct
with respect to a specification component A, i.e., A ⊑ C is satisfied, and a strongly admissible
component M with subcomponent A, then M ⊑ M{A ↦→ C} holds.
The additional condition that the component C is non-retracting, i.e., retractions or
re-executions are not used to explain the crash behavior of C , ensures that only a true
implementation component is substituted. Limiting the set of synchronized states is essentially
only allowed for the purpose of specification. Thm. 1 is applicable in practice, because we
can substitute implementation components bottom-up.
We prove Thm. 1 for a system M with only one subcomponent A. The extension to
multiple subcomponents follows from restriction (4.) and (5.) of Def. 4.29, i.e., the restrictions
guarantee the existence of corresponding reset transitions for additional subcomponents.
Notation. We write ms⊕as for the combined state of the component M with exactly one
subcomponent A, where ms is the state of M and as the state of A. Similarly, we write
IM⊕IA for the composition of intervals of the individual components.
The proof of Thm. 1 is first performed for the case that A is a non-retracting component.
Proof of Thm. 1 (for syncA ≡ true). Given the run (IM⊕IC , h) ∈ runs(M{A ↦→ C}) then
(IC , h⇂C ) is a run of C with additional stuttering steps of M .4 For the interval IC0 without these
additional stuttering steps (IC0 , h⇂C ) ∈ runs(C ) holds. The refinement A ⊑ C guarantees a
run (IA0 , h⇂C ) ∈ runs(A). The interval IA0 can be padded with the additional stuttering steps
of M and of C into IA. The general idea is to align the steps for invoke events, linearization
points and return events in IA with their corresponding steps in IC0 and add stuttering steps
in between. If an operation of C does not terminate so does the corresponding call of A and
therefore no padding is necessary. Note that every terminating call of A has exactly three
system steps per operation while the corresponding call of C has at least three steps. The
reset steps are then automatically aligned. Then (IM⊕IA, h) is a run of M with additional
stuttering steps. Removing them yields a run of M .
We now shift our attention to a retracting subcomponent A.
Proof of Thm. 1 (for syncA ̸≡ true). The general approach is the same, i.e., we extract the
run of C from a run of M{A ↦→ C}, find a matching run for A and reintegrate it yielding a
run of M{A ↦→ C} with the same observable behavior. We focus here on the reset transitions.
Given a reset transition ms⊕cs Reset ms′⊕cs′ of M{A ↦→ C}, then there is also a reset
transition cs Reset cs′ of C , since M{A ↦→ C} does not have any retraction or re-executions.4
By refinement A ⊑ C there is also a matching reset transition as Reset as′ of the run of
A. We now have to show that ms⊕as Reset ms′⊕as′ also holds, i.e., that it is possible
to construct intermediate states in accordance with Fig. 4.8 on page 36 for component M
based on the corresponding intermediates states of A. The idea is that M retracts the same
transitions that A does. Afterwards the pending operations of A are re-executed according to
the reset transition of A and then C stops re-execution. The subsequent crash transition can
restore the same state that M{A ↦→ C} does, because crashM ≡ true and recovery restores
the state ms′⊕as′. So the trick is basically that the state reached by M before the crash
transition is essentially irrelevant due to the specific crash predicate of M .
Note that Thm. 1 also holds for the weaker version of refinement that only preserves
crash linearizability.
4Note that this extraction assumes that the recovery operation of M{A ↦→ C} calls the recovery operation
of C only and no additional operations. As stated above, this limitation can be removed if the intermediate
states of the recovery operation and their history is added to runs.
42
Chapter 4 4.6. INVARIANTS, PRECONDITIONS & ASSERTIONS
4.6 Invariants, Preconditions & Assertions
In this section we will ensure that every component M calls its subcomponents within their
precondition and that all other assertions are satisfied when the execution reaches them.
Additionally, invariants that hold either in every step of the execution or in between steps of
a sequential component may be established in this step.
In the following we write
component C
invariant inv(x̂)
for a sequential invariant inv of a sequential or specification component C in the variables
of C and all its subcomponents. We implicitly assume that the invariant inv contains the
invariants given for all subcomponents of C .
Violations of preconditions and assertions are represented as nontermination in the
operations of a component. The proof obligations of Lem. 4.30 therefore ensure that all
operations terminate, too.
Lemma 4.30 (Invariants, Assertions & Preconditions for Sequential Components). For
sequential components with sequential invariant inv(x̂) the proof obligations




2. prei(in, x̂) ∧ inv(x̂)→ ⟨|OpCi (in; x̂, out)|⟩ inv(x̂)
3. guardk(x̂) ∧ inv(x̂)→ ⟨|ÎOp
C
k (; x̂)|⟩ inv(x̂)




are shown for each interface operation OpCi with precondition prei of the component C and
for each internal operations ÎOpCk with guard guardk(x̂) of C or any of its subcomponents.
The proof obligations ensure termination, establish the sequential invariant inv(x̂) and all
assertions, including preconditions of subcomponents.
The proof obligations of Lem. 4.30 show that the invariants of a specification subcomponent
A hold in every step of a run of C , because the state of A is not modified by steps of C and
Lem. 4.30 (for A) then propagates the invariant of the subcomponent over A’s atomic steps.
For atomic blocks of a sequential component the proof obligations of Lem. 4.30 ensure
that the atomic blocks terminate, i.e., it is possible to show that a component is actually a
specification component according to Def. 4.6 on page 28.
For a concurrent component we use rely/guarantee reasoning to establish concurrent
invariants. In the following we write
component C
concurrent invariant inv(X̂)
rely rely(Tid, X̂ , X̂
′
)
for a concurrent invariant inv and rely condition rely of a concurrent component C with
(flexible) state variables X . The rely condition may refer to the thread identifier Tid. For the
guarantee the conjunction of all rely conditions of all other threads is used.
Instead of termination as for sequential components, we first prove divergence freedom
for each thread in an invariant proof.
Lemma 4.31 (Invariants, Assertions & Preconditions for Concurrent Components). For a
concurrent component with concurrent invariant inv(X̂) the proof obligations (1.) and (4.) of
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Lem. 4.30 are shown and





), guar(Tid, X̂ , X̂
′
), inv(X̂), false, OpCi (In; X̂ ,Out)⟩ true
(2′′.) prei(In, X̂0) ∧ rely(Tid, X̂0, X̂1)→ prei(In, X̂1)





), guar(Tid, X̂ , X̂
′
), inv(X̂), false, IOpCk (; X̂)⟩ true
(5.) rely(tid, x, x)
(6.) rely(tid, x0, x1) ∧ rely(tid, x1, x2)→ rely(tid, x0, x2)
where
guar(Tid, X̂ , X̂
′
) ≡ ∀Tid0 ̸= Tid. rely(Tid0, X̂ , X̂
′
)
for the respective operations. The proof obligations ensure divergence freedom, establish the
concurrent invariant inv(X̂) and all assertions, including preconditions of subcomponents,
and show that atomic sections terminate if the guard is satisfied. Furthermore, it guarantees
that all preconditions are stable over steps of other threads.
Note that the runs predicate runs ≡ false allows each operation to block under any
condition, but ensures that no infinite computations occur otherwise. Ch. 13 will show that
most of the rely condition can be automatically derived by ownership annotations for a
component.
4.7 Related Work
Crashes & Recovery Koskinen et al. [80] use model checking to guarantee that a sequential
system is crash-recoverable. In the event of a power failure the program is re-executed and
correctness is stated as a successful re-execution of the program. This means that a crash-
recoverable program should not exhibit any new behavior on a re-execution after a power
failure. It is difficult to use this criterion for a modular and compositional verification of
components with externally callable interface. The purpose of the re-execution in this chapter
is different, the re-execution should yield a desirable state where crashes are easy to specify
and consider.
Marić and Sprenger [90] model crashes as exceptions in the context of a sequential
transactional hardware manager. The exception handler is used to perform the recovery
of the system. This essentially corresponds to the state-based specification approach for
sequential, crash-aware components. A generalization to concurrent systems of this modeling
approach seems difficult, since power failures affect all threads of execution at the same time,
but exceptions are handled locally by each thread.
The specification mechanisms used for the FSCQ file system [27, 28, 26] explicitly stores
a history of the system. The disk model similarly stores all possible values of a sector and
during a power failure nondeterministically chooses one of the possible values. This allows for
re-ordering of disk writes, which in the framework of this chapter is only possible with the
state-based approach. Bornhold et. al [18] model crashes on the level of abstraction of POSIX
by maintaining a list of update events. In the event of a power failure a re-ordering of a prefix
of the update events is applied to the initial state (or the state after the last power failure).
In Amani et al. [11, 9] the effect of the operations is captured similarly, as a list of state
transformers, although power failures and recovery from them is not considered formally. Such
a re-ordering of operations can currently only be specified with the state-based approach for
crash-aware components. In future work, we intend to extend the operations-based approach
to also allow for the re-ordering of operations. However, a compositionality result is more
difficult to achieve in this case.
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In several other approaches [124, 101] the volatile and durable state is explicitly disjoint
in the logic, and therefore also in the models. This impedes a refinement-based approach,
because it limits the ability for data refinement, i.e., the volatile and durable data structures
must always be refined separately. The modeling approach presented in this chapter does not
enforce a distinction between volatile and durable state.
Linearizability, Serializability & Persistency Several other correctness criteria for
concurrent objects with persistent data and crashes have been proposed. In the context of
process-local crashes there is recoverable linearizability [16] and strict linearizability [8] and
for message passing systems persistent and transient atomicity [57]. Each of these criteria
assumes that crashes are local to a component. This matches poorly to file systems, where
a power failure of the entire system and the correct recovery from such a failure is at the
core of the file system’s correctness. The first to consider linearizability in the context of
persistent objects with crashes of the full system is Israelevitz et al. [69]. They consider the
emerging technology of byte-addressable Non-volatile Random Access Memory (= NVRAM),
which allows for the implementation of highly concurrent algorithms on this new form of
persistent memory. They define durable linearizability and buffered durable linearizability.
Both criteria do not allow for additional effects as part of a system crash, since they require
that the history with crash events removed is linearizable, i.e., is a potential execution of
the system. This restriction does not apply to the components of the Flashix file system
as explained in more detail in subsequent chapters. There crashes may have far reaching
consequences. This thesis contributes a specification mechanism with synchronized states
and the crash predicate for state-based components, which simplifies the application to the
Flashix case study. Note that the criterion of buffered durable linearizability does allow for
retractions of operations. However, there is no limit to the amount of operations that may
be retracted. This is also not applicable to a file system, where it is necessary to show that
all operations are persisted if the user requests synchronization with the POSIX operation
sync or fsync. The criterion of durable linearizability has the property that it is local, i.e., a
general substitution theorem holds. For buffered durable linearizability this does not hold.
Thm. 1 shows that at least for a reasonable subset of composed components with only one
persistent storage substitution is possible.
Serializability and strict serializability [106] are correctness criteria for transactional,
concurrent systems. Strict serializability corresponds to linearizability if a transaction is
reinterpreted as an individual operation of a component.
Internal & External Operations Internal operations are similar to the events of Event-
B [7], which are also triggered internally when a guard is satisfied. The classical B-Method [6]
has internal operations as well as externally callable operations. Externally callable operations
are also standard in formalism based on data refinement [64, 60], such as Z [133, 40, 41].
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5
Refinement of Sequential, Crash-Aware Components
Summary. This chapter discusses three types of refinements for sequential, crash-
aware components. First, criteria for the refinement of the atomicity of operations with
respect to power failures are introduced. Afterwards, data refinement with crashes is
discussed. Finally, refinement of the expression of the reset transition, i.e., the switch
from a state-based to an operations-based view of a crash, is explained. Taken together,
it is possible to refine a sequential specification component with an operations-based
view on the crash to an actual implementation with potential power failures in any
intermediate state.
Publications. This Chapter is based on the publications [109, 45, 47, 107]. It
extends [107] to facilitate the applicability to concurrent components. The hierarchy
of criteria for increasing the atomicity of a component with respect to power failures,
also generalizes our previous work [47, 107].
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Figure 5.1: Refinement Approach for
Large, Crash-Aware Systems
In general, a refinement step can change the
atomicity of the operations of the component,
the data representation as well as change the
view of a crash, since only the observable
behavior must be preserved. The generality
of having all three changes in abstraction
is only needed for a uniform definition of
refinement.
In practice, Fig. 5.1 depicts our approach
to the refinement of a large, crash-aware sys-
tem. We will first increase the atomicity of a
component C to C ′, then abstract its data
representation to a component A′, which
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then allows us to abstract the specification of a crash to the final specification A. For
each refinement step invariants and assertions of the component may be used to facilitate
and structure the proof of refinement.
The rest of this section is structured as follows. Sec. 5.2 considers atomicity refinement,
then Sec. 5.3 gives proof obligations for data refinement that is aware of crashes. The section
concludes with Sec. 5.4, which defines crash refinement.
5.2 Atomicity Refinement
This section introduces several criteria that allow us to increase the atomicity of a component
without losing behavior in the event of a power cut. These criteria work well in the context









atomic { p; q }
crash & recover
Figure 5.2: Atomicity & Crashes
in Intermediate States
In general if we replace two consecutive
single-step programs p; q by one atomic block
atomic { p; q }, then we might lose the states reach-
able by a crash from the intermediate state between
p and q. For example in Fig. 5.2 (solid arrows only)
the state s′1 reached from s1 by a crash and sub-
sequent recovery might be lost. In order to ensure
that no such crash behavior is omitted when the
atomicity of a component is increased, we make
sure that for each removed intermediate s1 another
state exists that subsumes the crash behavior of
s1. Such a state is usually in the vicinity of s1, i.e.,
it is either s0 or s2 in the figure, if p or q do not
persist any data and most operations do not.
This section is structured as follows: First, several concepts are defined that relate the
crash behavior of two states. Afterwards, the criterion of R-atomicity, which gives rise to
atomicity refinement, is discussed. Then the three stronger criteria neutrality, retractability
and introducibility are defined and their crucial properties are proven. A calculus for sequential
programs is introduced that uses the invariants and assertions of a component.
5.2.1 R-Subsuming and R-Equivalent States
In the following R ⊆ S × S is a binary relation over states. The idea is essentially that the
crash and subsequent recovery of a component will be substituted for R, or more precisely we
assume that R is given by a formula R chosen according to Formula (R-is-crash-recover).
R(x, x ′)↔ ∃x̃. crash(x, x̃) ∧ ⟨recover(; x̃)⟩ x ′ = x̃ (R-is-crash-recover)
The formula states that the state x ′ is reached via the crash and subsequent recovery by an
intermediate state x̃. The relation over states R is defined by Equation (R).
R = {(s, s′) | (s, s′) |= R(x, x ′)} (R)
The definitions, however, are applicable to arbitrary relations. If a term that refers to R,
such as R-reachable, is applied to the concrete instance for crash and subsequent recovery
given by Eqn. (R-is-crash-recover), then the term “crash-recover” is used as a shorthand,
as e.g. in crash-recover-reachable.
In general we assume that R is extended to additional variables y with y ∩ x = ∅ by
allowing arbitrary changes to y.
Definition 5.1 (R-Reachability). A state s′ is R-reachable from a state s if and only if
s R s′ holds. The set of R-reachable states of s is R(s).
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Definition 5.2 (R-Subsumption). A state s R-subsumes a state s′, written s′ ⊑R s, if and




Figure 5.3: R-Reachable States
of s and s′ with s′ ⊑R s
If for example the state s0 subsumes s1, then
the dotted arrow in Fig. 5.2 from s0 to s′1 exists.
Analogously if s2 subsumes s1. Fig. 5.3 shows
the set of R-reachable states of s (black hatched
area) and s′ (blue hatched area) if sR-subsumes
s′.
The relation ⊑R is a preorder, i.e., it is re-
flexive and transitive.
One property of ⊑R is that it is possible to
split the relation into a composition R1 o9R2 of
two relationsR1 andR2 and only show s′ ⊑R1 s
if possible, in order to infer s′ ⊑R1 o9 R2 s.
Lemma 5.3 (R1 o9R2-Subsumption). ⊑R1 ⊆ ⊑R1 o9 R2
Proof. Given states s and s′ where s R1-subsumes s′, i.e., R1(s′) ⊆ R1(s) holds, then by
(R1 o9R2) (s′) = R2 (R1(s′)) ⊆ R2 (R1(s)) = (R1 o9R2) (s)
it follows that s also (R1 o9R2)-subsumes s′.
Lem. 5.3 allows us to prove crash-recover-subsumption by only considering crash-subsumption,
which is far easier, because the recovery is usually given by a rather complex program and
verifying that a specific change in the state before recovery does not alter the result is rather
difficult. The formula crash is usually far simpler.
Definition 5.4 (R-Equivalence). Two states s and s′ are R-equivalent, written s ≡R s′, if
and only if R(s) = R(s′) holds, i.e., the sets of R-reachable states are the same.
Note that ≡R is an equivalence relation.
For two R-equivalent states either one may be removed by increasing the atomicity of
the program without altering the behavior on a power cut.
5.2.2 R-Atomicity & Refinement
The next step is to systematically find a subsuming state to an intermediate state s by
looking at the programs leading to or following the state and then remove s just as done in
Fig. 5.2 on page 50 for state s1. The most general case whereby removing the intermediate
states does not alter the crash behavior at all is given by Def. 5.5.
Definition 5.5 (R-Atomic). A program p is R-atomic if and only if for each intermediate
state si of a finite execution I = (s0, . . . , sn) either
• si ⊑R s0 holds, or
• there is a (potentially different) finite execution I ′ = (s′0, . . . , s′m) starting in s′0 = s0
with si ⊑R s′m.
We denote with
φ, inv ⊢ p : ↶↷R
the judgment that program p is R-atomic in the context where the assertion φ holds initially
and the invariant inv always holds.
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The symbol ↶↷ is chosen to indicate that crash behavior of intermediate states is either
subsumed by the initial state of the execution or possible other final states of other completions.
For the calculus it is possible to transfer some knowledge such as the assertions φ that
hold in the initial state of p and the invariants inv that always hold for the entire component
that p is part of.
Lem. 5.6 states that a crash-recover-atomic program p, as the name implies, can be
replaced by an atomic block atomic { p } without loosing behavior on a power cut.
Lemma 5.6 (R-Atomic & Atomicity). If a program p is R-atomic, then
JpK o9R ⊆ Jatomic { p }K o9R
holds.
Proof. Given a state si of a finite execution (s0, . . . , sn) of p then there is another execution
(s′0, . . . , s′m) with s′0 = s0 and either si ⊑R s0 or si ⊑R s′m is satisfied. The R-reachable
states of si are a subset of those of s0 or s′m and (s0, s′m) is an execution of atomic { p }.
Every infinite execution (s0, . . .) of p, is also an execution of atomic { p } and therefore
the property holds trivially.
All programs that only take a single step, such as a single assignment, are trivially
R-atomic.
Remark 5.7. Note that the reverse implication of Lem. 5.6 does not hold. The reason is that
the crash behavior of an intermediate state si might not by subsumed by the initial state of
the execution or some final state reachable from the initial state, but maybe by several of
those. Consider for example the program
p ≡ {n := 1 ; n := 2 } with R = { (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 1), (2, 1), (2, 2) },
starting in a state where n = 0 holds. Then the potential set of intermediate values of n is
S = {0, 1, 2}. The set of R-reachable states therefore is also S. The program atomic { p }
does not have the intermediate state n = 1, but the set of R-reachable states is still S and the
subset relation of Lem. 5.6 holds. The intermediate state n = 1, however, is not R-subsumed
by either n = 0 or n = 2, only by the combination of both. This seems to be a rare case
though.
Thm. 2 lifts the substitution of atomic { p } for p to the level of entire components, where
synchronized states and retractions need to be considered.
Theorem 2 (Atomicity Refinement of Sequential Components). If the program p is crash-
recover-atomic in the context of a component C with invariant inv that always holds and with
assertion φ before every occurrence of p, i.e.,
φ, inv ⊢ p : ↶↷R for R of Eqn. (R-is-crash-recover) on page 50
is satisfied, then the component C refines the component A := C{p ↦→ atomic { p }} where
atomic { p } is substituted for p in C , i.e.,
C{p ↦→ atomic { p }} ⊑ C
holds and inv is also an invariant of C{p ↦→ atomic { p }}.1
Note that the component C{p ↦→ atomic { p }} is only more atomic than C if we prove
termination afterwards, as is done during the invariant and assertion proofs of Sec. 4.6.
1If the recovery operation is not considered atomic, then it is necessary to first prove that recovery
is crash-recover-atomic. This allows substituting the recovery operation with its atomic version. Another
approach is to show crash-atomicity for p, then substitution in a non-atomic recovery operation is also
possible.
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Figure 5.4: Constructing a reset transition for A = C{p ↦→ atomic { p }} based on a reset
transition of C : The original execution of C is depicted in as black arrows. The execution
of A makes the blue detours from the run of C , if the program p is the source or target of
the retraction transition of C .
Proof. The sequential input/output behavior of the component C is obviously preserved by
the substitution. Furthermore, A has fewer states than C , and therefore the invariant inv
has the invariant inv, too.
Assume that the reset transition s Reset s′ of C leads from an intermediate state s of
the execution of operation OpCi to the state s′. We construct a reset transition s̃
Reset s′ of
A starting in an intermediate state s̃ of the corresponding execution of OpCi . This shows that
the crash behavior is preserved by the substitution. The interesting case of this argument
is visualized in Fig. 5.4 and should be followed alongside the semantics of reset transitions
shown in Fig. 4.8 on page 36.
If the intermediate state s of C is not produced during the execution of p, we choose
s̃ = s. Otherwise, we use the state directly before the execution of p as s̃. This state is also
part of the corresponding execution in A. Similarly, if the target of the retraction transition
of C is not part of the execution of p, we chose the same state for the retraction and the state
directly before the execution of p otherwise. In the former case the remaining transitions of
the reset are exactly identical. In the latter case Lem. 5.6 guarantees that the re-execution of
atomic { p } of A can reach the same state s′ after crash and recovery as the re-execution of
p of C .
Note that the executions of A have fewer synchronized states and that therefore more
retractions are allowed.
The drawback of the criterion of R-atomicity is that it cannot be used to incrementally
construct ever larger atomic blocks, i.e., if programs p and q are R-atomic, it does not follow
that {p; q} is also R-atomic. Consider the example programs p and q with
p ≡ n := n + 1 and q ≡ n := n − 1 and R = {(n,n′) | n′ ≤ n}.
Then
Jatomic { p; q }K o9R = JskipK o9R = R ≠ JpK o9R = Jp; qK o9R
clearly holds, since for example the right-hand side contains the pair (0, 1), while the left-hand
side does not.
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5.2.3 R-Neutrality, R-Retractability and R-Introducibility











Figure 5.5: A Hierarchy of
Criteria for Atomicity
that if p and q satisfy the criterion †, then
{p; q} also satisfies †. All criteria imply R-
atomicity and therefore Lem. 5.6 is applica-
ble.
Fig. 5.5 depicts this hierarchy and the
symbols used for each criterion.
The criteria also admit a calculus that
in practice can be applied mostly automat-
ically.
Ch. 6 shows how the calculus is applied
to the Flashix file system and the kind of
proof obligations that remain to be shown.
The strongest criterion is R-neutrality,
which basically states that the crash behav-
ior is not changed in any of the steps of a
program, and is given by Def. 5.8.
Definition 5.8 (R-Neutral). A program p is R-neutral if and only if for finite executions
(s0, . . . , sn) the states {si}i are R-equivalent. We denote with φ, inv ⊢ p :≡R the judgment
that p is R-neutral.
The symbol ≡ indicates that the crash behavior is the same throughout an execution of
the program.
Examples of (parts of) crash-recover-neutral (steps of) programs include the evaluation of
tests (in e.g. if and while programs), skip and assignments to variables that are irrelevant
to the crash behavior. Irrelevant variables are e.g. local variables and the RAM state of the
component.
A crash-recover-neutral program p may always be combined into an atomic block with
the preceding or subsequent program, but not necessarily with both at the same time, since
the combination is not always crash-recover-neutral again.
A more general, but less intuitive criterion is given by R-retractability in Def. 5.9. If p
is R-retractable, then the program {p; q} may be replaced by atomic { p; q } assuming q is
R-atomic. For example q could be an assignment.
Definition 5.9 (R-Retractable Programs). A program p is R-retractable if and only if for
each finite execution (s0, . . . , sn) the initial state subsumes the crash behavior of all following
states, i.e., si ⊑R s0 holds for 0 ≤ i ≤ n. We denote with φ, inv ⊢ p :↶R the judgment that
p is R-retractable.
The symbol ↶ signifies that the initial state of every execution already exhibits the crash
behavior of the entire execution.
For example synchronizing programs p are R-retractable, since after execution of p it is
ensured that the data is persisted, i.e., the behavior on a power failure is just identity of the
state, whereas before p the data is only potentially persisted.
Another criterion is R-introducibility. It is in some sense symmetrical to R-retractability
and also weaker than R-neutrality. If q is R-introducible, then { p; q } may be replaced by
atomic { p; q } assuming p is R-atomic.
Definition 5.10 (R-Introducible). A program p is R-introducible if and only if for each finite
execution I = (s0, . . . , sn) and for each state si there is a finite execution I ′ = (s′0, . . . , s′n)
starting in s′0 = s0 with si ⊑R s′n holds. We call the execution I ′ the R-subsuming execution
of si. We denote with φ, inv ⊢ p :↷R the judgment that p is R-introducible.
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The symbol ↷ indicates that the crash behavior of initial and intermediate states of an
execution is subsumed by final states of a (potentially other) execution of the program.
Remark 5.11. Note that Def. 5.10 facilitates the interaction between R-introducibility and
atomic blocks by postponing proofs of termination. This allows us for example to infer
R-introducibility of while φ do { p } based solely on R-introducibility of p. This is also a
minor change to our definition in [47, 107]. It is made possible by the semantics of atomic
blocks of Def. 3.5 on page 20. Another change to the definition is that it is not necessary
to complete the execution starting in si; it is instead sufficient to find a possibly different
execution from the same initial state.
Lem. 5.12 states that the implications shown in the hierarchy in Fig. 5.5 in fact hold.
Lemma 5.12 (Hierarchy of Criteria for Atomicity). If program p is R-neutral it is also
R-retractable and R-introducible. If p is either R-retractable or R-introducible it is also
R-atomic.
Proof. By definition of the respective criteria.
Remark 5.13. Note that if a program p is R-introducible and R-retractable it is not necessarily
also R-neutral. Take for example the program
p ≡ skip ∨ {n := n − 1 }
and the relation R = {(n,n′) | n′ ≤ n}. Program p is R-retractable since decreasing n only
restricts the available values of n after R. Furthermore, p is R-introducible, which is ensured
by the skip and Lem. 5.20. However, the program is not R-neutral, since the set of values
available after R might have been reduced.
As stated already R-atomicity does not admit sequential composition. Lem. 5.14 states,
however, that all other criteria in fact propagate to the sequential composition.
Lemma 5.14 (Atomicity Criteria & Sequential Composition). If p and q are both R-neutral,
both R-retractable or both R-introducible programs, then so is {p; q}.
Proof. For R-neutrality this is obvious by its definition, since only two intervals with R-
equivalent states are concatenated.
Assume program p and q are R-retractable. Every finite execution I = (s0, . . . , sn) can
be split into I ′ = (s0, . . . , sj) and I ′′ = (sj , . . . , sn) where I ′ and I ′′ is the execution of p and
q, respectively. For all si with i ≤ j, si ⊑R s0 by R-retractability of p. For all other si, the
chain si ⊑R sj ⊑R s0 holds by R-retractability of both programs.
Assume that p and q are R-introducible. Given a finite execution I = (s0, . . . , sn), then
there is an index j with 0 ≤ j ≤ n splitting the interval into a part where p runs and a part
where q runs.
For states si with i ≥ j, by R-introducibility of q there is an R-subsuming execution I ′ of
si starting in sj . The interval (s0, . . . , sj) o9I ′ is the sought-after R-subsuming execution.
If i < j holds, then there is an R-subsuming execution I ′ of si starting in s0. If the
execution I ′ = (s′0, . . . , s′m) is finite with si ⊑R s′m, then s′m has an R-subsuming interval I ′′
starting in sm, since q is also R-introducible. I ′ o9I ′′ is then the sought-after R-subsuming
execution.
If one of the programs in { p; q } is R-atomic only the weaker form of sequential composition
of Lem. 5.15 holds.
Lemma 5.15 (R-Atomicity & Sequential Composition). If p is R-atomic and q is R-
introducible or p is R-retractable and q is R-atomic, then {p; q} is R-atomic.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lem. 5.14.
The criteria also propagate over loops as shown by Lem. 5.16.
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Lemma 5.16 (Atomicity Criteria & Loops). If p is R-neutral, R-introducible, or R-retractable,
then so is while φ do { p } and p∗.
Proof. For a finite execution I of while φ do { p } there is a finite n with I |= (skip; p)n ; skip
by unfolding the while-loop until it terminates. Then Lem. 5.14 can be applied. The proof
for p∗ is similar.
Recursive calls require an inductive argument. Since nontermination is excluded from
consideration by each of the criteria, Lem. 5.17 just replaces the recursive call with an
assignment that captures all possible effects of the recursive call, while still satisfying the
atomicity criterion in question. In order to state the lemma we define the formula ACrit†R(x, x ′)
for † ∈ {↶↷,↶,↷,≡} by Equations. (ACrit†R).
ACrit≡R(x, x ′) ≡ ∀x ′′. R(x, x ′′)↔ R(x ′, x ′′) (ACrit
†
R)
ACrit↷R (x, x ′) ≡ ∀x ′′. R(x, x ′′)→ R(x ′, x ′′)
ACrit↶R (x, x ′) ≡ ∀x ′′. R(x, x ′′)← R(x ′, x ′′)
ACrit↶↷R (x, x ′) ≡ ∀x ′′. ( R(x, x ′′)→ R(x ′, x ′′) ) ∨ ( R(x, x ′′)← R(x ′, x ′′) )
The equations just captures ⊑R and ≡R syntactically.
For the lemma we assume that we are in the context of a sequential component, where
the state variables x are always passed unmodified as additional arguments to (recursive)
calls and the formula R is only expressed in the state variables x. Furthermore, we assume
the state variables are never hidden by a let-binding in the body of the procedure.
Lemma 5.17 (Atomicity Criteria & (Recursive) Calls). A (recursive) call Proc(t; x, y),
where x are the state variables of the corresponding component and free(t) ∩ free(R) = ∅ and
free(R) ⊆ x ∪ x ′ holds, with declaration
Proc(u; x, z) { p }
is R-atomic, R-neutral, R-introducible or R-retractable, if the program
p′ ≡ let u = t in { p̂{z ↦→ y} }
is, where p̂ is derived from p by replacing all recursive calls Proc(t0; x, y0), with
choose* x1, y1 with ACrit
†
R(x, x1) in y0 := y1, x := x1
for the corresponding † ∈ {↶↷,↶,↷,≡}. The recursive calls must also satisfy the restriction
free(t0) ∩ free(R) = ∅.
The additional condition free(t) ∩ free(R) = ∅ in Lem. 5.17 for the initial call and
free(t0)∩ free(R) = ∅ for all recursive calls essentially states that input and output parameters
are always in main memory for the rule to apply.
Note that Lem. 5.17 is a rather coarse abstraction for recursive calls, for example variables
in main memory are assigned arbitrarily by it, but it is possible to strengthen the proof
obligation with assertions directly after the recursive call and establish them during the
invariant proofs of Sec. 4.6 if this should be necessary.
A very strong criterion for atomic blocks is given by Lem. 5.18.
Lemma 5.18 (Atomicity Criteria & Atomic Blocks). If p is R-atomic, R-neutral, R-
retractable or R-introducible, so is atomic φ { p } for any φ.
Proof. Note that any execution where φ does not hold initially is a non-termination one
in the sequential setting. Every finite execution of atomic { p } is either an execution of
p or has the form (s0, sn) and there is an execution I = (s0, . . . , sn) of p. In the first case
the proposition immediately follows. In case of R-neutrality and R-retractability s0 ≡R sn
and sn ⊑R s0 immediately hold, respectively. For R-introducibilty there is an execution
I ′ = (s0, . . . , sm) with sn ⊑R sm. Then (s0, sm) is also an execution of atomic { p }.
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φ, inv ⊢ p :↷R
Figure 5.6: Rely/Guarantee Rules of the Calculus for R-Atomicity, R-Neutrality, R-
Retractability & R-Introducibility
Lem. 5.19 proves that assertions may just be assumed for a proof of atomicity.
Lemma 5.19 (Atomicity Criteria & Assertions). If p is R-atomic, R-neutral, R-retractable
or R-introducible in a context where φ holds, so is {assert ψ; p } in any context.
Proof. Any termination execution I = (s0, . . . , sn) of {assert ψ; p } satisfies s0 |= φ.
Additionally, one can make any R-atomic single-step program q R-introducible by com-
bining it non-deterministically with a R-introducible program p to { p ∨ q }.
Lemma 5.20 (R-Introducible & Nondeterminism). If p is R-introducible and has a finite
execution starting from any state and q is R-atomic, then { p ∨ q } is R-introducible.
Proof. Any finite execution I = (s0, . . . , sn) of { p ∨ q } is either one of p or q. In the first
case, there is an R-subsuming execution immediately by R-introducibility of p. Otherwise,
either sn ⊑R s0 holds or there already is an R-subsuming execution by R-atomicity of q. In
the former case R-introducibility of p yields a R-subsuming execution I ′ = (s0, . . . , sm) with
s0 ⊑R sm. This step assumes that p actually has any finite executions starting in s0. Then
I ′ is also an R-subsuming execution for sn, because sn ⊑R s0 ⊑R sm holds.
Lem. 5.21 states that in order to prove crash-recover-atomicity, it is sufficient to prove
crash-atomicity, which significantly simplifies the reasoning if the recover procedure is given
by a large and complex program.
Lemma 5.21 (Crash-Recover-Atomicity). If a program p is crash-atomic, then it is also
crash-recover-atomic.
Proof. The assumption yields crash-subsuming states. These states are also crash-recover-
subsuming by Lem. 5.3.
5.2.4 R-Atomicity Calculus
Fig. 5.6 reduces the judgments φ, inv ⊢ p :† for † ∈ {↶↷,↶,↷,≡} to purely rely/guarantee
reasoning. The criteria only talk about intervals with empty environment, therefore the rely
states that environment steps do not modify the flexible variables X . For all rules except
R-Neutral, the initial state is stored in the static variable x . The invariants that needs to be
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φ, inv ⊢ p :†R Reduce R-Atomic
φ, inv ⊢ p : ↶↷R
φ, inv ⊢ p :≡R Reduce R-Retractable
φ, inv ⊢ p :↶R
φ, inv ⊢ p :≡R Reduce R-Introducible
φ, inv ⊢ p :↷R
φ ∧ ψ, inv ⊢ p :†R Atomic
†∈{↶↷,↶,↷,≡}φ, inv ⊢ atomic ψ { p } :†R
φ ∧ ψ, inv(x) ⊢ ⟨|p|⟩ true
R-Atomic
φ, inv ⊢ atomic ψ { p } : ↶↷R
R-Atomic
Assignmentφ, inv ⊢ x := t : ↶↷R
RAM Assignment,
x ∩ free(R) = ∅φ, inv ⊢ x := t :≡R
φ, inv ⊢ p : ↶↷R φ, inv(x0), x0 = x, ⟨p⟩ true ⊢ [p] (ACrit
↶
R (x0, x)) R-Atomic
Retractableφ, inv ⊢ p :↶R
φ, inv ⊢ p : ↶↷R φ, inv(x0), x0 = x, ⟨p⟩ true ⊢ ⟨p⟩ (ACrit
↷
R (x0, x)) R-Atomic
Introducibleφ, inv ⊢ p :↷R
φ, inv ⊢ p : ↶↷R inv ⊢ q :↷R Seq. Comp.
Leftφ, inv ⊢ {p; q} : ↶↷R
φ, inv ⊢ p :↶R inv ⊢ q : ↶↷R Seq. Comp.
Rightφ, inv ⊢ {p; q} : ↶↷R
φ, inv ⊢ p :†R inv ⊢ q :†R Seq. Comp.
φ, inv ⊢ {p; q} :†R
φ ∧ ψ, inv ⊢ p :†R Assertion
φ, inv ⊢ assert ψ; p :†R
φ ∧ ψ, inv ⊢ p :†R φ ∧ ¬ψ, inv ⊢ q :†R If
φ, inv ⊢ if* ψ then p else q :†R
(φ ∨ φ′) ∧ ψ, inv ⊢ p :†R While
φ, inv ⊢ while ψ do { p; assert φ′ } :†R
φ, inv ⊢ p :†R φ, inv ⊢ q :†R Or
φ, inv ⊢ p ∨ q :†R
inv ⊢ p :†R Iteration
φ, inv ⊢ p∗ :†R
φ, inv ⊢ p :↷R φ, inv ⊢ q : ↶↷R φ, inv ⊢ ⟨p⟩ true Or Left
(Or Right symmetric)φ, inv ⊢ p ∨ q :↷R
φ ∧ ψ, inv ⊢ p :†R φ ∧ ∀x.¬ψ, inv ⊢ q :†R Choose
x ∩ free(R) = ∅φ, inv ⊢ choose* x with ψ in p ifnone q :†R
φ, inv ⊢ p′ :†R Call p′ as in
Lem. 5.17 on page 56φ, inv ⊢ Proc(t; x, y) :†R
Figure 5.7: Calculus for R-Atomicity, R-Neutrality, R-Retractability & R-Introducibility for
Sequential Programs, with † ∈ {↶,↷,≡} except where otherwise noted
established then ensures the desired criterion. Note that infinite traces are not excluded from
consideration by the rules, i.e., the rules imply a stronger criterion.
Obviously rely/guarantee reasoning is difficult, specifically the existence proof of an
R-subsuming execution of p in every intermediate step is quite laborious. Fig. 5.7 shows an
alternative proof method. The rules of the calculus profit from the assertions and invariants
established as part of the termination proof of Sec. 4.6.
Most rules are proven correct by the above lemmas, except for RAM Assignment, R-
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Atomic Retractable and R-Atomic Introducible. The rule RAM Assignment holds, because R
is arbitrary on all variables outside free(R). If we choose R as the crash, then x ∩ free(R)
corresponds to the intuition that the variables x are in main memory and therefore not
mentioned in the formula describing the transition of the crash. Then the values of x are
irrelevant to the behavior modulo R and the assignment is R-neural. The other two rules
underlies the insight that if a program is already R-atomic then it is already clear that the
“interesting” behavior is at the initial and final states of the interval. The dynamic logic proof
obligations then only need to establish that the behavior can be observed solely in the initial
and final states for retractability and introducibility, respectively. For both rules at least one
terminating execution may be assumed additionally.
The additional condition x ∩ free(R) = ∅ for the rule Choose just means that renaming is
necessary to avoid clashes and is not a restriction per se.
5.3 Data Refinement
The atomicity refinement of the previous step usually yields a specification component C ′ for
the initial component C as discussed for the example of the Flashix file system in Ch. 6. This
step obviously maintains the complex data structures and algorithms of the implementation
C .
Like in standard data refinement [40], data refinement of crash-aware components allows
for changes in the representation of data. It is typically proved using forward simulations. New
proof obligations for crash-aware components result from the reset transitions sn Reset sn+1
and internal operations.
The proof obligations for changing data representation are just slightly more complex
than standard data refinement.
Theorem 3 (Data Refinement). A refinement A ⊑ C of two compatible specification
components A and C is implied by a forward simulation abs(xA, xC ) satisfying the conditions
(1.) to (5.) for all i ∈ I, k ∈ K, inputs in and outputs out0 and out1.
1. ⟨|initC (; xC )|⟩
(
⟨initA(; xA)⟩ abs(xA, xC )
)
(initialization)
2. preAi (in, xA) ∧ abs(xA, xC ) (correctness)
→ ⟨|OpCi (in; xC , out0|⟩(
⟨OpAi (in; xA, out1)⟩
(
abs(xA, xC ) ∧ out0 = out1
) )
3. guardCk (xC ) ∧ abs(xA, xC ) (internal)
→ ⟨|IOpCi (; xC )|⟩
(
⟨IOpAi (; xA)⟩ abs(xA, xC )
)
4. syncA(xA) ∧ abs(xA, xC )→ syncC (xC ) (synchronization)
5. abs(xA0 , xC0 ) ∧ crash
C (xC0 , xC1 ) (crash)
→ ⟨|recoverC (; xC1 )|⟩(
∃xA1 . crash
A(xA0 , xA1 ) ∧ ⟨recoverA(; xA1 )⟩ abs(xA1 , xC1 )
)
Note that for interface operations the precondition of the abstract component A is used.
In contrast for internal operations the guard of the concrete component C is assumed.
The synchronization condition states that fewer states of component A are synchronized
and therefore all retractions over n operation of C are also allowed for A. The crash condition
abstracts the remaining effect of a power cut after a recovery of both components.
Proof of Thm. 3. The proof composes commuting diagrams as usual, starting with two
related initial states given by (1.). For transitions of interface and internal operations, proof
obligation (2.) and (3.) gives the relevant commuting diagram, respectively. A retraction of
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Figure 5.9: S-R-Completable Transition
component C is mapped to a retraction over the same number of operations in A. Condition
(4.) ensures that each unsynchronized state retracted by C can be retracted by A as well. The
re-execution of the reset transition commutes due to (2.) and (3.). Condition (5.) commutes
the rest of the reset transition.
Note that the invariants of Sec. 4.6 and the corresponding theorems about the operations
can be used in the proofs of data refinement.
5.4 Crash Refinement
The third kind of refinement, termed crash refinement, replaces the specification of the reset
transition of a single specification component, i.e., crash refinement assumes that the data
structures and operations are the same on both levels. The basic idea is to move parts of a
power cut from a crash transition to the retraction transition by looking at the history fragment
sn
Opi(in,out) sn+1
Reset sn+2 of the component before a reset transition and construct a
different explanation of how the component ended up in sn+2. This construction yields an
alternative intermediate state s′n+1 from a set S ⊆ dom(R). The relation R and the formula
R denote the crash and subsequent recovery as in Eqn. (R) and Eqn. (R-is-crash-recover)
on page 50. This allows us to simplify the crash and recovery transition to the relation S ◁R,
where S ◁R denotes the domain restriction of relation R to the set S. We assume the set of
states S is given by a formula S.
Definition 5.22 (R-Retractable Transition). A transition s0
Op(in,out)
s1 of an operation
Op of a specification component is R-retractable, if and only if every state s2 with s1 R s2,
also satisfies s0 R s2.
If a transition is R-retractable, it did not have any immediate permanent effect and
we can ignore that it ever took place directly before a crash happened. Figure 5.8 depicts
this alternative execution in bold. This does not mean that the execution will never have a
permanent effect. Any of the subsequent operations may very well persist the data of previous
operations.
Note that Def. 5.22 defined R-retractable for transitions, not programs as is done in Sec. 5.2.
A program is R-retractable if all state transitions of a finite execution are R-retractable.
Definition 5.23 (S-R-Completable Transition). A transition s0
Op(in,out)
s1 of an operation
Op of a specification component is S-R-completable, if and only if for every state s2 with
s1
R s2 there is an execution s0
Op(in,out′)
s′1 with s′1 ∈ S and s′1
R s2 for some output
out′.
If a transition is S-R-completable it is possible to construct an alternative partial execution
that ended in an S-state without any difference after a crash. Figure 5.9 depicts this alternative
execution in bold.
Def. 5.24 lifts Def. 5.22 and Def. 5.23 to the level of one operation.
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Figure 5.10: From the State-based to the Operations-based Reset Specification
Definition 5.24 (S-R-Completable Operation). An operation Op of a specification com-
ponent is S-R-completable, if and only if every transition of Op is either R-retractable or
S-R-completable.
The following theorem can be used to abstract a state-based crash specification as part
of C to an operations-based crash specification by A.
Theorem 4 (Crash Refinement). Given two specification components
A=
(





x, init, {Opi}i∈I, {IOpk}k∈K, syncC , crash
C , recover, ∅
)
that only differ in their crash and synchronized predicates. Then A ⊑ C is implied by the






∧ crashC (x0, x1)→ crash
A(x0, x1)
2. syncA(x)→ syncC (x)
3. ⟨OpC (in; x0, out)⟩ crash
C (x0, x1)
→ crashC (x0, x1) ∨
(
⟨OpA(in; x0, out′)⟩ crash
A(x0, x1)
)
The first proof obligation of Thm. 4 asserts that if the state x0 is in the domain of the
crash predicate of A, then it corresponds to the crash predicate of C . The second proof
obligation ensures that the component A permits further retractions than C . The third
condition establishes that all operations are S-R-completable for
S ≡ ∃x ′. crashA(x, x ′) and R ≡ crashC (x, x ′),
i.e. S and R corresponds to the domain of the crash predicate of A and the crash predicate
of C , respectively.
We usually apply Thm. 4 with crash predicates that satisfy the (stronger) condition
that the domain of the crash predicate of A is a proper subset of the domain of the crash
predicate of C . Then the theorem strengthens the crash transition, i.e., a crash can happen
in fewer states of component A than of component C and is therefore simpler to express.
This is compensated by further retractions on the history of A in comparison to those of C .
These retractions are then easily propagated upwards over abstractions with data refinement
(Thm. 3 on page 59).
Proof of Thm. 4. We choose the run of C as the run of A and focus on the reset transition.
Figure 5.10 depicts the situation before the power cut (omitting input and output labels for
brevity), starting in a state s0 where both C and A are synchronized. Such a state exists
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because at least in the initial state and after every power cut both components are in a
synchronized state. The four parts of the reset transition of C are depicted in the figure
starting in state sn and ending in sn+1. First, C retracts all operations and reaches state
sk, then some operation is re-executed and reaches state s′k+1 (or the transition stutters).
Finally, the crash and recovery are applied and yield the final state sn+1.
We construct a matching reset transition of A, depicted by arrows in the figure. All
operations that C retracts are also retracted by A (retraction from sn to sk). However, the
retraction transition might be further still (retraction from sk to sl). The idea is to determine
a state s′l+1 of component A with the properties shown in the figure: there is an additional
second retraction to sl, a re-execution that yields s′l+1 and the (restricted) crash crash
A is
possible in state s′l+1.
The construction considers the alternative run
s0 sk
Opi or stutter s′k+1
crashC s′n
recover sn+1
of C that does not retract or re-execute any operations. This run is implied by Remark 4.21
on page 37. The existence of A’s retraction and re-execution is proven by induction over k.









is also a run of A: the additional retraction and re-execution transitions stutter. Note that the
crash predicate is applicable in this state, because crashes are always possible in synchronized
states according to the definition of weak admissibility of components (Def. 4.3 on page 28).
Otherwise, Opi is S-R-completable and therefore the transition sk
Opi s′k+1 is either:




is also a valid run. The induction hypothesis gives a matching run of A and a history
jump over m operations for this sequence. The retraction for the original sequence then
is over m+ 1 operations and we take the re-execution from the induction hypothesis






holds for some state s′′k+1 in the domain of the crash predicate crash
A. We choose





is the alternative run of A with s′l+1 in the domain of crash
A and the retraction
stutters.
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5.5 Related Work
Refinement and abstraction of atomicity is quite common in the context of the verification of
concurrent systems as discussed in Ch. 13 further. Lipon [87] observed that under certain
conditions a program can be replaced by an atomic section. The calculus of atomic actions due
to Elmas et al. [42] is an extension of Lipton’s approach for highly concurrent, linearizable
programs. The refinement calculus of Back [14] uses the opposite direction. Instead of
abstracting a program to an atomic block, one starts out with an atomic program and splits
it into smaller actions.
The Crash Hoare logic employed in the FSCQ file system [27, 28, 26] adds a crash condition
to standard Hoare triples. The verification considers each individual step of a program and
has to prove that the step implies the crash condition. The calculus for atomicity presented
in this chapter allows for an incremental increase in atomicity of an entire component. In the
context of the Flashix file system the criterion of crash-introduciblity can be proven by a
simple pre/post-verification. This simplifies proofs significantly.
Ntzik et al. [101] propose a variant of separation logic [114] that facilitates reasoning about
volatile and durable memory and power failures. The judgments S ⊢ {PV |PD} p {QV |QD}
of the language extend separation logic with a fault-condition S. The formula PV and PD
describes the volatile and durable part of the state before the execution of p, respectively. The
fault-condition S describes the states of durable memory after a recovery. This is similar to
the crash condition of Chen et al. [27, 28, 26]. The methodology is similar to the state-based
approach, since the fault condition S refers to the state and it is the only guarantee that is
given in the event of a power failure. In [101] the methodology is applied to a fault-tolerant
bank transfer and to a model of a database system with logging.
Marić and Sprenger [90] model power failures explicitly as exceptions with a handler that
performs the recovery and increase the atomicity with respect to power failures incrementally,
similar to the approach of this chapter. They also observe that a complete run of a program
might already capture the full crash behavior of the system. Their approach is similar to the
state-based approach for sequential, crash-aware components.
An implicit specification mechanism with synchronized states and retractions is not
considered in related work.
Standard data refinement is due to Hoare et al. [64, 60]. It is used in many formalism for
incremental refinement, such as Z [133, 40, 41].
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The Flashix File System and its Components: Write-Back
Caching, Commit & Crashes as Cross-Cutting Concerns
Summary. The development of the Flashix file system is conducted with the formal-
ism and methodology introduced in Ch. 4 and 5. This chapter gives an overview over
the components of the file system and details how the methodology is applied to the
case study. Two cross-cutting concerns are discussed: The non-local effect of write-back
caching of user data by a write-buffer and its propagation with the synchronized states
of Ch. 4 is explained conceptually, before the models are presented in more detail
in Ch. 11 and Ch. 12. The second aspect that permeates several components is the
commit of the file system, at which point several internal data structures are persisted.
During normal operations updates to these data structures are cached. Finally, the
error model and its interaction with power failures is discussed. The error model
facilitates contracting individual steps of a components into larger atomic blocks.
This guarantees atomicity with respect to power failures and connects the atomicity
refinement developed in Ch. 5 with the presentation of the case study in Chapters 7
to 12.
Publications. This Chapter is based on the overview over the Flashix project
published in [118]. The application of the theory to the case study is part of [107, 45].
The models are updated to reflect the current state of the project.
Contents
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6.2 Non-Local Effects of Write-Buffering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
6.3 Commit & Recovery as Cross-Cutting Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
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6.1 Flashix: A Hierarchy of Components
The Flashix file system is composed of a total of 20 components. Fig. 6.1 depicts the com-
ponents and their relationship. Eleven of the components are specification components.
The remaining 9 components are implementations and used for code generation. The im-
plementation components are depicted in gray in the figure. The POSIX specification is
realized and implemented in incremental and modular steps, i.e., each of the implementation
components deals with a specific concern and delegates conceptually separate issues to a
subcomponent. The verification only has to consider one implementation component and an
abstract specification of the subcomponent(s) at a time. Correctness of substitution of refined
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Figure 6.1: Flashix: A Hierarchy of Components
components then ensures that the system composed of only the implementation components
is functionally correct, too. The final implementation’s observable behavior therefore adheres
to the top-level POSIX specification.
In the following the system boundaries and the responsibilities and main data structures
of the implementation components are discussed briefly in order to obtain an overview over
the interactions between the components. The subsequent chapters 7 to 12 then present the
components formally with invariants and abstraction relations and sketch important steps
in the refinement proofs. The formal models and mechanized proofs conducted with the
interactive verified KIV are available online.1
This thesis contributes the following models from Fig. 6.1 and their correctness proofs:
The implementation components Transactions, Node Serialization, Wbuf , Superblock, EBM
and Header Serialization, and the specification components Index &Persistence, Persistence,
Wbuf (Op-based), Wbuf (State-based), Commit, AEBM , EBM Headers and Flash. The spec-
ification component Index &Journal is joint work with Gidon Ernst [43].
The system boundaries of the Flashix file system are the POSIX specification located at
the top-left and the model of flash hardware located at the bottom-right of the figure.
POSIX The top-level component POSIX specifies the interface, functional correctness and
crash-safety for the entire Flashix file system, in accordance with the POSIX Standard [3].
The component abstractly captures a file system as an algebraic tree that represents the
directory structure. The nodes of the tree correspond to files and directories and the edges
assign a name to the target node. Structural operations of POSIX modify the directory
hierarchy only. The file contents are kept in a separate data structure from the tree, accessed
by read, write and truncation operations. Open file handles store the access mode and the
current offset in the file. The component and the guarantees Flashix provides is presented in
Ch. 7 in more detail.
Flash The lower system boundary of the Flashix file system is the specification Flash,
which captures the characteristics and limitations of flash hardware. It is based on the Linux
interface MTD (= Memory Technology Devices), implemented by all drivers for raw flash
hardware. The specification divides the storage into erase blocks and each block into several
pages. Preconditions ensure that only sequential writes within an erase block are permissible
and that only full pages may be written. The limitation to sequential writes also prevents
overwrites of pages until the entire block is erased. The specification also formalizes and
clarifies the assumptions of the file system about hardware errors and the behavior of the
1http://isse.de/flashix
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flash device during power failures. Ch. 8 presents the full model and details and discusses
the assumptions underlying the model and therefore Flashix.
The remainder of this section covers the implementation components, in the order from
top to bottom of the figure.
Virtual File System Switch (= VFS) The component VFS is the first step in the
implementation of the POSIX specification and takes on the responsibility of implementing all
file system independent operations, such as tree traversal, access checks and the management
of open file handles.
For a given path to a file or directory the VFS performs a traversal of the directory tree
in order to find the specific file system objects that are accessed. There are three types of file
system objects: Inodes capture the meta data of files and directories, such as permissions,
sizes and number of hard links. Directory entries or dentries correspond to the edges in the
directory tree. A page is a segment of the file’s contents. The segments are usually of 4KiB
size and do not necessarily correspond to the size of a page on the flash hardware. The tree
traversal takes permissions checking into account, i.e., in order to access a file or directory
certain permissions for all directories on the path are required and need to be checked.
The specification component AFS (= Abstract File System) provides access to individual
file system objects, i.e., it is possible to retrieve the meta data to files and directories, query
whether a directory entry of a given directory exists and which inode it refers to, and read
and write individual pages of the file. During path lookup several queries of dentries and
inodes are performed, afterwards a call to a single operation modifies the accessed file system
objects atomically.
Details about the component VFS and AFS and the refinement proof POSIX ⊑ VFS are
discussed in Ernst [43, Ch. 8] and [48, 46].
Flash File System Core (= FFSC) The component AFS is implemented by the Flash
File System Core, which introduces the concepts of a log-structured file system. These
concepts are necessary in order to deal with the characteristics of flash hardware efficiently.
Updates to the file system objects are written out-of-place, and an index is kept in order to
locate their most recent version. The file system objects are encapsulated into nodes and
several nodes are grouped into an atomic transaction.
Robustness in the event of a power failure is ensured by keeping a log of the changes to
the file system since the last commit. During a commit the log is emptied and the index is
written to flash. A replay of the log, starting from the flash index, is guaranteed to reconstruct
the most recent version of the RAM index in the event of a power failure.
The component FFSC introduces the concepts of log-structures file systems on a very
abstract level, e.g., the view on the storage device is basically unstructured and maps addresses
to algebraic data structures, and delegates their realization to the Transactions and B+-tree
components. Ch. 11 provides more detail on each of these components.
Transactions The component Transactions guarantees atomicity of transactions of several
nodes and introduces a block-structured view of the flash device. Out-of-place updates lead to
an accumulation of obsolete versions of file system objects in erase blocks. The Transactions
component locates blocks with few remaining live objects, moves them to a new location and
deallocates the erase block. This frees up memory. The component is tightly integrated with
the index, in order to check whether a file system object is still in use.
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B+-Tree The component B+-tree implements the index of the FFSC component with
a wandering, lazily loaded B+-Tree. The nodes of the tree are stored on flash during the
commit. In order to improve performance and decrease memory use not the entire index is
written, only the modified parts of the tree “wander” to new locations on the flash device,
in order to avoid overwrites and instead perform updates out-of-place. After a reboot or
recovery from a power failure, the index is not loaded immediately. Only once a node is
accessed during the traversal of the tree, it is loaded from flash. In order to free up space,
blocks with obsolete nodes of the B+-Tree also need to be garbage collected.
Node Serialization The transactional journal as well as the B+-Tree persist nodes on
the flash device. The component Node Serialization is responsible for tracking allocations of
erase blocks in the LEB Property Array. The data structure also accounts for the number of
bytes still referenced by live nodes, i.e., nodes that contain the current version of a file system
object or store a node of the B+-Tree. The component serializes both node types to bytes
and writes them to flash with the help of a write-buffer. There are two key properties that
have to be established by the byte representation of nodes. First, partially written nodes,
which might occur due to hardware failures or power loss, must be detected and taken care
of in order to ensure that nodes appear to be written atomically to the Transactions and
B+-tree components. Second, if synchronization is requested by the user, the component
must be able to write a padding node that fills the remaining space until the write-buffer is
properly flushed.
Write-Buffer The component Wbuf is the reason for the user-visible crash behavior of
the file system. The write-buffer caches the writes to a single erase block. In order to cope
with the first limitation of flash hardware, namely the necessity to write sequentially, it
provides an operation for appending data to the erase block. The appended data is retained
in main memory until a page-aligned write is possible. Only then the pages are written.
The write-buffer therefore alleviates two of the characteristics of flash hardware, namely the
limitation to sequential and to page-aligned writes.
Such a cache is order-preserving, in the sense that the orders in which data enters and
leaves the cache are the same. Therefore, the modeling methodology of synchronized states
of Ch. 4 is applicable. The cache stores data of the user, i.e., the directory structure and file
contents. Thus, its effect on a power failure is visible across the entire component hierarchy.
The theory of Ch. 4 facilitates the propagation of the effect of the cache upwards the entire
refinement hierarchy. Sec. 6.2 discusses this issue in more detail.
The write-buffer is the component where crash refinement of Ch. 5 is used to introduce
the operations-based view into the component hierarchy.
Superblock The component Superblock reserves part of the flash device for several of the
file system’s internal data structures. The most important one is the superblock, which is
used to guarantee the atomicity of file system commits. Furthermore, it stores the LEB
Property Array, a pointer to the root node of the index and several others. Each of these data
structures is only written during a commit and therefore we refer to them as the commit data
structures. Persisting every modification to them would incur a huge performance cost by
causing a lot of additional I/O operations, and is completely impractical for flash hardware
where only out-of-place updates are possible.
A commit also has the advantage that a consistent state of these data structures is stored,
which facilitates recovery after a reboot or a power failure. It is critical for the consistency of
the file system that the commit operation is therefore performed atomically.
To this end the superblock stores the address of the currently valid version of the commit
data structures. The commit data structures are written to a secondary location during a
commit and only if successful, the superblock is atomically exchanged with the addresses to
the new versions.
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The components Node Serialization, Wbuf and Superblock are discussed in more detail in
Ch. 12. The commit and recovery after a power failure affects multiple components of the
hierarchy. Sec. 6.3 gives a brief overview.
Erase Block Manager (= EBM) The erase block manager provides the abstraction of
logical erase blocks over the physical erase blocks of the flash hardware. This indirection allows
the component to move the contents from one physical block to another, again, transparently
to its clients. Data is moved in order to distribute erases of blocks evenly among the physical
blocks of the device, thereby increasing its lifetime. In order to pick suitable blocks for
wear-leveling several additional internal data structures are kept.
The component also performs a lot of error recovery. If a hardware error, such as an I/O
error during reading or writing, is detected the component attempts to move the contents of
the respective block to a new location transparently to the user. Errors are not completely
masked and may still surface at the level of the client. In these cases, however, the errors can
be treated as fatal and a file system should switch to a read-only mode.
The component maintains a partial forward mapping from logical to physical blocks
in main memory, and an inverse mapping in each physical block. The forward mapping
constitutes a write-back cache, i.e., updates to the inverse mapping are applied only lazily in
order to improve performance. After a power failure it is critical that a consistent forward
mapping is restored and that no data is lost.
The component EBM persists its internal data structures, i.e., mainly the inverse mapping,
with the help of the component Header Serialization. The component provides an abstract
algebraic view over the first few pages of each erase block in order to decouple the serialization
of data structures from the algorithmic part of the erase block manager. This facilitates the
verification of the erase block manager.
The component EBM and Header Serialization are discussed in Ch. 10 in more detail.
Ch. 14 extends the implementation and verification to a concurrent setting.
6.2 Non-Local Effects of Write-Buffering
This section discusses the effect of the write-buffer component on the entire model hierarchy
above this component. The synchronized states of Ch. 4 are employed to uniformly and easily
express the effect and propagate it upwards the refinement hierarchy.
As shown by Fig. 6.1 the write-buffer is in the middle of the component hierarchy of the
Flashix file system. Flash hardware only supports writing entire pages sequentially within an
erase block. Additionally, overwriting is not easily possible. Therefore it is necessary to cache
at least the contents of one flash page in main memory and only perform an I/O operation
once a page boundary is crossed.
Fig. 6.2 depicts the same situation at different levels of abstraction, starting from the
flash device at the lowest level and up to the level of POSIX at the top. At each level the
name of the corresponding component of Fig. 6.1 is shown. In the following we will see how
at each of these levels previously completed operations and their written data elements are
affected by a power failure.
The figure visualizes an erase block composed of eight pages at the bottom. The first five
pages are already filled with data. The sixth page is not yet written. However, the write-buffer
above the sixth page already contains some data—visualized in blue—for the page. Once
the page-sized cache is filled, the sixth page is written and the buffer is moved further along
the erase block. If the erase block itself is completely full, the write-buffer is moved to the
next block.
The buffer caches user data, such as the directory structure and the file contents, across
several operations. The figure visualizes the five write operations W1-W5 requested by the
client component of the write-buffer directly above the erase block. The dots signify the
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Figure 6.2: The effect of write-back caching of user data is propagated upwards the component
hierarchy by synchronized states.
states in between write operations. The starting point of each black arrow denotes the
offset in the erase block of the write operation. The arrow’s length corresponds to the number
of bytes written.
In the event of a power failure all data cached in the write-buffer is lost. With the
theory discussed in Ch. 4 this is expressible in terms of synchronized states as shown by
Equation (wbuf-synchronized). This definition marks all states in between operations where
the write-buffer was empty as synchronized.
synchronized states wbuf .bytes = 0 (wbuf-synchronized)
Note that Equation (wbuf-synchronized) only illustrates the concepts, Ch. 12 provides the
details of the write-buffer component.
In the figure synchronized states are visualized as slightly larger, red dots. The synchro-
nized states are exactly above the page boundaries. The effect of a power failure is visualized
in the figure by blue arrows, i.e., the last operation W5 is retracted and the second to
last operation W4 is re-executed. The re-execution yields the synchronized state s at the
boundary between the fifth and sixth page of the erase block. Note that the state s reached
by a crash can not be explained by the states of the write-buffer component in between
operations W1-W5 alone, i.e., re-execution of operations is necessary for an operations-based
explanation of the state s.
At the next level of abstraction in Fig. 6.1, the component Node Serialization serializes
nodes into bytes. A individual node is visualized in the figure as a rounded rectangle. Each
of the nodes corresponds to a modification of one file system object, such as directory or file
meta data, a directory entry or a segment of a file.
Several nodes are written at once, in a single transaction, in order to minimize the
number of I/O operations necessary. The nodes that belong to the same operation of the
component Node Serialization are visualized in the same color in Fig. 6.2. For example the
three gray nodes correspond to one operation call to the component Node Serialization by
its client, and the component issues the two writes W1 and W2 to persist the nodes.
At this level of abstraction a power failure removes the last two nodes, which again
corresponds to a retraction of the last, black operation and a re-execution of the second to
last, green operation reaching the state s′. In the state s′ only the five nodes are present.
The re-execution persists one node and then fails with an error. Note that the second green
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Figure 6.3: Effects of Write-Back Caching of Internal Data Structures
Effects of write-back caching of internal data structures diverges from effects on user data.
node is in reality written partially. Therefore, the component has to detect such partial nodes
and must hide them from its clients, i.e., the byte representation of nodes must ensure that
partially written nodes are detectable, as discussed in Ch. 12 in more detail. The synchronized
states on this level are no longer expressed in terms of the regular state, i.e., in terms of
nodes. They are modeled by an explicit state variable synced, which is set by a successful
call to an explicit synchronization operation and reset by any other operation.
state synced : B (nodes-synchronized)
synchronized states synced
The next level of abstraction, the component Transactions groups several nodes into one
transaction. The gray nodes, the single red node, the two green nodes and the single
black node each correspond to one transaction. The transaction is written by one call to
the component Node Serialization. It groups several modifications of different file system
objects. Transactions are atomic with respect to power failures. As shown in the figure, the
component Transactions retracts both the black and green operations during a crash. The
final state is then the synchronized state s′′. In order to guarantee atomicity of transactions
the component Transactions has to detect and discard incomplete transactions as shown in
Ch. 11.
At the top-level the first transaction might correspond to a single POSIX operation
while the remaining three transactions are also part of a single operation. The power failure
corresponds to a retraction and re-execution of the last operation, yielding the synchronized
state s′′′.
At the level of component Transactions and POSIX the synchronized states are also
expressed by an additional flag, similar to equation (nodes-synchronized). For these compo-
nents it is no longer easily feasible to express the crash as a predicate in the state before and
after the power failure without a lot of additional specification overhead.
This section shows the main levels of data abstraction above the write-buffer component
and how these components are affected by the caching mechanism it employs. As can be
seen power failures and recovery are cross-cutting concerns, i.e., it is not easily possible to
isolate and encapsulate them in some component. Instead most components of the Flashix file
system are affected by power failures and play a part in the recovery, because each of them
needs to mask part of the effect of a crash in order to guarantee the desired atomicity with
respect to power failures. Synchronized states are a simple approach to uniformly capture the
effect of order-preserving caches on large hierarchy of components. Order-preserving means
that the cache performs I/O operations in the order the data arrives in the cache.
6.3 Commit & Recovery as Cross-Cutting Concerns
The effect on user data as described in the previous section is, however, not the entire effect
of a power failure for intermediate components. Every file system has internal, persistent
data structures such as an index, which maps identifiers of file system objects to the physical
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address of the contents of the latest version of the object. Persisting every modification of
these data structures would greatly impact performance. Therefore, internal data structures
are written to the flash medium only at specific points, called commit. On a power failure the
version of these commit data structures at the point of the last commit is therefore recovered.
Fig. 6.3 visualizes the effect of the write-buffer on a power failure as the blue arrow.
The state of the previous commit is synchronized. The effect of the write-buffer reverts a
small number of operations, because only one page is cached. The effect on the internal data
structures, however, is quite large and depicted by the red arrow in the figure. In order
to restore a state where the internal data structures match the user data, a reconstruction
mechanism replays the modifications performed between the previous commit and the power
failure. Note that this reconstruction is not perfect, i.e., some effects are visible locally. The
commit data structures are accessed by different components of the Flashix file system,
therefore several of the components in the middle of the model hierarchy are affected by
these effects as discussed in more detail in Ch. 11 and Ch. 12. This effect is kept invisible to
the user.
The effects are modeled explicitly with the crash predicate of Ch. 4.
6.4 Error Model & Atomicity
Ch. 4 defines a calculus that facilitates reasoning about power failures by substituting an
atomic block atomic { p } for a subprogram p if p is crash-recover-atomic. We show for
every component of the hierarchy depicted in Fig. 6.1 on page 66 that every operation is
crash-introducible, which is a stronger criterion.
The hierarchy of components follows the pattern M A where M only contains RAM
state, i.e., the crash predicate crashM of the individual component M is just equivalent
to true. The entire persistent state is captured by the subcomponent A. The calculus in
Fig. 5.7 on page 58 can be employed to prove that all operations of the component M are
crash-introducible and by the rules of the calculus it is sufficient to prove that all operations
of A are crash-introducible as summarized by Thm. 5.
Theorem 5 (RAM Components & Atomicity). All operations of a RAM component M with
subcomponent A are crash-introducible (and thereby crash-atomic) if all operations of A are
crash-introducible.
Proof. The calculus of Fig. 5.7 on page 58 only yields the crash-introducibility of calls to the
subcomponent A as the only nontrivial premises. The reason is that the variables accessed
by component M , outside of the subcomponent calls to A, are disjoint from those of the
combined crash predicate ĉrash
M
. Therefore, the rule RAM-Assignment can be applied to
all assignments of the component M outside the calls of A.
Fig. 6.4 visualizes how Thm. 5 lifts this insight from the component A to its client
component. The run of the client component M is depicted as solid arrows at the bottom. It
starts in the state ms0⊕as0 and ends in state msn⊕asn. The large dots indicate that these
states are not intermediate state, but states in between two operations of M . Component M
calls two operations on the component A before reaching the final state of the operation.
According to the Def. 5.10 on page 54 we have to show that for each intermediate state
si = msi⊕asi of the operation of M there is another final state sm = msm⊕ asm of the
operation, which subsumes the crash behavior of si. For the intermediate state si directly
after the execution of OpAi in the figure, which produces state ms′i⊕as′i after a crash, we
try to complete the operation of M starting in the intermediate state si with a final state
msm⊕ asm that satisfies asm crash
A
as′i. This constructed final state msn⊕asn is an
alternative explanation of the actual state ms′i⊕as′i after the crash. Notice that the state
of component M is irrelevant with respect to the crash, since the crash predicate crashM is
equivalent to true. The figure shows an example for such a completion. All RAM operations in
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Figure 6.4: Hardware Errors and Crash-Recover-Introducible Completions
between the two subcomponent calls are reused as is. After the crash-introducible execution
of OpAj the new run might diverge from its origin. However, it is always maintained that an
edge crashA to the actual state ms′i⊕as′i after the power failure exists. The new run might
produce a different call sequence for the subcomponent A, shown by the additional call to
OpAk in the figure. This could for example be the effect of a retry mechanism of the component
M .
At each level of the hierarchy depicted in Fig. 6.1 on page 66 we then use Thm. 5
in order to conclude that all operations are atomic with respect to power failures. The
implementation components depicted in gray in the figure are all RAM components. All
specification components are atomic, and only a dynamic logic proof obligation remains to
be proved for each of their operations individually, as stated by Thm. 6.
Theorem 6 (Crash-Introducible Specification Components). An operation OpAi of a specifi-
cation component A with state x, precondition pre(in, x), invariant inv(x) and crash predicate
crash(x, x ′) is crash-introducible if the proof obligation
pre(in, x) ∧ inv(x) ∧ crash(x, x ′)
→ ⟨OpAi (in; x, out)⟩ crash(x, x ′)
holds for all inputs in, outputs out and states x and x ′.
Proof. A call OpAi (in; x, out) is equivalent to p ≡ atomic { OpAi (in; x, out) }, because A is a
specification component. Application of the rules R-Atomic Introducible and R-Atomic of
the calculus of Fig. 5.7 on page 58 on p yields the above proof obligation as a result, if the
formula for R-subsumption is expanded, and additionally the termination condition
pre(in, x) ∧ inv(x)→ ⟨|OpAi (in; x, out)|⟩ true
which is already proven for the component A in its invariant proof of Sec. 4.6.
The underlying reason why all components are crash-introducible lies in the error model.
Every operation of the component Flash basically either performs the operation successfully
or fails with an error code and without changing the state. Program (error model) shows
this pattern.
{ · · · ; err := ESUCCESS } ∨ { err := EIO } (error model)
All operations following this pattern are immediately crash-introducible by choosing the
program on the right-hand side of the nondeterministic choice, see also Lem. 5.20 on page 57.
Since error code err is in volatile state and therefore arbitrarily modified by a crash, the
flash operation has a run, which is completely reverted by a power failure.
Note that Program (error model) does not mean that at each intermediate level of
abstraction all operations may fail in this way. At intermediate level components usually
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also expose operations that are purely performed in main memory in the implementation
and therefore do not return an error code at all. In these circumstances however, the crash
predicate reverts the changes performed by the operation and the proof obligation of Thm. 6
is not trivial and reasoning about the specification of the power failure is necessary. An





Functional Correctness & Crash-Safety of File Systems
Summary. This chapter uses the framework of crash-aware components of Ch. 4 to
specify the behavior of a file system. As a basis the informal POSIX specification is
used and formalized as a component with precise and succinct guarantees in the event
of power cuts or other fatal crashes. The model of POSIX also gives the strongest
possible guarantee for other errors during the normal operations of the file system,
i.e., an error leaves user-observable state unmodified. The Flashix file system is a
refinement of this specification, implementing the behavior demanded by POSIX on
top of flash memory, which is known for its error-prone nature.
Publications. The basis of the POSIX specification described in this chapter is
published in [49]. The publications [47] and [107] extend the component POSIX to
cover crash-safety.
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Note that this chapter is based on previous work by Ernst [43, Ch. 7]. The contribution of
this thesis is the generalization of the crash behavior with synchronized states. The material
is presented to clearly state the correctness criterion achieved by the Flashix file system with
respect to errors and power failures, both of which are concerns that pervade the entire file
system, and to introduce several concepts of file systems.
7.1 The Directory Tree, File Store and File Handles
The POSIX standard [3] provides an API for C programs that does not only cover file system
operations but also e.g. process and thread management and interprocess communication. It
is not only supported on Unix-like operating systems, such as Linux, but also on Windows
via the Microsoft POSIX subsystem.
In POSIX the file system essentially consists of a tree as shown in Fig. 7.1. The nodes of the
tree represent files and directories. The edges connect a directory to one of its entries. The name
of the directory entry is given by the label of the edge. The root of the tree represents the root
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Figure 7.1: The File
System Tree
directory “/”. The labeling of the path from the root to a file or
directory node, separated by “/”, is the (or more precisely one)
absolute path of this file or directory in the file system.
One distinguishing feature of POSIX are hard links to files. A
hard link allows two paths to refer to the same file, i.e., its meta
data such as the size and permissions and contents, by different
names. Incremental backups for example copy the changed files
only and store a hard link to the previous backup for files that
were not altered. This saves a lot of space while still maintaining
a complete directory tree of the files that need a backup. From a
modeling perspective taking hard links into account requires one
indirection between the node in the directory tree that represents a file and the meta data
and contents of the file. This indirection are file identifiers and are visualized in Fig. 7.2. The









Figure 7.2: Structure of the POSIX
File System Interface
This indirection is also necessary to ex-
press orphaned files. These files are still
opened, but have already been deleted from
the directory tree, i.e., the file is no longer
reachable by any path from the root direc-
tory. Reading and writing of the file is, how-
ever, still possible through its file handle.
The blue arrow in the figure visualizes an
orphaned file, since there is no correspond-
ing arrow from the directory tree pointing to
it. Orphaned files are useful for system-wide
updates of packages. A process might still
refer to old versions of executable files or
might still have configuration files opened
while these file are being replaced by a new
version. The file system needs to recognize
orphaned files and delete them during recov-
ery from a power failure or during a normal
reboot. Otherwise, precious capacity is lost
by storing inaccessible files.
With these two features in mind the state of the component POSIX is modeled as a tree
root, a file store fs for the file meta data and contents and file handles ofh for all opened files.
state root : Tree, fs : F ↦→ file-data, ofh : D ↦→ file-handle, sync : B
The synchronized states of the component POSIX are expressed explicitly as an additional
state variable sync, which is set if the user requests synchronization of the data to the storage
device and reset by operations that alter the state but are not persisted immediately and are
cached in main memory only.
A directory tree Tree is either a file node that refers to a file identifier of type F in the
file store fs or a directory with meta data and a subtree for each of the directory’s entries.
The entries are given by their file and directory name only.
data type Tree = filenode(fid : F)
| directorynode(meta : metadata, entries : String ↦→ Tree)
Meta data is an abstract type that only provides three predicates pr, pw and px, which
return whether a specific user has read, write and execute permissions to the directory or
file, respectively. For example px(user ,meta) returns true if and only if the user user has
execute access to the file or directory with the given meta data meta. Execute permissions
for a directory are necessary in order to access any child directory or file.
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A path into a tree is just a sequence of names of files and/or directories. The path
separator “/” is implicitly added in between the path segments of a list.
type alias Path ≡ List⟨String⟩
A path p is considered valid for tree t, written p ∈ t, if it is possible to walk the path
p starting from the root of the tree, i.e., if a path in the file system tree exists that has a
labeling corresponding to p. If a path p is valid for t, t[p] extracts the subtree of t at path p
and t[p, t′] replaces the subtree at path p by the tree t′. Removal of the subtree at a given
path p is denoted by t -- p.
The file store fs maps file identifiers to their meta data and contents. The contents are
stored as an array of bytes and the length of the array corresponds to the file’s size.
data type file-data = mkfile(meta : metadata, content : Array⟨Byte⟩)
The open file handles ofh map a file descriptor of type D, to the file identifier of the
opened file, the access mode and the current offset (in bytes) for reading and writing in the
file.
data type file-mode = MODE_R | MODE_W | MODE_RW
data type file-handle = mkfilehandle(fid : F, mode : file-mode, pos : N)
The component POSIX has two invariants. The first invariant (root-is-dir) states that
the root of the tree is always a directory.
invariant root.dir? (root-is-dir)
The second invariant (fids-cons) ensures that the file identifiers referred to by the directory
tree root and the open file handles ofh are valid and together comprise the domain of the file
store fs.
invariant dom(fs) = root.fids ∪ ofh.fids (fids-cons)
The functions fids : Tree → Set⟨F⟩ and fids : (D ↦→ file-handle) → Set⟨F⟩ return the
set of file identifiers referred to by the corresponding data structure and are defined by
ofh.fids = { ofh[fd].fid | fd ∈ dom(ofh) }
and





In the actual POSIX interface file identifiers F and file descriptors D are identified with
natural numbers, i.e., F = D = N holds. For clarity of the presentation these two concepts
are separated into distinct types in the presentation.
7.2 Operations & Error Handling
Initialization creates a root directory for some given meta data with the proper permissions
and access times set. The file store does not contain any files and no file handles exist yet.
Initialization also has to yield a synchronized state, which is achieved by setting the state
variable sync to true.
initialization
posix_init(meta : metadata)
root := directorynode(meta, ∅), fs := ∅, ofh := ∅, sync := true
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All operations of the component POSIX , except for posix_read and posix_write have
the precondition true, since the component has to deal with any bogus (but well-typed) input
by returning an error code instead. Error codes are for example returned if the file a user
tries to open does not exist or if the user does not have the necessary access permissions.
For the procedures posix_read and posix_write it is assumed that the number of bytes
requested does not exceed the length of the buffer passed to the procedure.
POSIX error codes fall into three categories. The error code ESUCCESS is returned if
the operation was successful, high-level errors are returned if additional prerequisites for
a successful execution of the operation, such as adequate permissions to the accessed files
and directories, are not satisfied. Low-level errors may be returned by any operation if the
hardware or system cannot satisfy the request for some “internal” reason.
data type Error = ESUCCESS success
| EEXISTS | EISDIR | EACCESS | · · · high-level error
| EIO | ENOMEM | ENOSPC | · · · low-level error
For example EEXISTS is a high-level error returned by the file creation operation if the file
already exists. Low-level errors include input/output error EIO, which is caused by unreadable
sectors or blocks, the out-of-space errors ENOSPC and ENOMEM, which are returned when the
medium has no free space to store the data and when there is not enough main memory,
respectively. The predicate ⌊ . ⌋ denotes whether an error is a low-level error or not.
The specification of the POSIX operations uses convention (error-handling) for the choice
of the returned error code. First, an error code is chosen, dependent upon the input of the
operation and the state. If preconditions are not met, then the corresponding error(s) are
allowed. Low-level errors are always allowed by the predicate op-pre. The nondeterminism
in the choice of error codes is necessary, because the POSIX component cannot foresee the
exact error that may be returned by a file system or flash hardware. Only in the case of
ESUCCESS the actual code is executed, otherwise the state is left unchanged.
posix_op(in; out, err) (error-handling)
choose err ′ with op-pre(in, root, fs, ofh, out, err ′) in
err := err ′;
if err = ESUCCESS then
· · ·
Note that leaving the user-visible state unmodified is a very strong guarantee and the Flashix
file system provides several mechanisms on different layers to ensure that this property
is satisfied. For example, the component Transactions in Fig. 6.1 on page 66 provides
transactions grouping versions of several file system objects into one atomic entity. The
component Node Serialization is responsible for ensuring that writing a new version of one
file system object itself is seen by its client as one atomic operation. These mechanism are
discussed in Ch. 11 and Ch. 12 in more detail.
Fig. 7.3 depicts the interface operations of the component POSIX that either change
or query the structure of the directory tree or ensure synchronization to the persistent
medium. Note that POSIX is a specification component and therefore all operations should
be interpreted as being enclosed by an atomic section, although the atomic block is omitted
for brevity. Error handling is omitted and follows the convention (error-handling).
Note that all operations that alter the persistent state reset the sync flag and only the
operation posix_sync sets it. The operation ensures that the file contents and meta data
and the directory tree is completely written to the storage device.
The operation posix_mkdir creates a new, empty directory at the given path, if the path
does not yet exist. Deletion of a directory has as a prerequisite that the directory is empty,
then it just removes the subtree at the path from the directory tree. A directory listing is
requested via posix_readdir and returns the set of names of the entries.
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interface operations
posix_mkdir(path,meta; err)
root[path] := directorynode(meta, ∅), sync := false
posix_rmdir(path; err)




choose fid with fid ̸∈ dom(fs) in
root[path] := filenode(fid), fs[fid] := mkfile(meta, []), sync := false
posix_link(srcpath, dstpath; err)
root[dstpath] := filenode(root[srcpath].fid), sync := false
posix_unlink(path; err)
let fid = root[path].fid in
root := root -- fid, sync := false;
if fid ̸∈ root.fids ∪ ofh.fids then
fs := fs -- fid
posix_rename(srcpath, dstpath; err)
let srctree = root[srcpath], exists = dstpath ∈ root, dsttree = root[dstpath] in
root := (root -- srcpath)[dstpath, srctree], sync := false;
if exists ∧ ¬ dsttree.dir? ∧ dsttree.fid ̸∈ root.fids ∪ ofh.fids then
fs := fs -- dsttree.fid
posix_sync(; err)
sync := true
Figure 7.3: Structural Operations of the Component POSIX (error handling omitted)
File creation allocates a new file identifier and then adds an empty file to the file store
and a new file node pointing to it to the directory tree. The operation posix_link creates
a hard link of a file by adding a file node at the destination with the file identifier of the
source. A file can be removed with the operation posix_unlink. If this is the last link of the
file from the directory tree or from the open file handles, then the file’s contents are removed
since they can no longer be accessed by the user.
A file or directory can be moved to a new path by posix_rename. Note that the destination
may already exist if we are renaming a file. In this case the destination file is removed from
the tree. This special case of posix_rename facilitates replacing the entire contents of a file
A atomically by first creating and writing a new file B and then renaming B to A.
The file operation of POSIX are shown in Fig. 7.4. Opening and closing of a file adds
and removes the file handle, respectively. If the file becomes an orphan after removal of the
file handle, it is also deleted from the file store, analogously to the operation posix_unlink.
Truncation resizes the file to the desired size. If the new size is larger then all bytes above
the previous file size are initialized with 0.
Reading and writing takes place at the current file position stored in the file handle and
might read and write a smaller number of bytes count′. The value is chosen nondeterminis-
tically. Note that if count′ is less than the requested number of bytes this still counts as a
successful operation. Reading just copies the requested bytes from the file contents in the file
store fs to the given buffer. Writing has to extend the file with bytes initialized to 0 if the
current file position is beyond the file’s size. Afterwards, the buffer is copied into the file’s
contents.
The current file position is set with the procedure posix_seek. Its flag has one of the
following values: The seek flag determines whether the file position is set relative to the offset
0 (SEEK_SET), the current file position (SEEK_CUR) or the file size (SEEK_END). Reading and
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interface operations
posix_open(path,mode; fd, err)
choose fid0 with fid0 ̸∈ dom(ofh) in
ofh[fid0] := mkfilehandle(fid,mode, 0), fid := fid0
posix_close(fd; err)
let fid = ofh[fd].fid in
ofh := ofh -- fid
if fid ̸∈ ofh.fids ∪ root.fids then
fs := fs -- fid
posix_truncate(path,filesize; err)
let fid = root[path].fid in
fs[fid].content := resize(fs[fid].content,filesize), sync := false
posix_read(fd; buf , count, err)
pre count ≤ # buf
let fid = ofh[fd].fid in
choose count′ with count′ ≤ count ∧ count′ + ofh[fd].pos ≤ # fs[fid].content in
buf := copy(fs[fid].content, ofh[fd].pos, buf , 0, count′), count := count′,
ofh[fd].pos := ofh[fd].pos + count′
ifnone
count := 0
posix_write(fd, buf ; count, err)
pre count ≤ # buf
let fid = ofh[fd].fid in
choose count′ with count′ ≤ count in
fs[fid].content := splice(buf , 0, fs[fid].content, ofh[fd].pos, count′), count := count′,
ofh[fd].pos := ofh[fd].pos + count′, sync := false
posix_seek(fd,flag; pos, err)
if flag = SEEK_CUR then pos := pos + ofh[fd].pos;
if flag = SEEK_END then pos := pos + # fs[ofh[fd].fid].content;
ofh[fd].pos := pos
posix_readmeta(path; meta, err)
if root[path].dir? then meta := root[path].meta
else meta := fs[root[path].fid].meta
posix_writemeta(path,meta; err)
if root[path].dir? then root[path].meta := meta
else fs[root[path].fid].meta := meta;
sync := false
Figure 7.4: File Operations of the Component POSIX (error handling omitted)
writing meta data such as access rights and access times is performed by the operations
posix_readmeta and posix_writemeta, respectively.
data type seek-flag = SEEK_SET | SEEK_CUR | SEEK_END
The invariant proofs, access checking and error handling are described in more detail
by Ernst [43, Ch. 7]. Error handling is quite intricate and constitutes a large part of the
specification.
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7.3 Crash-Safety & Correctness of File Systems
The crash behavior of the component POSIX is expressed in terms of synchronized states




root′ = root ∧ fs′ = fs
recovery
posix_recover() { fs := root.fids ◁ fs, ofh := ∅, sync := true}
The crash effect in addition to the retraction of several operations, arbitrarily changes ofh and
sync and leaves the directory tree and file store unchanged. Recovery removes all orphaned
files by restricting the file store to all files reachable from the directory tree and clears the
opened file handles.
Since all operations are atomic the effect on a power cut is that the system retracts several
operations, but never across a call to posix_sync, and then retries one operation, yielding an
alternative trace for the system. If an implementation of a file system satisfies this guarantee,
we consider it functionally correct and crash-safe by Def. 7.1.
Definition 7.1 (Functional Correctness & Crash-Safety of File Systems). A file system
is functionally correct and quasi-sequentially crash-safe, if and only if it refines the formal
POSIX specification given in this chapter.
The term quasi-sequential crash-safety is chosen based on work by Bornholt et al. [18],
which defines sequential crash-safety. The difference to Def. 7.1 is that sequential crash-safety
does not permit the re-execution of one operation, which is necessary for the compositionality
result of Ch. 4.
Notice that an explicit account of the effect of write buffering described briefly in Ch. 6
is completely missing from the specification (posix-crash) of the crash behavior on this level
of abstraction. The entire effect is captured by the synchronized states and the implicit
retraction of operations.
The Flashix file system introduced in Ch. 2 and presented in more detail in the following
chapters refines the POSIX component and is therefore functionally correct and quasi-
sequentially crash-safe according to Def. 7.1.
7.4 Related Work
Models of POSIX There are a lot of specification of the POSIX or similar interfaces
for file systems at different levels of abstraction. Most focus on the aspect of functional
correctness and some make strong simplifications or require additional invariants.
A mapping from paths to directories and files is used in [63, 50, 96] as an abstract
specification for a file system. An additional invariant is necessary guaranteeing that the
prefix of a valid path is also valid. Of the three models hard links are only supported in [96].
In [39] the directory tree is formalizes as a pointer structure where each node stores a
parent pointer with an additional invariant that ensures acyclicity.
Heisel [61] uses an algebraic tree to evaluate specification languages.
The POSIX component treats preconditions similar to [63], i.e., if an error occurs then
the state remains unchanged.
In [29] an algorithm for path resolution with symbolic links is proven correct.
A more detailed comparison of our model of POSIX can be found in [43].
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POSIX & Crashes Bornholt et al. [18] define crash consistency models for POSIX-
compliant file systems, based on operations that produce (potentially many) update events.
A crash is then expressed by taking a prefix of the update events. The difference between
their definition of sequential crash consistency [18, Def. 5] and quasi-sequential crash consis-
tency Def. 7.1 is that the latter allows a re-execution that might produce different events and
not just (a reordering of) a prefix. Furthermore, the POSIX model also allows an additional
effects of the crash afterwards, i.e., all files are closed after the crash and all orphans removed.
Their notion of crash consistency omits the effect on opened and orphaned files. Update
events also have a lot of overhead in the specification, because it is necessary to a) specify
how the operations act on the state and b) the events and how the events update the state.
Crash-aware components basically use the operations as the events. Furthermore, [18] does
not support truncation of files.
Effects of a crash on a file system at the level of the POSIX specification is discussed in
[11, 26], too. The abstract model of [11] keeps an explicit history back to the most recent
flush as a list of higher-order state transformers at a level of abstraction below POSIX. It
is proved that the implementation of sync correlates to reducing the history to produce a
current state. Chen’s thesis [26] discusses a specification methodology of write-back caches




Pages, Blocks, Erasing and Sequential Writes
Summary. The Flashix file system implements the POSIX specification based
on flash memory. This chapter describes the specification component Flash, which
formalizes the assumptions the Flashix file system makes about flash hardware. As a
blueprint the Memory Technology Devices (MTD) interface used in Linux is chosen. It
is implemented by every flash driver for raw flash devices on Linux. This also ensures
that an integration with Linux of the C code, that is derived from the implementation
components of Flashix is possible. The component takes the limitations of ONFI-
compliant flash hardware, which is an industry standard for flash memory, and its
error-prone nature into account.
Publications. The model of flash memory and its invariants are published in [108].
Contents
8.1 Pages and Blocks of Flash Memory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
8.2 Operations & Limitations of Flash Memory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
8.3 Power Failure and Hardware Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
8.4 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
8.1 Pages and Blocks of Flash Memory
This chapter defines our assumptions about the hardware, captured by the behavior of
an abstract interface representing the driver. The interface is based on Linux’s Memory
Technology Devices (= MTD) interface to flash drivers.
Flash hardware can be categorized into two distinct types [89], which use different types
of logic gates. The first flash devices were based on NOR technology, while newer hardware
uses NAND gates. NOR flash memory allows for random-access, while NAND flash only
supports page-based and sequential access within one block. On the flip side NAND gates are
smaller and therefore allow for more storage capacity in the same form factor. The limitations
of NAND flash subsume those of NOR flash and we therefore follow the Open NAND Flash
Interface (= ONFI) standard [4] in order to support both storage technologies.
A NAND flash device is composed of (erase) blocks, each of which contains several pages.
A page usually has a capacity of around 512 bytes to 4 KiB. A block consists of approximately
32 to 128 pages. Additionally, there is usually some out-of-band (OOB) data used by the
flash driver for error-correction codes in order to compensate for bit flips. Additionally, there
is usually one bit to mark a block as bad, which is either set initially by the manufacturer
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Figure 8.1: A physical erase block of Flash Memory consisting of eight pages. The gray pages
were written sequentially. The white pages are still in the erased state and all their bytes
contain the value 0xFF.
if some blocks already have errors at the time of fabrication or can be used later by the
system to exclude some blocks after they are worn out. Blocks can be read arbitrarily, but
writing is only possible sequentially within a block and only at the granularity of entire pages.
Fig. 8.1 depicts a physical erase block with eight pages, the first three of which are already
programmed. The pages of a block can not be overwritten directly. First, the block must be
erased in its entirety and only afterwards the file system may perform write operations on
the pages of the block again. Initially and after an erase operation, all bits in a block are set
to 1. In the figure and throughout this thesis pages in their initial, erased state are depicted
in white. Erase is a slow process and we will move this process to a background operation in
the erase block manager presented in Ch. 10. After around 103 to 106 erase cycles, depending
on the storage technology used, a block is physically worn out and can not be reused reliably.
These hardware characteristica are modeled by the flash component depicted in Fig. 8.2.
In the model flash memory is organized as an array of physical erase blocks (= PEBs):1
state pebs : Array⟨Peb⟩
Each PEB stores a byte-array data of fixed length PEB_SIZE that is implicitly partitioned
into pages of length PAGE_SIZE.
data type Peb = mkpeb(data : Array⟨Byte⟩, written : N, bad : B) (PEB)
A PEB stores a page-aligned counter written that tracks the part of the block that contains
programmed pages, i.e., only data above written is known to be EMPTY and can still be
programmed before an erase operation is necessary. The constant EMPTY denotes the byte
value 0xFF, i.e., all bits set. Note that the counter cannot be accessed by software. It is an
auxiliary state only used to enforce that pages are written sequentially and never overwritten.
PEBs also carry a hardware-supported marker bad that is set by the erase block manager of
Ch. 10 to prevent future usage of the block.
The model maintains the invariant flash-inv(pebs),
invariant flash-inv(pebs)
defined by Equation (flash-inv).
flash-inv(pebs) ↔ ∀p. p < # pebs → peb-inv(pebs[p]) (flash-inv)




∧ is-empty(peb.data, peb.written, PEB_SIZE)
)
It specifies that the counter written is a multiple of PAGE_SIZE, which is a consequence of
the fact that only page-aligned writes are permitted.
page-aligned(n) ↔ n % PAGE_SIZE = 0
1The term physical erase blocks is chosen to distinguish them from logical erase blocks, which are provided
as an abstraction by the erase block manager of Ch. 10.
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component Flash
state pebs : Array⟨Peb⟩
initialization





pre p < # pebs ∧ ¬ pebs[p].bad
{ pebs[p] := mkpeb(Array⟨Byte⟩(PEB_SIZE, EMPTY), 0, false), err := ESUCCESS }
∨ { fail(; err) }
flash_read(p, poff , boff , len; buf , isbflip, err)
pre p < # pebs ∧ ¬ pebs[p].bad ∧ poff + len ≤ PEB_SIZE
∧ boff + len ≤ # buf
isbflip := ?;
{ buf := copy(pebs[p].data, poff , buf , boff , len), err := ESUCCESS }
∨ { fail(; err) }
flash_write(p, poff , boff , len, buf ; err)
pre p < # pebs ∧ ¬ pebs[p].bad ∧ poff + len ≤ PEB_SIZE
∧ boff + len ≤ # buf ∧ pebs[p].written ≤ poff
∧ page-aligned(poff ) ∧ page-aligned(len)
{ pebs[p] := mkpeb(copy(buf , boff , pebs[p].data, poff , len), poff + len, false),
err := ESUCCESS }
∨ { choose len0 with len0 = 0 ∨ len0 < len ∧ page-aligned(len0) in
if len0 ̸= 0 then
pebs[p] := mkpeb(copy(buf , boff , pebs[p].data, poff , len0), poff + len0, false);
fail(; err) }
flash_is_bad(p; isbad, err)
pre p < # pebs
{ isbad := pebs[p].bad, err := ESUCCESS } ∨ { fail(; err) }
flash_mark_bad(p; err)
pre p < # pebs ∧ ¬ pebs[p].bad
{ pebs[p].bad := true, err := ESUCCESS } ∨ { fail(; err) }
flash_get_blockcount(; blockcount) { blockcount := # pebs }
flash_get_page_size(; pagesize) { pagesize := PAGE_SIZE }
flash_get_block_size(; blocksize) { blocksize := PEB_SIZE }
crash
pebs′ = pebs
Figure 8.2: Flash Component (Sequential)
The size of a erase block PEB_SIZE is also a multiple of the page size, i.e., the ax-
iom (page-aligned-peb) is assumed.
axiom page-aligned(PEB_SIZE) (page-aligned-peb)
The predicate is-empty(buf , n,m) states that n and m are within the bounds of the array
buf and that all bytes in between index n and m contain the value EMPTY and therefore can
be programmed by a subsequent writes.
is-empty(buf , n,m) ↔ n ≤ m ≤ # buf ∧ ∀i. n ≤ i < m→ buf [i] = EMPTY
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8.2 Operations & Limitations of Flash Memory
The operations of the component Flash are also depicted in Fig. 8.2. Note that this component
is a specification component and all operations are considered to be atomic, although this is
omitted in the figure.
All operations that access an individual physical erase block, given by its index p, have
the precondition that the block exists on the device. Except for flash_is_bad, which returns
whether the given erase block is already marked as bad, all operations additionally have the
precondition that the block is not yet worn out.
Most operations may produce a low-level error by non-deterministically choosing between
the successful case of the operation and the procedure fail defined by (fail).
fail(; err) (fail)
choose err0 with ⌊err⌋ in err := err0
This allows for hardware failures, such as being unable to read due to too many uncorrectable
bit flips (EIO), as well as failures in the driver, e.g., the driver could be unable to allocate
sufficient memory to perform an operation (ENOMEM).
The operation flash_synchronous_erase sets all bits of the physical erase block to 1
and resets the counter written to 0, which enables subsequent writes to this physical erase
block again.
For reading and writing all offsets and lengths must be in their respective bounds. For
flash_write the offset into the erase block poff and the number of bytes to write len must
be page-aligned. Reading is not restricted to page-aligned access.
The function copy(buf0, i, buf1, j, n), used by the read and write operations, copies n bytes
of buffer buf0 starting at offset i to the buffer buf1 starting at offset j.
A read may indicate with the isbflip output parameter that the error-correction code of
the flash driver detected a bit flip. This can be used by the client in order to schedule a
wear-leveling cycle for this physical erase block in order to move the data to a more reliable
location, before reading from the block completely fails and the data is irrecoverably lost.
This is performed by the wear-leveling algorithm of the erase block manager described in
more detail in Sec. 10.5.
The operation flash_write either writes the entire buffer at the desired offset and
increases the counter written appropriately, or a hardware failure occurs. In the latter case
a low-level error code is returned and only a prefix of the pages is written to the flash device.
The operations flash_get_page_size and flash_get_block_size ensure that the client
components of flash memory are independent of the PAGE_SIZE and PEB_SIZE constants,
which are only an artifact of the verification. For the verification it is sufficient to assume that
there are such constants that are unchanged during the lifetime of the component. However,
the integration of executable code is easier if the code does not refer to such global constants
and instead queries this information during initialization or runtime from the actual flash
device.
8.3 Power Failure and Hardware Errors
Access to raw flash devices is usually synchronous and not cached, therefore all states of the
model are synchronized and the crash predicate used as a means to express a power failure.
synchronized states true
crash pebs′ = pebs
This means that all states are synchronized and no retractions and retries possible. The crash
transition itself just states that the physical erase blocks are unaltered, since there are no
caches on raw flash.
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All operations of the component are introducible (Def. 5.10 on page 54). The operations
flash_is_bad, flash_get_blockcount, flash_get_page_size and flash_get_block_size
do not modify the state. All other operations have the ability to choose the error code EIO
and leave the state unchanged.
The component Flash is the basis for the entire Flashix file system and therefore care
should be taken with respect to the assumptions about errors that are implicitly made here.
In the following the decisions and their rationale are explained in more detail.
1. Writes of individual pages and block erasure can be viewed as atomic operations.
2. An unsuccessful write of an individual page and an unsuccessful attempt to erase a
block do not modify the state.
3. Success of a write operation can be recognized, i.e., an error is not returned by mistake.
4. Conversely, hardware failure can also be detected reliably. In particular, reads that
produce garbage can be recognized.
5. An unexpected power failure has no effect on the state of the flash device.
For Assumptions 2 and 3 note the choice if len0 with the condition
len0 = 0 ∨ len0 < len ∧ page-aligned(len0)
in flash_write, i.e., len = len0 is not allowed (if len ̸= 0) and only a strict, page-aligned
prefix of the data is written.
The assumptions are partly justified by the existence of error-correction codes used by
the flash driver, which will catch most of these cases in practice.
The motivation behind assumption 1 is that it must be ensured that power failures during
these operations must yield an invalid physical erase block. However, what exactly invalid
means depends on the data structures a client of the component stores on the device. Similarly,
assumption 4 requires the client to detect that the data written is actually invalid, when
it is read again afterwards. This can be achieved for example by checksums and additional
error-correction codes.
Assumptions 3 and 4 ensure that the data structures that are kept in RAM by the file
system and the information returned to the user do not arbitrarily diverge from the data
stored on the device. Assumption 4 can be relaxed once it is clear what the client stores and
what kinds of corrupted data is detectable after reading from flash.
In summary, some of the assumptions are necessary due to the limited expressiveness of
the model, but we can relax them later on incrementally, discussed in more detail in Ch. 9
and Ch. 10.
8.4 Related Work
The characteristics of NOR and NAND memory and approaches to deal with them are
described in the quite extensive survey [89] and in [56].
Note that the model of flash presented in this chapter does not cover all possible hardware
failures that are potentially possible. The model does not cover read disturbs [129], where
a read can lead to bit flips in adjacent pages. The model assumes that such an error can
be detected reliably when reading the other page. A second problem not modeled by the
component Flash of this chapter are unstable bits [132]. If a power failure occurs during
writing or erasing then the bits in the block become unstable, and might be read several
times afterwards without any errors, but at some point they may suffer from a bit flip. If
enough of those bits are flipped then the page or block might become (un)readable. This issue
seems to occur only in newer MLC (= Multi-Level Cell) flash devices and cannot be handled
solely by the flash driver with error correction codes. However, the erase block manager UBI,
which is used in production environments, does not yet handle this error, too.
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The models [22, 21, 23] in Z notation of an ONFI-compliant [4] device are conceptually
below our model of a driver for flash memory. It would be possible to provide an implementation
of our MTD model on top of their hardware model. None of the formal models [22, 75, 38]
considers the limitation to sequential writes within an erase block, although non-sequential
writes are often not supported by newer ONFI-compliant devices [2, 4].
The flash file system BilbyFs [77, 11, 9] developed at Data61 (formerly NICTA) does
not use Linux’s MTD interface directly, but builds on top of the erase block manager UBI
(see Ch. 10), which already provides error handling, but retains the limitation to sequential,
page-aligned writes. Power failures are also not considered formally.
The flash model here does not feature additional out-of-band (OOB) data per page,
which is assumed to exist by most Flash Translation Layers (FTLs) [30] and some flash file
systems [1, 53]. For the OOB data area the limitations to page-sized and sequential writes
only do not apply and individual bits can be programmed. This simplifies the design of FTLs
and flash file systems. However, NOR flash devices do not have OOB data and some NAND
devices use the whole area for error-correction codes [131].
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Specification & Verification of (De-)Serialization
Summary. At its core a file system must serialize data structures into a byte-
representation and retrieve the contents of the data structure by deserializing the
byte-representation. Since this has to happen for various data structures in the following
chapters, a generic approach was chosen that integrates well with code generation. It
is sometimes necessary to take into account additional constraints on the serialization,
such as a fixed or an aligned size, especially when considering the restrictions of flash
memory presented in the previous Ch. 8.
Instead of giving a function for data elements that returns the byte-representation, we
assume a predicate serialized⟨T⟩(t, buf ),1 which allows for multiple representations of the
same value of type T or no representation at all. For example, not all natural numbers might
find a representation in 4 bytes of memory and all sequences of the byte representations
of the elements of a set might constitute a valid byte representation of the set, preceded
by the byte representation for the number of elements. The only two restrictions are ax-
ioms (size) and (prefix): The size of the byte-representation of a value t is given by a function
serialized-size⟨T⟩(t).
axiom serialized⟨T⟩(t, buf )→ serialized-size⟨T⟩(t) = # buf (size)
Furthermore, the prefix of the byte-representation of a value t does not hold any other
byte-representations of another value t′.
axiom serialized⟨T⟩(t, buf ) ∧ n ≤ # buf ∧ serialized⟨T⟩(t′, buf [0..n]) (prefix)
→ t′ = t ∧ n = # buf
For the procedures that perform the actual (de-)serialization the contracts (serialize)
and (deserialize) are assumed.
axiom off + serialized-size⟨T⟩(t) ≤ # buf (serialize)
→ ⟨|serialize⟨T⟩(t, off ; buf , size, err)|⟩(
err = ESUCCESS→ size = serialized-size⟨T⟩(t)
∧ serialized⟨T⟩(t, buf [off ..(off + size)])
)
The error code EINVAL signals that no valid data structure is presented by the buffer. The
additional constraint that the buffers length and contents outside of the range off to off +size
1Technically, in the tool KIV a generic specifications and the mechanism of instantiation of generic
specifications are used to derive an instance of the predicate serialized for some particular parameter type.
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are unchanged are tacitly omitted. Note that for performance reasons operating on a subrange
of the buffer is allowed by giving an offset into the buffer. This facilitates allocation of one
buffer and iteratively filling the buffer with the byte-representations of several values of the
same (or another) type without having to allocate and append several arrays.
axiom ⟨|deserialize⟨T⟩(off , buf ; t, size, err)|⟩ (deserialize)( (
err = ESUCCESS→ off + size ≤ buf




err = EINVAL→ ∀n. off + n ≤ # buf → is-garbage⟨T⟩(buf [off ..(off + n)])
))
A code generator derives an implementation for these procedures and for the function
serialized-size for every used instance of the parameter types. Having an explicit function
serialized-size allows for the allocation of a sufficiently large buffer in advance of calling
the procedure serialize.
Note that we split the assumptions into the predicate and procedures to facilitate code-
generation and in a future step the verification of the contracts and axioms on the level of
the generated C code by a separate tool such as VeriFast [71] or VCC [32]. These tools only
support predicate logic contracts for procedures, instead of the more generic dynamic logic
contracts available in KIV. For the verification with KIV an axiom that only involves the
two procedures serialize and deserialize would be sufficient. It would basically state
that calling the procedure deserialize after serialization with the procedure serialize
returns the original value, in case both calls are successful.
Now it is also expressible what kind of write errors are acceptable for a value of type T,
namely those byte sequences that are not a byte-representation of any value of type T. This
was left open in the hardware model of the previous Ch. 8. This is captured by the predicate
is-garbage⟨T⟩(buf ).
axiom is-garbage⟨T⟩(buf ) ↔ ∀t.¬ serialized⟨T⟩(t, buf ) (garbage)
If the type T contains additional measures, such as checksums, then the predicate can be
weakened by stating that either no byte-representation or one that is invalid, i.e., contains
an invalid checksum, is allowed.
Additional Constraints For a serialization of fixed size, which for example needed to
store a subset of the natural numbers into several bytes, we add an additional, nonzero
constant for the size and an axiom stating that the size function always returns the constant.
constant serialized-size⟨T⟩ : N (fixed-size serialization)
axiom serialized-size⟨T⟩ ≠ 0
axiom serialized-size⟨T⟩(t) = serialized-size⟨T⟩
Byte-representations with different additional restrictions can be build. For example for
flash memory it is sometimes necessary to know that the byte-representation does not contain
only EMPTY bytes. This can be achieved by signaling an error during serialization when the
constraint is violated. Another common constraint is that the byte-representations have a
certain alignment. This can be implemented by adding padding bytes until the alignment is
reached. The verification of serialization with these constraints and serializations of compound
types is rather straightforward and boils down to reasoning about subranges of arrays. One
example is presented in the next chapter in Sec. 10.3. Otherwise the details are omitted, only
the relevant constraints are stated.
Related Work Related to byte-representations in file systems are specification mechanism
for network packets [91] or more general file formats [13] with the ability to generate an
implementation for serialization and deserialization procedures.
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Crash-Safe Erase Block Manager & Wear-Leveling
Summary. This chapter presents one application of the theory of components and
crash-safe refinement of Ch. 4, namely the Erase Block Manager (= EBM) of the
Flashix file system. As a blueprint for its design and interface the state-of-the-art
erase block manager UBI (= Unsorted Block Images) is used. This chapter first
captures the interface and expected behavior in an abstract specification and then
provides some detail on its implementation and proof of correctness. Of special interest
are wear-leveling and asynchronous erasure of blocks, in order to partially deal with
the hardware characteristics of flash memory and its performance. The overarching
concerns are atomicity with respect to power failures of wear-leveling and the caching
of an inverse block mapping caused by the asynchronous erasure of blocks. Another
aspect that is considered is whether wear-leveling improves the distribution of erase
cycles.
Publications. The specification of the erase block manager is published in [108]
and the verification is part of the technical report [109]. This chapter extends both by
also considering the quality of wear-leveling.
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10.1 Abstract Specification of an Erase Block Manager
The purpose of the erase block manager is to provide an abstraction over the flash hardware
that transparently supports wear-leveling and asynchronous block erasure. The performance
of garbage collection and of the commit, both discussed in Ch. 11 are improved by postponing
erasure of blocks. A file system that builds on this layer no longer needs to take the degradation
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Figure 10.1: Mapping from Logical to Physical Erase Blocks: The in-RAM mapping
consists of the blue arrows and the inverse on-flash mapping is denoted by the red arrows.
The labeling of the inverse mapping is its version, i.e., after wear-leveling the new inverse
mapping has version 3, while the previous version is 1.
of blocks into account. Furthermore, performance problems associated with erasing a block
are also dealt with by performing it in the background. Another feature offered by the erase
block manager of Flashix and by UBI is atomically exchanging the contents of one block. This
is a costly operation and typically only used for the super block of a file system. Atomicity
in the case of a super block guarantees that there is no point in time where the super block
is invalid or unavailable, which would lead to a complete loss of data after a reboot.
An erase block manager also supports multiple volumes (or partitions) of one flash device.
This enables the erase block manager to perform wear-leveling across the entire device,
instead of only across the erase blocks assigned to one volume, i.e., wear-leveling and volume
management should be coupled on flash hardware in contrast to normal hard disks where
volume management is usually performed in a separate layer below all file systems.
The erase block manager does not completely eliminate the characteristics of flash
hardware. Errors and partial writes still occur, however, the implementation already performs
several attempts to move the data in such cases and to continually perform wear-leveling.
Thus, errors surface less often at the level of the client and can basically be treated as fatal
errors then, i.e., switching to a read-only mode while still ensuring that a consistent state is
reached is sufficient there. Checksums and error-correction codes can and should be used by
clients additionally in order to be able to detect more errors or errors that fall outside of the
class of errors that can be modeled formally.
In order to be able to move blocks during wear-leveling transparently, an abstraction
called logical erase blocks (= LEBs) is introduced on top of the physical erase blocks of
Ch. 8. The client can only access logical erase blocks, while the implementation maintains a
mapping from logical to physical erase blocks as depicted by Fig. 10.1. A forward mapping
(blue arrows) is stored in RAM for fast access during run-time. On flash only an inverse
mapping (red arrows) is persisted, where each physical erase block stores in the first few
pages (red area) the logical erase block that is being mapped. Erasing of a block is performed
in the background. Therefore, older mappings might still be stored on flash, e.g., the inverse
mapping of PEB 4 to LEB 3 in the figure. In case of a power failure, this older mapping is
then restored and some logical erase blocks that have already been deallocated reemerge as
allocated with arbitrary contents.
In such an implementation wear-leveling copies the data to a new physical erase block and
then updates the mapping without disrupting the client. In Fig. 10.1 for example the contents
of PEB 2 are moved to PEB 3, including a newer version of the inverse mapping (dotted
red arrow and red, shaded part of PEB 2). Then the forward mapping is adjusted, i.e.,
the dotted blue arrow from LEB 1 to PEB 3 replaces the solid blue arrow from LEB 1
to PEB 2. The old version of the inverse mapping (solid, red arrow from PEB 2 to LEB 1)
is still kept until PEB 2 is actually erased. A valid mapping is only removed once the fist few
pages of the PEB are erased.
In order to distinguish between different versions of the inverse mapping, version or
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sequence numbers are attached to it as shown as a red labeling of the arrows of the inverse
mapping in Fig. 10.1.
The abstract specification of an erase block manager does not need to model both logical
and physical erase blocks and a mapping between them completely, since the distinction is
invisible to the client under normal circumstances. However, in the event of a power failure
the effects of a cached mapping are observable. It is only necessary to know whether a block
is asynchronously erased (unmapped), synchronously erased (erased) or mapped with some
contents. A power failure is then expressible by allowing arbitrary contents for LEBs where
an asynchronous attempt to erase the corresponding PEB was made.
The remainder of this section introduces the abstract specification of an erase block
manager formally, taking the above-mentioned implementation details into account. Sec. 10.2
gives an overview over the implementation. Sec. 10.3 shows how the inverse mapping is
encoded and stored. The Sections 10.4 to 10.8 provide details on the state, invariants and
operations of the erase block manager’s implementation. Afterwards, Sec. 10.9 explains the
abstraction relation and the proof of crash-safe refinement. The quality of wear-leveling in
terms of an improvement in the distribution of erase cycles by wear-leveling is discussed in
Sec. 10.10.
State The complete component AEBM is shown in Fig. 10.2 for reference and described in
the following in more detail. The state only consists of a finite, partial mapping from volume
identifiers V to volumes. The type of volume identifiers V is left uninterpreted and can be
instantiated with the sort Byte for example.
state avols : V ↦→ Volume
type alias Volume ≡ Array⟨Leb⟩
Each volume has a fixed size and contains logical erase blocks. Similar to PEBs as shown in
Equation (PEB) on page 84, LEBs contain data and a counter used to restrict the model to
sequential writes only. Bad blocks are hidden by the implementation.
data type Leb = unmapped | erased | mapped(data : Array⟨Byte⟩, written : N)
The mapping from logical to physical erase blocks is usually partial in an implementation,
i.e., some LEBs might not yet have a corresponding PEB as is for example the case for
LEB 2 and 3 in Fig. 10.1. If a LEB is unmapped this means that an asynchronous erase
operation was requested by the client and the block might or might not yet have been erased.
Asynchronous erasure is a form of caching in the sense that updates to the inverse mapping
(red arrows in Fig. 10.1) are cached and after a power failure an older version of the mapping
might emerge. If a block is erased synchronously this is prohibited.
In order to simplify the presentation we define the selectors data and written on all
constructors of the data type Leb.
leb.data = empty-array(LEB_SIZE) and
leb.written = 0 for leb ∈ {unmapped, erased}
Invariants The invariant (avols-inv) of the abstract specification of an erase block manager
just asserts that leb-inv(leb) holds for every logical erase blocks leb.
invariant avols-inv(avols) (avols-inv)
where
avols-inv(avols) ↔ ∀⟨v, l⟩ ∈ avols. leb-inv(avols[v][l])
93
10.1. ABSTRACT SPECIFICATION OF AN ERASE BLOCK MANAGER Chapter 10
component AEBM
state avols : V ↦→ Array⟨Leb⟩




pre v ̸∈ dom(avols)
{ avols := avols[v, Array⟨Leb⟩(size, erased)], err := ESUCCESS }
∨ { fail(; err) }
aebm_get_volume_size(v; volsize)
pre v ∈ dom(avols)
{ volsize := # avols[v] }
aebm_read(v, l, poff , boff , len; buf , err)
pre ⟨v, l⟩ ∈ avols ∧ poff + len ≤ LEB_SIZE ∧ boff + len ≤ # buf
{ buf := copy(avols[v][l].data, poff , buf , boff , len), err := ESUCCESS }
∨ { fail(; err) }
aebm_write(v, l, poff , boff , len, buf ; err)
pre ⟨v, l⟩ ∈ avols ∧ avols[v][l].mapped? ∧ poff + len ≤ LEB_SIZE ∧ boff + len ≤ # buf
∧ page-aligned(poff ) ∧ page-aligned(len) ∧ avols[v][l].written ≤ poff
{ avols[v][l] := mapped(avols[v][l].data[0..poff ] + buf [boff ..(boff + len)]
+ empty-array(LEB_SIZE− (poff + len)), poff + len);
err := ESUCCESS
∨ { choose len0 with len0 = 0 ∨ len0 < len ∧ page-aligned(len0) in
if len0 ̸= 0 then
avols[v][l] := mapped(avols[v][l].data[0..poff ] + buf [boff ..(boff + len0)]
+ empty-array(LEB_SIZE− (poff + len0)), poff + len0);
fail(; err) }
aebm_erase(v, l; err)
pre ⟨v, l⟩ ∈ avols
{ avols[v][l] := erased, err := ESUCCESS }
∨ { avols[v][l] := unmapped; fail(; err) }
aebm_unmap(v, l)
pre ⟨v, l⟩ ∈ avols
{ avols[v][l] := unmapped }
aebm_map(v, l; err)
pre ⟨v, l⟩ ∈ avols ∧ ¬ avols[v][l].mapped?
{ avols[v][l] := mapped(empty-array(LEB_SIZE), 0), err := ESUCCESS }
∨ { fail(; err) }
aebm_atomic_change(v, l, len, buf ; err)
pre ⟨v, l⟩ ∈ avols ∧ len ≤ # buf ∧ len ≤ LEB_SIZE ∧ page-aligned(len)
{ avols[v][l] := mapped(buf [0..len] + empty-array(LEB_SIZE− len), len),
err := ESUCCESS }
∨ { fail(; err) }
aebm_get_page_size(; pagesize) { pagesize := PAGE_SIZE }
aebm_get_block_size(; blocksize) { blocksize := LEB_SIZE }
crash
avols ⊆ avols′ ∧ avols-inv(avols′)
Figure 10.2: Abstract Specification of an Erase Block Manager
Here and in the following we will use the pair ⟨v, l⟩ as the address of a logical erase block
and use ⟨v, l⟩ ∈ avols as a shorthand for the formula
v ∈ dom(avols) ∧ l < # avols[v],
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stating that the LEB’s address is within bounds of avols (and similar data structures).
The invariant on logical erase blocks (leb-inv) is analogous to the invariant on physical
erase blocks (flash-inv) on page 84, except that the size of the blocks is smaller, i.e., their
size is equal to the constant LEB_SIZE, and the bad blocks are hidden from the client by the
implementation.
leb-inv(leb)↔ # leb.data = LEB_SIZE ∧ page-aligned(leb.written) (leb-inv)
∧ is-empty(leb.data, leb.written, LEB_SIZE)
Operations The component provides operations to create new volumes and to get the
size of a volume. Creating a volume means that all its logical erase blocks are marked as
erased. Reading and writing from LEBs is subject to the same limitations as those imposed
by the model of flash hardware of Ch. 8, with the addition that writing is only allowed to
mapped blocks. The operations aebm_erase, aebm_unmap and aebm_map are used to affect
the mapping of a logical erase block. Unmapping a block does not fail, because it modifies only
the in-RAM version of the mapping. Mapping a block sets all its bytes to EMPTY. Atomically
exchanging the contents of an entire block with aebm_atomic_change either successfully
writes n bytes of the buffer to the first n bytes of the block and leaves the remainder empty,
or does not change the block at all and its old contents are still valid.
Wear-leveling and the actual, asynchronous erasure of unmapped blocks are not observable
by the client at this level of abstraction. The correspond to a stuttering step in the specification.
Power Failures All states of the specification are synchronized and therefore no backwards
jumps are used to express a power failure. The crash transition of the EBM specification
chooses a post-state avols′ that satisfies the invariant and retains all data available in the
state avols just before the power failure.
synchronized states true (ebm-crash)
crash avols ⊆ avols′ ∧ avols-inv(avols′)
More formally, the volumes and their sizes are preserved and all logical erase blocks that
were marked as erased or mapped before the crash retain their previous value. Unmapped
LEBs, however, may have an arbitrary value afterwards. This captures the fact that the
mapping from LEBs to PEBs for asynchronously erased blocks is only cached in RAM in an
implementation and the previous mapping and contents might reappear.
avols ⊆ avols′ ↔ dom(avols) = dom(avols′) ∧ ∀v ∈ dom(avols). avols[v] ⊆ avols′[v]
avol ⊆ avol ′ ↔ # avol = # avol ′ ∧ ∀l < # avol. avol[l] ⊆ avol ′[l]
leb ⊆ leb′ ↔ (leb.erased? ∨ leb.mapped? → leb′ = leb)
The volumes and their sizes have to be stored on flash in order to guarantee that the correct
volumes and sizes are restored after a power failure, which complicates the implementation.
Crash-Introducibility In order to prove that a client component’s operations are atomic
with respect to crashes, it is sufficient to prove that the specification is crash-introducible
according to Thm. 6 on page 73. For the operation aebm_write the crash-introducible run
just choses to write the empty prefix. For the operations aebm_erase and aebm_unmap the
case where the LEB is set to unmapped is chosen. The effect of this operation can then be
reverted by a power failure according to Equation (ebm-crash). All other operations have a
run that does not change the state and are therefore immediately crash-introducible.
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Figure 10.4: Layers of Abstraction: From
Physical to Logical Erase Blocks
10.2 Overview over the Implementation
The implementation of the erase block manager is split into two parts as shown in Fig. 10.3:
In a first step (component Header Serialization) the on-flash data structures for wear-leveling
and the inverse mapping depicted in Fig. 10.1 on page 92 are serialized into the first two
pages of an erase block. The second step (component EBM ) then implements the algorithms
and data structures for wear-leveling and asynchronous erasure, based on algebraic on-flash
data structures. Fig. 10.4 relates the different views on the data of an erase block to each of
the levels of abstraction of Fig. 10.3. Bottom-most the physical erase block as seen by the
component Flash is depicted where all pages are given by a sequence of bytes. In the middle
the contents of the first two pages are algebraic data structures instead of raw bytes. In the
abstract specification of the previous section only the data pages are observable.
Splitting away a separate component for a data refinement of serialized data structure has
in general proven advantageous in the Flashix case study. This measure limits cumbersome
reasoning about subranges of arrays and encodings to the subcomponent and does not
complicate invariants and the proof of correctness of the “actual” implementation. This
pattern is also used several times in subsequent chapters for other on-flash data structures.
The internal structure of the component EBM is visualized by Fig. 10.5. Blue nodes
represent functional parts. The access of data structures of the component is visualized by
arrows. At the core of the component is the PEB Properties Array, which stores the current
status of each physical erase block, i.e., whether a PEB is currently in use, free, in the process
of being erased or already marked as bad. Additionally, the PEB Properties Array stores
how often a PEB has already been erased. The latter is called the PEB’s erase count and it
guides the wear-leveling algorithm. The erase count is also stored on flash in the EC-header
depicted in Fig. 10.4. For efficient allocation and wear-leveling the array is augmented by two
search trees, which store the used and free PEBs, respectively, and are ordered by erase count.
The component stores a forward mapping, which is accessed by the interface operations and
the wear-leveling algorithm. Additionally, there is a queue of PEBs that need to be erased.
The queue is filled by the interface operations with unmapped PEBs and PEBs where a
write operation failed. The internal operation responsible for erasure dequeues and erases the
PEBs. The physical erase blocks themselves are accessed by each subsystem via the interface
of the EBM Headers.
10.3 Erase Counter and Volume Identification Headers
Fig. 10.4 on page 96 shows the layout of a PEB. The first two pages are used to store two
headers and the remaining pages are data pages usable by the client of the erase block
manager.
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Figure 10.5: Data structures and subsystems of the erase block manager: Functional subsys-
tems are depicted as blue nodes; bold arrows denote access to data structures and thin
arrows denote that both trees are an index for the PEB Properties Array.
EC- & VID-Header The first page contains an erase counter associated with the physical
erase block (erase count or EC-header). In order to store the data the serialization procedures
and abstraction predicates of the previous Ch. 9 are instantiated for the data type Echdr.
data type Echdr = echdr(ec : N)
The erase count is used to allocate appropriate erase blocks and to find suitable erase blocks
for wear-leveling.
The second page of allocated PEBs contains the inverse mapping (red arrows in Fig. 10.1
on page 92) and is called the volume identifier header (VID-header). The data type Vidhdr
is used as an algebraic version of the serialized data.
data type Vidhdr = vidhdr(vol : V, leb : N, sqn : N, size : N, checksum : N)
The VID-header stores the corresponding volume identifier and logical block number of a
mapped PEB. Sequence numbers sqn distinguish multiple PEBs with equal ⟨vol, leb⟩ pairs:
The highest sequence number identifies the most recent block for a given inverse mapping.
An (optional) size and checksum of the contents of the block are used for atomic block-writes
during wear-leveling and is discussed in more detail in Sec. 10.5.
Two headers are necessary, because every non-bad PEB must store its erase counter, but
only once a PEB is allocated an inverse mapping is needed. Overwriting a header is not
possible due to the limitations of flash hardware. For both headers serialization procedures
are used that yield a page-sized buffer that is distinguishable from all bytes set to 0xFF. The
serialized data must be different from all bytes set to 0xFF in order to distinguish whether
a valid EC-header is present from the situation directly after block erasure or whether the
header needs to be written first and whether a PEB is currently mapped and a VID-header
exists or whether it is free.
Implementation An excerpt of the component is depicted in Fig. 10.6. As a subcomponent
the component Flash from Ch. 8 is used. Reading of the headers returns a more general
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component Header Serialization
subcomponent Flash (see Fig. 8.2 on page 85)
initialization
ebm_io_init() { · · · /* write initial EC-headers */ · · · }
interface operations
ebm_io_read_echeader(p; aehdr , isbflip, err)
pre p < # pebs ∧ ¬ pebs[p].bad
let buf = Array⟨Byte⟩(PAGE_SIZE), IsEmpty in
flash_read(p, 0, 0, PAGE_SIZE; buf ; isbflip, err);
if err = ESUCCESS then
deserialize-page-sized-nonempty⟨Echdr⟩(0, buf ; ehdr , IsEmpty, err);
if err = ESUCCESS ∧ IsEmpty then
aehdr := empty
else if err = ESUCCESS then
aehdr := mkaechdr(ehdr .ec)
else if err = EINVAL then
aehdr := garbage, err := ESUCCESS
ebm_io_write_echeader(p, aehdr ; err)
pre p < # pebs ∧ ¬ pebs[p].bad ∧ pebs[p].written = 0 { · · · }
ebm_io_read_vidheader(p; avhdr , isbflip, err) · · ·
ebm_io_write_vidheader(p, avhdr ; err) · · ·
ebm_io_read_data(p, poff , boff , len; buf , isbflip, err) · · ·
ebm_io_write_data(p, poff , boff , len, buf ; err) · · ·
...
Figure 10.6: Component Header Serialization: All other operations only forward to the
corresponding operation of the subcomponent Flash (see Fig. 8.2 on page 85).
value of type AEchdr and AVidhdr.
data type AEchdr = empty | garbage | mkaechdr(ec : N)
data type AVidhdr = empty | garbage
| mkavidhdr(vol : V, leb : N, sqn : N, size : N, checksum : N)
This allows the client to distinguish between a situation where a read failed spuriously, which
returns an error code, from one where deserialization failed, because the previous write of
the header failed and scrambled the bits. The latter returns the special value garbage and
should lead to the erasure of the erase block. Furthermore, this allows the Flashix file system
to deal with more erroneous hardware behavior during writing than explicitly permitted by
the hardware model discussed in Ch. 8. The model also allows for writes of bytes that could
never be interpreted as a valid header into the first two pages.
Note that the procedures for writing headers and data have as a precondition that the
respective part is not yet written, e.g., in the case of the EC-header the precondition states
that no bytes of the erase block have been written as shown in Fig. 10.6. The procedures
for reading and writing data pages just adds 2 · PAGE_SIZE to the offset poff and calls the
subcomponent Flash.
Specification The abstract specification EBM Headers separates the two, now algebraic
headers from the data pages, see also Fig. 10.4 on page 96 for the different views on each
level of abstraction.
data type APeb = mkapeb(echdr : AEchdr, vidhdr : AVidhdr,
data : Array⟨Byte⟩, written : N, bad : B)
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component EBM Headers
state apebs : Array⟨APeb⟩
initialization




ebm_io_read_echeader(p; aehdr , isbflip, err)
pre p < # apebs ∧ ¬ apebs[p].bad
isbflip := ?;
{ aehdr := apebs[p].echdr; err := ESUCCESS } ∨ { fail(; err) }
ebm_io_write_echeader(p, aehdr ; err)
pre p < # apebs ∧ ¬ apebs[p].bad ∧ apebs[p].echdr = empty
...
Figure 10.7: Component EBM Headers
An excerpt of the component is given in Fig. 10.7. Reading the EC-header just takes the
value from the abstract PEB and writing (not shown) might write the value garbage when
it fails. Note again that the precondition for writing must ensure that the header has not yet
been written, i.e., that it is still empty.
The invariant of the specification is given by the predicate ebm-io-inv(apebs) defined by
Equation (ebm-io-inv).
ebm-io-inv(apebs)↔ ∀p < # apebs. apeb-inv(apebs[p]) (ebm-io-inv)
apeb-inv(apeb)↔ # apeb.data = LEB_SIZE
∧
(
¬ apeb.bad→ (apeb.echdr.empty?→ apeb.vidhdr.empty?)
∧ (apeb.vidhdr.empty?→ apeb.written = 0)
∧ page-aligned(apeb.written)
∧ is-empty(apeb.data, apeb.written, LEB_SIZE)
)
The invariant is obviously quite similar to the invariant for physical and logical erase blocks
given by Equation (flash-inv) on page 84 and Equation (leb-inv) on page 95, respectively.
The differences are highlighted in green and just propagate the restriction that erase blocks
need to be written sequentially, i.e., the EC-header is written first while the VID-header and
the data pages are still empty. Only then the VID-header may be filled and afterwards data
pages may be programmed.
Refinement In order to prove a refinement between the implementation Header Serialization
from Fig. 10.6 and the specification EBM Headers from Fig. 10.7, the abstraction rela-
tion (abs-ebmio) is used.
abstraction relation # pebs = # apebs (abs-ebmio)
∧ ∀n < # pebs. abs-peb(pebs[n], apebs[n])
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The abstraction just relates individual erase blocks by the predicate abs-peb defined by the
Equation (abs-peb)
abs-peb(peb, apeb) (abs-peb)
↔ ( peb.bad↔ apeb.bad )
∧
(
¬ peb.bad→ peb.written = abs-peb-written(apeb)
∧ abs-peb-echdr(peb.data[0..PAGE_SIZE], apeb.echdr)
∧ abs-peb-vidhdr(peb.data[PAGE_SIZE..2 · PAGE_SIZE], apeb.vidhdr)







; (apeb.vidhdr.empty? ⊃ PAGE_SIZE
; apeb.written + 2 · PAGE_SIZE )
)
and
abs-peb-echdr(buf , empty) ↔ buf = empty-array(PAGE_SIZE)
abs-peb-echdr(buf , mkaechdr(n)) ↔ serialized⟨Echdr⟩(echdr(n), buf )
abs-peb-echdr(buf , garbage) ↔ is-garbage⟨Echdr⟩(buf )
and abs-peb-vidhdr(buf , avhdr) defined analogously to abs-peb-echdr(buf , aehdr).
The invariant and refinement proofs are quite easy and just boil down to using the contract
for the (de)serialization operations of Ch. 9 and reasoning about subranges of arrays. Note
that this is the point of this additional layer of abstraction. Its only purpose is facilitating
the verification of the erase block manager presented in the remainder of this chapter by
concealing the details of (de)serialization of headers.
10.4 Forward & Inverse Mapping, Reading & Writing
The previous section showed an abstraction of physical erase blocks that separates the two
headers needed for the erase block manager from the data stored by its client. The remainder
of this chapter presents the RAM state of erase block manager, its operations and verification.
The full state and invariants of the component are depicted in Fig. 10.8 and are introduced
incrementally. Note that preconditions of the operations are essentially the same as those of
their respective counterpart in the specification of Sec. 10.1, just expressed over a different state
space. The preconditions are therefore omitted in the figures that follow. The component EBM
uses the I/O component EBM Headers of the previous section as a subcomponent.
This sections first discusses part of the state and its invariants and shows some of the
operations of the component exemplary.
Forward Mapping The forward mapping vols (blue bold arrows in Fig. 10.1 on page 92)
is stored in RAM. It maps each volume identifier v ∈ vols of a created volume to an array,
which is indexed by logical block numbers.
state vols : V ↦→ Array⟨PebMapping⟩
data type PebMapping = unmapped | mapped(peb : N)
The value stored is either a physical block number if one has been allocated, or the constant
unmapped otherwise. If a LEB is unmapped reads return bytes set to EMPTY to the client,
which corresponds to the initial state of a PEB, after erasure.
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PEB Properties Array The second core data structure is the PEB Properties Array
given by the state variable ppa. It is depicted in the center in the overview provided by
Fig. 10.5 on page 97. The array stores whether a physical erase block is free, allocated,
scheduled for erasure or is already unusable, alongside the PEB’s erase counter.
state ppa : Array⟨PebProps⟩
data type PebProps = peb-props(ec : N, state : PebState)
data type PebState = FREE | USED | ERASE | BAD
invariant # ppa = # apebs
The state of a physical erase block stored in the array ppa must correspond to the actual
state of the block according to the Invariant (ppa-inv).
invariant (ppa-inv)
∀p < # ppa.
(








ppa[p].state = FREE ∨ ppa[p].state = USED




ppa[p].state = USED→ ∃v, l. maximal(v, l, apebs[p], apebs)
)
The invariant states that a PEB marked as free only has an EC-header, but not yet a
VID-header or any data written to it. Furthermore, the erase counter persisted in the header
matches the counter stored in the array ppa.
Valid, Maximal PEBs and the Inverse Mapping The most important part of In-
variant (ppa-inv), however, is that used physical erase blocks are valid and maximal for
some logical erase block ⟨v, l⟩. The discussion on what exactly constitutes a valid PEB is
postponed to Sec. 10.5 (Equation (valid-peb) on page 106), where atomicity of wear-leveling
is considered. For now the following intuition is sufficient: A PEB is valid for the logical erase
block ⟨v, l⟩ if the PEB has a VID-header that stores ⟨v, l⟩ in the respective fields.
A PEB is maximal for a LEB ⟨v, l⟩ as defined by (maximal-peb) if it is valid and the
sequence number (or version number) is the maximum over the sequence numbers of all
PEBs valid for LEB ⟨v, l⟩.
maximal(v, l, apeb, apebs) (maximal-peb)
↔ valid(v, l, apeb)
∧ apeb.vidhdr.sqn = max
{
apebs[p].vidhdr.sqn
⏐⏐ p < # apebs ∧ valid(v, l, apebs[p]) }
The maximum is defined as zero if no valid physical erase block exists, although this is never
needed since apeb is always part of apebs.
In order to guarantee that maximal PEBs are uniquely determined, Invariant (unique-sqns)
enforces that PEBs that are valid for a LEB (v, l) have a unique sequence number.
invariant 1sqns(v,l,apebs)(n) ≤ 1 for all v, l and n (unique-sqns)
The function sqns : V × N × Array⟨APeb⟩ → Multiset⟨N⟩ picks up the sequence numbers
and the number of occurrences of all PEBs that are valid for the given LEB. It is defined
recursively over the array.
sqns(v, l, []) = ∅
sqns(v, l, [apeb] + apebs) = (valid(v, l, apeb) ⊃ {apeb.vidhdr.sqn}; ∅) ⊎ sqns(v, l, apebs)
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component EBM
subcomponent EBM Headers (see Fig. 10.7 on page 99)
state vols : V ↦→ Array⟨PebMapping⟩, ppa : Array⟨PebProps⟩,
eraseq : List⟨EraseInfo⟩, sqnum : N, bflips : Set⟨N⟩, doWl : B
volspeb : N, free : Set⟨TreeEntry⟩, used : Set⟨TreeEntry⟩
invariant
# ppa = # apebs ∧ (ppa-inv) ∧ (unique-sqns) (Page 101)
∧ (vols-inv) (Page 102)
∧ (bflips-inv) ∧ (eraseq-ppa-inv) ∧ (eraseq-no-dups) ∧ (eraseq-mapping) (Page 103)
∧ (used-inv) ∧ (free-inv) ∧ (sqnum-inv) (Page 104)
∧ (vtbl-inv) (Page 112)
interface operations
ebm_read(v, l, poff , boff , len; buf , err)
if vols[v][l] = unmapped then
buf := fill(buf , EMPTY, boff , len), err := ESUCCESS
else let p = vols[v][l].peb, isbflip = false in
aebm_io_read_data(p, poff , boff , len; buf , isbflip, err);
if err = ESUCCESS ∧ isbflip then bflips :+= p
ebm_unmap(v, l)
if vols[v][l] ̸= unmapped then
let p = vols[v][l].peb in
vols[v][l] := unmapped;
used :−= tree-entry(p, ppa[p].ec), bflips :−= p;
ebm_asynchronous_erase(p, Some(⟨v, l⟩));
auxiliary operations
ebm_asynchronous_erase(p, lebaddr : Option⟨LebAdr⟩)
ppa[p].state := ERASE;
eraseq :+= erase-info(p, lebaddr);
Figure 10.8: Component EBM : State, Invariants and the Operations for Reading and Un-
mapping
Referring back to Fig. 10.1 on page 92, Invariant (unique-sqns) states that the labels of all
red arrows targeting one specific LEB are distinct.
The correspondence of the forward and inverse mapping is guaranteed by the Invari-
ant (vols-inv).1
invariant ⟨v, l⟩ ∈ vols ∧ vols[v][l] = mapped(p) (vols-inv)
↔ p < # ppa ∧ ppa[p].state = USED ∧ p ̸= volspeb
∧ apebs[p].vidhdr.vol = v ∧ apebs[p].vidhdr.leb = l for all v, l and p
The invariant basically just says that the red arrows of the inverse mapping match the
blue arrows of the forward mapping in Fig. 10.1 on page 92. Together with Invari-
ant (ppa-inv) it follows that only maximal PEBs are actually mapped. This just states
that there is a blue arrow in Fig. 10.1 on page 92 only if the corresponding inverse red ar-
row’s number is maximal, i.e., before wear-leveling the PEB with version 1 is mapped and
afterwards the PEB with version 3 must be mapped.2 Note that the invariants do not enforce
that all maximal PEBs are mapped, just if a PEB is mapped it must be maximal.
Note that Invariant (vols-inv) implies that the mapping vols is injective, i.e., one PEB is
not mapped for more than one LEB.
1The state variable volspeb is explained in Sec. 10.7 and can safely be ignored for the moment.
2Assuming that wear-leveling was successful and left the PEB in a state that is valid for the LEB.
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Reading an Erase Block Reading from a logical erase block is implemented as shown in
Fig. 10.8. If the logical erase block is not mapped, then the buffer is filled with bytes of the
value EMPTY. Otherwise, the forward mapping is used to determine the number of the mapped
physical erase block p. Then, the requested part of the data pages of PEB p are read from
the flash device via the component EBM Headers. Note that the component EBM Headers
adds 2 ·PAGE_SIZE to the offset, i.e., this read is past both headers on the actual flash device.
If a correctable bit flip occurs, i.e., the read succeeded with ESUCCESS and the flag isbflip
is set to true, then the physical erase block number is stored in a dedicated set called bflips.
state bflips : Set⟨N⟩
These physical erase blocks are preferred for a wear-leveling cycle in Sec. 10.5, since erasing
the block and reusing it might alleviate bit flip errors. Since only PEBs currently in use are




⏐⏐ p < # ppa ∧ ppa[p].state = USED } (bflips-inv)
Unmapping an Erase Block The interface operation that removes the mapping of a
logical erase block is also depicted in Fig. 10.8. If the LEB is mapped then the mapping is
reset to the constant unmapped and the state of the corresponding physical erase block in
ppa now indicates that it is about to be erased. For performance reasons all PEBs that are
scheduled for an erase cycle are additionally kept in the erase queue. The queue does not
only store the number of the PEB, but it caches also the original mapping ⟨v, l⟩ of the PEB
(if one existed) in order to be able to implement the synchronous erase operation efficiently.
state eraseq : List⟨EraseInfo⟩
data type EraseInfo = erase-info(peb : N, leb : Option⟨LebAdr⟩)
type alias LebAdr ≡ V× N
Synchronous and asynchronous erases are discussed in Sec. 10.6 in more detail.
The erase queue only caches information already available in the PEB information
array and in the VID-header of the PEB itself. Therefore, several invariants that guarantee
consistency of this cache are necessary. Invariant (eraseq-ppa-inv) ensures that a PEB has an
entry in the erase queue if and only if it has the state ERASE in the PEB information array.
invariant (eraseq-ppa-inv){
p
⏐⏐ erase-info(p,_) ∈ eraseq } = { p ⏐⏐ p < # ppa ∧ ppa[p].state = ERASE }
The function pebs : List⟨EraseInfo⟩ → Multiset⟨N⟩ (omitted here) just calculates the
multiset of all peb fields of the erase queue and the Invariant (eraseq-no-dups) then states
that a PEB has at most one entry in the erase queue. The symbol 1M denotes the characteristic
function of the multiset M .
invariant 1pebs(eraseq)(n) ≤ 1 for all n (eraseq-no-dups)
Invariant (eraseq-mapping) ensures that if a PEB is valid for some LEB and has an entry in
the erase queue, then the correct mapping is also stored in the entry.
invariant e ∈ eraseq ∧ valid(v, l, apebs[e.peb]) (eraseq-mapping)
→ e.leb = Some(⟨v, l⟩) for all e, v and l
The final step of the interface operation ebm_unmap removes the pair of PEB number and
its erase counter from the used tree. In this binary search tree all PEBs currently marked
as used have an entry. The tree is sorted by the erase counter. In addition to the used tree
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there is also a free tree. Both data structures are used for allocation and for wear-leveling,
where a PEB with a suitable erase counter needs to be chosen.
state used : Set⟨TreeEntry⟩, free : Set⟨TreeEntry⟩
data type TreeEntry = tree-entry(peb : N, ec : N)
For brevity only the abstraction of the search tree to a set is shown, in the actual model
access to the tree is encapsulated in a dedicated subcomponent. The subcomponent is then
refined by an implementation that is based on a red-black tree, which provides logarithmic
time complexity for all relevant operations.
Invariants (used-inv) and (free-inv) just capture that the right PEB numbers and erase









⏐⏐ p < # ppa ∧ ppa[p].state = FREE } (free-inv)
Mapping an Erase Block The operation ebm_map is shown in Fig. 10.9. It requests a
new physical block p from the free tree. The PEB with the minimum erase counter of all free




⏐⏐ tree-entry(_, ec) ∈ free }
This decision ensures that the best physical erase blocks, according to their erase counter,
are reused as soon as possible.
After the allocation of a free PEB, ebm_map tries to write the VID-header of the physical
erase block. The requested mapping ⟨v, l⟩ is written with the sequence number sqnum.





⎫⎬⎭ < sqnum (sqnum-inv)
Invariant (sqnum-inv) ensures that the allocated PEB contains the most recent mapping for
the logical erase block ⟨v, l⟩, because sqnum is larger than the sequence number of any valid
PEB. Afterwards, sqnum is incremented in order to maintain Invariant (sqnum-inv).
If the VID-header is written successfully, the forward mapping vols is adjusted accordingly
and the PEB p is moved to the used tree. Otherwise, the PEB p is added to the erase queue,
because it might contain a corrupted VID-header and therefore can only be safely reused
after erasure.
The entire process of trying to write the VID-header can be repeated several times with
different PEBs until it succeeds, in order to improve resilience against unpredictable hardware
errors.
Instead of returning the error code ENOSPC in line (⋆) in Fig. 10.9, the implementation
tries to synchronously erase a PEB from the erase queue and then uses this block as a result
of the allocation. This just uses the facilities explained in Sec. 10.6 and is omitted here for
brevity.
Writing an Erase Block The implementation of the operation ebm_write is also shown
in Fig. 10.9. In the normal case the data pages are written successfully to the physical erase
block that is mapped the given logical erase block ⟨v, l⟩.
However, if the call was not successful, the data pages programmed by previous writes to
the PEB—everything up to the offset poff — are read. An attempt is made to atomically
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let tries = 0, p = 0 in
while tries ≤ EBM_MAP_RETRIES ∧ err ̸= ESUCCESS do
tries := tries + 1;
ebm_allocate_peb(; p, err);
if err = ESUCCESS then
aebm_io_write_vidheader(p, mkavidhdr(v, l, sqnum, 0, 0); err);
sqnum := sqnum + 1;
if err = ESUCCESS then
vols[v][l] := mapped(p), ppa[p].state := USED, used :+= tree-entry(p, ppa[p].ec);
else
ebm_asynchronous_erase(p, None);
ebm_write(v, l, poff , boff , len, buf ; err)
let p = vols[v][l].peb in
aebm_io_write_data(p, poff , boff , len, buf ; err);
if err ̸= ESUCCESS then
let buf 0 = Array⟨Byte⟩(poff + len), isbflip = false in
aebm_io_read_data(p, 0, 0, poff ; buf , isbflip, err);
if err = ESUCCESS then
buf 0 := copy(buf , boff , buf 0, poff , len);
ebm_atomic_change(v, l, poff + len, buf 0; err);
auxiliary operations
ebm_allocate_peb(; p, err)
choose p0 with tree-entry(p0, min-ec(free)) ∈ free
p := p0, free :−= p0, err := ESUCCESS
ifnone
err := ENOSPC (⋆)
Figure 10.9: Component EBM : The implementations of ebm_map and ebm_write: The
operation ebm_map maps a logical erase block to a free physical erase block allocated via
the auxiliary operation ebm_allocate_peb. The interface operation ebm_write writes to the
data pages of a mapped logical erase block. Both interface operations employ different retry
mechanism to increase resilience against hardware errors.
replace the contents of the logical erase block with the old data appended by the new data. If
this fails we end up with the partially written, original PEB. Note that it is crucial here that
moving the old data to a new location is done atomically. Otherwise, an interruption in the
middle could yield partially written (old) data, but with a newer mapping. This would lead
to a loss of data. Fig. 10.10 depicts the different stages the involved PEBs can have. The
state that would be reached by the red arrow should not occur if the ebm_change operation
is atomic with respect to errors and power failures.
The facility to move data atomically is also used by the wear-leveling algorithm and is
discussed in the next section.
10.5 Atomic LEB Content Exchange & Wear-Leveling
The mechanism that ensures that exchanging the contents of a LEB is possible atomically is
to store additional information in the VID-header—specifically a measure of the minimum
size of the data in the PEB and a checksum over this data—and only consider a PEB valid
if these additional fields match their expected value. This is the purpose of the size and
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Figure 10.10: The four (legal) stages of writing to a LEB: At each stage only the PEB that
is mapped to the LEB is depicted and EC-headers are omitted for clarity. At the top the
initially mapped PEB n is shown. If writing is successful PEB n remains mapped with the old
and new data. A failed write results in a prefix of the new data being persisted. In this case
a retry mechanism tries to move the old and new data to a new PEB m, which is mapped
for the LEB if successful. Otherwise, the half-written PEB n remains mapped and a failure
is reported to the client. The black VID-header has a higher sequence number than the
red VID-header. Atomicity of ebm_change guarantees that the state reached by the red,
crossed arrow is never observable.
checksum fields of the VID-header that were unused and set to zero up until now.
Valid PEBs Formally, we consider the PEB apeb valid for some logical erase block ⟨v, l⟩
if and only if valid(v, l, apeb) holds as defined by Equation (valid-peb).
valid(v, l, apeb) (valid-peb)
↔ ¬ apeb.bad ∧ apeb.echdr.mkaechdr?
∧ ∃sqn, size, chk. apeb.vidhdr = mkavidhdr(v, l, sqn, size, chk)
∧
(
size ̸= 0→ size ≤ datasize(apeb.data, LEB_SIZE)
∧ chk = checksum(apeb.data, size)
)
A valid physical erase block is not marked as bad, has valid EC- and VID-headers. The mapping
stored in the VID-header corresponds to the LEB ⟨v, l⟩. Furthermore, the offset of the last
non-EMPTY byte in the data pages, which is calculated by datasize(apeb.data, LEB_SIZE),
is not less than the size field of the VID-header and the checksum over the first size bytes
matches the checksum field of the VID-header.
As a checksum algorithm for example CRC32 could be used. We only demand axiomatically
that two buffers buf0 and buf1 that contain the same elements up to offset size return the
same checksum, i.e., checksum(buf0, size) = checksum(buf1, size) holds in this case.
Atomically Exchanging LEBs Fig. 10.11 shows the implementation of the procedure
ebm_atomic_change_peb, which atomically exchanges the contents of the LEB ⟨v, l⟩ with
the first len bytes from buffer buf by leveraging Equation (valid-peb). It writes into the data
pages of the newly allocated PEB to an appropriately prepared VID-header and the contents
of the buffer. Note that a page-aligned number of bytes must be written, i.e., the offset of
the last non-EMPTY byte len0 is aligned to the next page boundary for writing by passing
align↑(len0, PAGE_SIZE) to the write operation.
In order to understand the error and power failure behavior of this operation better
and how it relates to the validity of a PEB as defined by Equation (valid-peb), Fig. 10.12
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auxiliary operations
ebm_atomic_change_peb(v, l, to, len, buf ; err)
let len0 = datasize(buf , len), avhdr in
avhdr := mkavidhdr(v, l, sqnum, len0, checksum(buf , len0));
sqnum := sqnum + 1;
aebm_io_write_vidheader(to, avhdr ; err);
if err = ESUCCESS ∧ len0 ̸= 0 then
aebm_io_write_data(to, 0, 0, align↑(len0, PAGE_SIZE), buf ; err);
if err = ESUCCESS then {
if vols[v][l] ̸= unmapped then { (⋆)
let p0 = vols[v][l].peb in
ppa[p0].state := ERASE, eraseq :+= erase-info(p0, Some(⟨v, l⟩));
used :−= tree-entry(p0, ppa[p0].ec);
}
vols[v][l] := mapped(p), ppa[p].state := USED, used :+= tree-entry(p, ppa[p].ec);
} else
ebm_queue_erase(p, Some(⟨v, l⟩)) ;
interface operations
ebm_atomic_change(v, l, len, buf ; err)
let to = 0 in
ebm_allocate_peb(; to, err);
if err = ESUCCESS then
ebm_atomic_change_peb(v, l, to, len, buf ; err);
Figure 10.11: Component EBM : Atomic LEB Exchange (used by wear-leveling and when
writing the superblock in Ch. 12)
visualizes the different stages during and after the operation. Note that here only PEB to is
shown at each stage.In all stages where PEB to is dashed, it is not (yet) valid for the LEB
⟨v, l⟩ and the previous PEB that was and is still valid for ⟨v, l⟩ is chosen, i.e., the mapping is
not updated during the operation and the recovery after a power failure would also chose the
previous PEB as discussed in Sec. 10.8 in more detail.
At the top the newly allocated, free PEB to is shown. The bold arrows denote state
transitions due to a call of an I/O operation. An unsuccessful write to the VID-header leads to
an invalid PEB, since either the VID-header is empty or contains garbage. After a successful
write of the VID-header, the erase block is still invalid, since the data size and checksum
fields of the VID-header do not match the data size of the four empty data pages, which
is zero.3 If the copying is successful, the data size and checksum fields match the contents
of the block and the in-memory mapping can be updated accordingly. Otherwise, the new
physical erase block is scheduled for erasure and the old PEB is used.
Note that the checksum is only calculated up to the initial data size. Thus, a successive
write to the LEB afterwards maintains that the data size and checksum stored in the VID-
header match the values calculated from the contents of the data region. Therefore, validity
of the PEB is maintained by successive writes.
The operation ebm_atomic_change that atomically exchanges the contents of a logical
erase block is also shown in Fig. 10.11 and is built around ebm_atomic_change_peb. If the
operation fails the LEB is unchanged. It only needs to allocate a fresh, free PEB and call
ebm_atomic_change_peb. In contrast to ebm_write, ebm_atomic_change is more general
and has a more favorable behavior with respect to failures. However, this comes at the price
3This assumes that the client did not pass a buffer filled with bytes of the value EMPTY to the operation
ebm_atomic_change_peb. In this case, the PEB is already valid, but obviously also already contains the
desired contents.
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Figure 10.12: States of the new PEB during and after an atomic LEB exchange: The exchange
operation should write the first two pages with the green data. The dashed states are
invalid for the corresponding LEB, either because the VID-header is invalid or the size and
checksum fields of the VID-header do not match the contents of the data pages. In contrast,
the solid states are valid. Even after a successive write of the third page to the PEB, it
remains valid for the LEB, since the data size only increases and the checksum is unchanged.
(EC-headers omitted)
of one additional erasure of a block. Thus, it is only desirable if the additional guarantees
are actually required, for example in order to write a new version of the super block during a
commit as shown in Ch. 12.
Wear-Leveling The internal operation for wear-leveling is shown in Fig. 10.13. It is
triggered by the other operations by setting the state variable doWl to true.
state doWl : B
The internal operation additionally performs the task of scrubbing erase blocks. Scrubbing
moves data from blocks with bit flips to fresh blocks in order to erase the block. Future reuse
is usually possible afterwards. Otherwise, the internal operation chooses a used and a free
physical erase block of low resp. high wear. Note that the free and used tree are implemented
by binary search trees ordered by the erase counter of each entry. Therefore this choice
is of logarithmic time complexity. If the difference of the erase counters exceeds a certain
threshold, wear-leveling is performed. First, the VID-header and data region of the used
PEB are read. Reading the VID-header yields the LEB the PEB is currently mapped for.
Afterwards, the data is moved atomically to the new PEB to and the forward mapping for
the corresponding LEB is updated to point to PEB to.
The exact choice of a free PEB for wear-leveling has several reasons. The PEB should
have a relatively high erase counter. This is ensured by the maximum of the choice of to0 in
Fig. 10.13 and by the check that its erase counter is larger as that of from0 by at least the
threshold. However, the erase counter should not be too high, since we want to delay the use
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let to, from, avhdr , isbflip, buf = Array⟨Byte⟩(LEB_SIZE) in
ebm_get_wear_leveling_pebs(; to, from; err , isScrubbing);
if err = ESUCCESS then
aebm_io_read_vidheader(from; avhdr , isbflip, err);
if err = ESUCCESS ∧ avhdr .mkavidhdr? then
aebm_io_read_data(from, 0, 0, LEB_SIZE; buf , isbflip, err);
if err = ESUCCESS then
ebm_atomic_change_peb(avhdr .vol, avhdr .leb, to, LEB_SIZE, buf ; err);
auxiliary operations
ebm_get_wear_leveling_pebs(;to, from, err , isScrubbing)
if bflips ̸= ∅ then
. . ., isScrubbing := true
else
choose from0 with tree-entry(from0,min-ec(used)) ∈ used in
choose to0 with ∃ec. tree-entry(to0, ec) ∈ free
∧ ec = max
{
ec′
⏐⏐ tree-entry(_, ec′) ∈ free
∧ ec′ < min-ec(free) + 2 · WL_THRESHOLD
}
in
if ppa[from].ec + WL_THRESHOLD ≤ ppa[to].ec then
. . ., isScrubbing := false
Figure 10.13: Component EBM : Wear-Leveling
of potentially bad blocks as long as possible. Therefore only PEBs with an erase counter that
is only higher than the minimum by twice the threshold. Furthermore, the criterion should
be algorithmically efficient to check, since the other operations check it when the free and
the used are modified and trigger wear-leveling by setting the flag doWl when appropriate.
Note that in order for wear-leveling to work correctly and transparently it is necessary
that successive write operations to the mapped PEB are still possible. This is guaranteed,
because ebm_atomic_change_peb only writes up to the offset
align↑(datasize(buf , LEB_SIZE), PAGE_SIZE).
However, writes are always sequential within an erase block and therefore always occur
after the last non-EMPTY byte, i.e., all successive writes must start above this offset and are
therefore still permitted.
Preserving PEB Validity This insight is also essential for the verification of the Invari-
ant (ppa-inv) on page 101, which requires preserving the validity of a PEB over successive
writes. Invariant (ppa-inv) is the main source of difficulty during the verification of the
invariants, exactly because reasoning about the validity of PEBs is quite difficult.
Formally, by the definition of validity (valid-peb) on page 106, it is necessary to prove
that (In-)Equalities (10.1) hold for the physical erase block apeb that is affected by the write
in order to preserve the validity of apeb over a successive write.
datasize(copy(buf , boff , apeb.data, poff , len), LEB_SIZE) ≥ size (10.1)
checksum(copy(buf , boff , apeb.data, poff , len), size) = checksum(apeb.data, size)
In (10.1) the variable size is a shorthand for apeb.vidhdr.size and all other non-state variables
are the input of the operation ebm_write from Fig. 10.9 on page 105: The left-hand side
denotes the state after a write of len bytes to apeb beginning at offset poff . Fig. 10.14 depicts
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Figure 10.14: Preserving PEB Validity over Successive Writes: The PEB apeb is the result
of a run of wear-leveling that only wrote the first page and some bytes at the end of
the first page are EMPTY. Afterwards, a successive write of the second page is performed,
which increases datasize(apeb.data, LEB_SIZE) and apeb.written to the depicted values.
Another successive write then must start at an offset poff , which satisfies the inequalities
apeb.vidhdr.size ≤ datasize(apeb.data, LEB_SIZE) ≤ apeb.written ≤ poff .
this situation and the inequalities between the different offsets. Since the PEB was valid
before the write datasize(apeb.data, LEB_SIZE) ≥ size is known. The precondition of a write
operation implies that apeb.written ≤ poff also holds. By Invariant (ebm-io-inv) on page 99
datasize(apeb.data, LEB_SIZE) ≤ apeb.written holds. Taken together this implies size ≤
datasize(apeb.data, LEB_SIZE) ≤ poff . Thus, the subrange of the PEB the checksum is
calculated for is unchanged, i.e.,
copy(buf , boff , apeb.data, poff , len)[0..size] = apeb.data[0..size]
holds and therefore the checksum itself remains the same. With respect to the first inequality
of (10.1), the resulting array can be split into the three parts
copy(buf , boff , apeb.data, poff , len) = apeb.data[0..poff ]+buf [0..len]+apeb.data[poff +len..]
where additionally
apeb.data[poff + len..] = empty-array(LEB_SIZE− (poff + len))
is known, because datasize(apeb.data, LEB_SIZE) ≤ poff + len. With this the following
(in-)equalities imply that (10.1) holds.
datasize(copy(buf , boff , apeb.data, poff , len), LEB_SIZE)
= datasize(apeb.data[0..poff ] + buf [0..len] + empty-array(. . .), LEB_SIZE)
= datasize(apeb.data[0..poff ] + buf [0..len], LEB_SIZE)
=
(
datasize(buf , len) = 0 ⊃ datasize(apeb.data[0..poff ], LEB_SIZE)
; poff + datasize(buf , len)
)
≥ datasize(apeb.data, LEB_SIZE) ≥ size
This quite tricky reasoning should illustrate that ensuring the (in)validity of a physical erase
block is quite complex due to the extensive use of subranges and functions applied to them.
Note also that this line of reasoning is pervasive in the entire component, because uniqueness
of the sequence numbers (unique-sqns) on page 101 and maximality of the currently held
mapping (ppa-inv) on page 101 are also based on validity of a physical erase block.
10.6 Synchronous & Asynchronous Block Erasure
Synchronous erasure of a logical erase block is performed by the interface operation ebm_erase
shown in Fig. 10.15. The operation first unmaps the corresponding PEB and adds it to the
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· · · // call ebm_synchronous_erase_peb for all blocks in eraseq for the LEB ⟨v, l⟩
ebm_synchronous_erase_peb(p; err)
err := EIO;
let tries = 0 in
while tries ≤ ERASE_RETRIES ∧ err ̸= ESUCCESS do
ppa[p].ec := ppa[p].ec + 1, tries := tries + 1;
aebm_io_synchronous_erase(p; err);
if err = ESUCCESS then
aebm_io_write_echeader(p, mkaechdr(ppa[p].ec); err);
if err = ESUCCESS then
ppa[p].state := FREE, free :+= tree-entry(p, ppa[p].ec) ;
else
aebm_io_mark_bad(p; err)
if err = ESUCCESS then;
ppa[p].state := BAD;
ebm_synchronous_erase_all(; err)
· · · // call ebm_synchronous_erase_peb for all blocks in eraseq
internal operations
ebm_erase_worker()
guard eraseq ̸= []
let p = eraseq.head.peb, err in
ebm_synchronous_erase(p; err);
if err = ESUCCESS then
eraseq := eraseq.tail;
Figure 10.15: Component EBM : Synchronous & Asynchronous Erase (preconditions omitted)
erase queue, if a PEB is mapped at all. Afterwards, all PEBs in the erase queue that contain a
valid mapping for the LEB ⟨v, l⟩ are synchronously erased by ebm_synchronous_erase_leb.
The operation ebm_synchronous_erase_peb is then called for each of those PEBs. It tries
to erase the block and write a new EC-header with an increased erase counter several times.
If it succeeds the PEB is marked as free and placed into the free tree. Otherwise, an attempt
is made to physically mark the block as bad. If the attempt fails, the block remains in the
erase queue.4
There is also an operation ebm_synchronous_erase_all that attempts to erase all blocks
in the queue and is called before the file system is unmounted and before a new volume is
created, discussed in more detail in the next section.
The background operation for asynchronous erasure is ebm_erase_worker and dequeues
an entry from the erase queue and then also tries to erase the PEB synchronously via
ebm_synchronous_erase_leb.
4In the actual models in such situations an error message is emitted, such that the user is kept informed
of such critical failures.
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10.7 Volume Management
In order to support volumes a volume table needs to be kept on flash, which stores the existing
volumes and their sizes. The state variable volspeb records the PEB holding the most recent
version of the volume table.
state volspeb : N
Updates to the volume table also need to be performed atomically. Therefore, the facilities of
Sec. 10.5 for the atomic exchange of the contents of a LEB are reused for the volume table.
Invariant (vtbl-inv) associated with the volume table then just states that PEB volspeb
is marked as used and valid for the LEB (VTBL_VOLID, VTBL_LEB), which implied by Invari-
ant (ppa-inv) on page 101. Furthermore, the data pages contain the set to-vtbl(vols), which
is just defined as the set of pairs of volume identifiers and the corresponding volume’s size in
vols.
invariant volspeb < # ppa ∧ ppa[volspeb].state = USED (vtbl-inv)
∧ apebs[volspeb].vidhdr.vol = VTBL_VOLID
∧ apebs[volspeb].vidhdr.leb = VTBL_LEB
∧ serialized⟨Set⟨V× N⟩⟩(to-vtbl(vols), apebs[volspeb].data)





⏐⏐ v ∈ vols }
With respect to the actual serialization, the predicate serialized first stores the byte
representation of the number of elements, afterwards one possible sequence of those elements
and then padding bytes to fill up the space up to LEB_SIZE. Thus, the volume table fills up
all data pages of one physical erase block.
The volume table only stores the user-accessible volumes and only those are also part of
the forward mapping vols. Apart from user-accessible volumes, there are also hidden volumes.
We currently only use the hidden volume VTBL_VOLID to store the volume table itself.5 Thus,
Invariant VTBL_VOLID ̸∈ vols must be maintained.
A new volume is created as shown in Fig. 10.16. It is first checked that enough space is
available in the volume table to hold another entry. Afterwards, a fresh, free PEB is allocated
and the contents of the (user-inaccessible) LEB (VTBL_VOLID, VTBL_LEB) are exchanged
atomically with the new, serialized volume table. Note again that atomicity is required in
order to maintain a consistent and valid volume table.6 Otherwise, either some or all volumes
might be lost if an error or power failure occurs at an intermediate stage of writing. Only
if the volume table is written successful, the newly created volume is added to the forward
mapping vols and all entries are set to unmapped.
Note that deleting or resizing a volume can be implemented and verified similarly.
10.8 Initialization, Power Failures & Recovery
Initialization of the component EBM writes initial EC-headers with a counter of 0 to all
non-bad blocks. In the PEB information array ppa all bad blocks are marked accordingly
5The Linux implementation of UBI uses additional hidden volumes for a feature termed Fastmap, which
increases the speed during recovery after the file system is unmounted. The idea essentially is to store a
version of the forward mapping vols in the first blocks of the device when the file system is unmounted and
reconstruct the RAM state from this during normal mounting. However, in the case of a recovery after a
power loss, the data is restored from the inverse mapping stored in each block as discussed in Sec. 10.8, since
the persisted version might be out of date.
6Note that in order for the call to ebm_atomic_change_peb to work properly its implementation needs to
be adapted appropriately, i.e., the if-statement at line (⋆) in Fig. 10.11 on page 107 has to handle the case
v = VTBL_VOLID separately and use p0 = volspeb instead of the PEB found in the forward mapping vols.
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if err = ESUCCESS then
let vtbl = to-vtbl(vols), buf = Array⟨Byte⟩(LEB_SIZE),n, p in
to-vtbl[v] := size;
if serialized-size⟨Set⟨V× N⟩⟩(vtbl) > LEB_SIZE then
err := ENOSPC
else
serialize⟨Set⟨V× N⟩⟩(vtbl, 0; buf ,n, err);
if err = ESUCCESS then
ebm_allocate_peb(; p, err)
if err = ESUCCESS then
ebm_atomic_change_peb(VTBL_VOLID, VTBL_LEB, p, LEB_SIZE, buf ; err);
if err = ESUCCESS then
vols[v] := Array⟨Byte⟩(size, unmapped), volspeb := p;
Figure 10.16: Component EBM : Volume Management
and all other blocks are marked as free except for the PEB volspeb. In this PEB an initial
volume table that does not contain any volumes is written. All other data structures are
initialized accordingly.
The recovery from power loss is by far the largest part of the component EBM and
constitutes around a third of the code. This difficulty stems from the fact that quite a few
data structures have to be rebuilt, since all state variables except for apebs are lost in a
power failure. The physical erase blocks, however, are assumed to be unchanged by a power
failure. Rebuilding the data structures is intricate mainly because checking whether a physical
erase block is valid for some LEB as defined by Equation (valid-peb) on page 106 has many
cases and steps and needs to be performed for every physical erase block on the device
incrementally.
Another contributing factor to the complexity is that an intermediate data structure
ai (attachment information) is needed during the scanning of the device. There are three
reasons for this.
1. The volume table and therefore the existing volumes and their sizes are only known
after the scanning is complete and the most recent version of the volume table has
been located and read.
2. In order to find the PEB with the highest sequence number for a mapping, it is necessary
to cache the highest sequence number for each LEB that is encountered during the
scanning process. Then contending PEBs can be discarded or chosen based on a
comparison of their sequence number with the current maximum for the LEB
3. Not only the normal volumes need to be restored, but also the hidden volumes, which
in our case is only the volume VTBL_VOLID with the volume table.
The necessary information for user-accessible and hidden volumes is stored during recovery
in the attachment entries mapping ai.
ai : V× N ↦→ AttachmentEntry
data type AttachmentEntry = aientry(peb : N, sqn : N)
Fig. 10.17 shows conceptually how the in-memory state is rebuilt from the data structures
stored on flash.
First, all physical erase blocks are scanned by the procedure ebm_scan, i.e., it is checked
whether a PEB is marked as bad and has valid EC- and VID-headers in order to determine
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recovery
ebm_recovery(; err)
let blockcount, valid-ec-mean, invalid-ec-pebs = [] in
ebm_io_get_blockcount(; blockcount);
vols := ∅, ppa := Array⟨PebProps⟩(blockcount), eraseq := [], sqnum := 0;
free := ∅, used := ∅;
ebm_scan(blockcount; ai, valid-ec-mean, invalid-ec-pebs, err);
if err = ESUCCESS ∧ ⟨VTBL_VOLID, VTBL_LEB⟩ ̸∈ ai then
err := EINVAL;
else if err = ESUCCESS then let buf = Array⟨Byte⟩(LEB_SIZE), vtbl = ∅ in
volspeb := ai[⟨VTBL_VOLID, VTBL_LEB⟩].peb
ebm_io_read_data(volspeb, 0, 0, LEB_SIZE; buf ,_, err);
if err = ESUCCESS then
deserialize⟨Set⟨V× N⟩⟩(0, buf ; vtbl,_, err);





ebm_scan(blockcount; ai, valid-ec-mean, invalid-ec-pebs, err)
for i = 0 . . . blockcount do
· · · // Check whether apebs[i] is bad, free, valid or invalid and update
// ppa[i], ai, eraseq, free and used accordingly
// Add PEBs with empty or invalid EC-header to invalid-ec-pebs
// Calculate mean value of all valid erase counters as valid-ec-mean
ebm_initialize_vols(vtbl, ai);
· · · // Allocate enough space for each volume in vtbl
// Move mappings in bounds of vtbl from ai to vols
// Move all other PEBs referred to by ai to eraseq
ebm_fix_ecs(valid-ec-mean, invalid-ec-pebs)
· · · // Set ppa[n].ec to valid-ec-mean for all PEBs n ∈ invalid-ec-pebs
// with invalid EC-header
Figure 10.17: Component EBM : Recovery after Normal Reboot or Power Loss
whether it is a valid PEB. If the PEB has a VID-header with a non-zero data size field, then
additionally the data pages have to be read and their data size and checksum compared with
the expected values as the definition of validity demands. All the data structures are updated
during this scanning process with the exception of vols and volspeb, instead all maximally
valid PEBs are stored in the attachment entries map ai.
During this process some PEBs might be encountered which are not bad, but nonetheless
have an invalid EC-header, because they were in the process of being erased or erasing failed.
These PEBs are kept in the list invalid-ec-pebs in order to fix their erase counter with some
reasonable value later on. As such a value the mean over all erase counters of PEBs with a
valid EC-header is chosen and also calculated in the variable valid-ec-mean by ebm_scan.
Afterwards, it is checked that a volume layout was found during scanning. Mounting
fails if no layout is present. Otherwise, the volume table is read and deserialized. For each
non-hidden volume identifier a volume of the stored size initialized to unmapped is added
to vols by ebm_initialize_vols_sizes. Then the operation ebm_init_volume_mappings
transfers all mapping information from the intermediate data structure ai referring to an
existing volume and within its bounds to vols.
Finally, for each physical erase block p with an invalid EC-header, its cached erase counter
ppa[p].ec is set to the mean value over all erase counters by the procedure ebm_fix_ecs. This
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value is then used after the next erase cycle by ebm_synchronous_erase_peb (see Fig. 10.15
on page 111) for the EC-header.
It is crucial for the correctness of the recovery that the in-memory mapping corresponds to
the most recent (inverse) mapping stored on-disk after each operation, among those PEBs that
are valid. This is implied by Invariant (vols-inv) on page 102 together with Invariant (ppa-inv)
on page 101. To see that this is necessary assume the opposite: There are two PEBs p and
p′ and both store a mapping for a LEB ⟨v, l⟩. In memory ⟨v, l⟩ is mapped to p, although p′
has the higher sequence number. If the contents of both data regions are initially identical,
assume that a write operation is requested by the client on LEB ⟨v, l⟩ with non-empty data.
Afterwards, the contents of PEB p and p′ definitely differ. In the event of a power failure, the
subsequent recovery will restore a mapping from ⟨v, l⟩ to p′. Reading the mapped LEB ⟨v, l⟩
before and after the power-loss will yield different results and therefore data will be lost.
The definition of maximality Def. 10.1 is the key insight necessary to prove the correctness
of the recovery mechanism of the component EBM .
Definition 10.1 (Maximal State). A state of the component EBM is maximal if all in-
variants of the component (see Fig. 10.8 on page 102) are satisfied and additionally Equa-
tion (maximal-state) holds, which states that LEBs with pending entries in the erase queue
are not marked as unmapped in the forward mapping vols.









⏐⏐ ⟨v, l⟩ ∈ vols ∧ vols[v][l] = unmapped }
The function lebs returns all LEBs that have a valid PEB pending in the erase queue. The
set of all LEBs that are unmapped in vols is returned by the function unmapped-lebs.
The most interesting aspect of maximality is summarized in Lem. 10.2.
Lemma 10.2 (Maximal Mapping). Given two states s and s′ of the component EBM over
the same device apebs = apebs′ that satisfy all invariants of the component (see Fig. 10.8 on
page 102) and s′ is maximal, then
vols ⊆ vols′
holds, where the subset relation between mappings is defined by Equation (mapping-⊆).
vols ⊆ vols′ (mapping-⊆)
↔ dom(vols) = dom(vols′)
∧ ∀v ∈ dom(vols). # vols[v] = # vols′[v]
∧ ∀l < # vols. vols[v][l] ̸= vols′[v][l]→ vols[v][l] = unmapped
Proof. Invariants (unique-sqns) on page 101, (ppa-inv) on page 101 and Invariant (vols-inv)
on page 102 are crucial for this insight.
The condition of maximality (maximal-state) ensures that if a LEB ⟨v, l⟩ is mapped in
vols, then vols′ also provides a mapping. Assume vols[v][l] = mapped(p) for some PEB p,
which is marked as used in ppa. In the maximal state ppa′ the PEB p must be marked either
as in use or as scheduled for erasure, according to the Invariant (ppa-inv) (for the states
ppa and ppa′ with the same flash device apebs). If the PEB is not in used, according to
maximality (maximal-state) there is another PEB for the LEB ⟨v, l⟩ that is. This proves that
vols′ maps more LEBs then vols.
According to Invariant (unique-sqns) valid and maximal PEBs are uniquely determined
and according to Invariants (ppa-inv) on page 101 and (vols-inv) on page 102 mapped PEBs
are valid and maximal. Thus, If a LEB ⟨v, l⟩ is mapped in vols and in vols′, then vols[v][l] =
vols[v][l] must holds.
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Since the device is the same for Lem. 10.2, the component EBM in its maximal states is
able to access the largest possible amount of data. Lem. 10.3 then states that such a state is
recovered after a power failure.
Lemma 10.3 (Correctness of Recovery). The procedure ebm_recovery terminates and if
successful returns a maximal state.
The proof of Lem. 10.3 only gives a high-level overview and highlights some key steps in
the verification.
Proof Outline (Lem. 10.3). The proof is split into four steps. First, a postcondition for
ebm_scan is established. In a second step it is proven that the most recent version of the
volume table is identified correctly. Then the forward mapping and its invariants are restored.
In the following variable names with an index zero, e.g., vols0 refer to the state of the
component EBM before the reboot, variable names without an index refer to the current
state.
1. The call to ebm_scan recovers a state where all invariants of the component (see Fig. 10.8
on page 102) hold, except for Invariant (vols-inv) on page 102 and Invariant (vtbl-inv)
on page 112 since those refer to vols and volspeb. Instead for the data structure ai the
postcondition
lebs(eraseq) ⊆ dom(ai) ∧ (scan-ai-post) (scan-post)
is established. The first conjunction ensures that the temporary data structure ai
contains a mapping for every LEB that is in the erase queue. This means that no PEBs
that are valid and maximal are put into the erase queue.
⟨v, l⟩ ∈ dom(ai) ∧ ai[⟨v, l⟩] = aientry(p, sqn) (scan-ai-post)
↔ p < # ppa ∧ ppa[p].state = USED ∧ apebs[p].vidhdr.sqn = sqn
∧ apebs[p].vidhdr.vol = v ∧ apebs[p].vidhdr.leb = l for all v, l, p and sqn
The second conjunct (scan-ai-post) ensures that the entries of ai are consistent with
the inverse mapping and the sequence number stored in the physical erase blocks.
Establishing Invariant (ppa-inv) on page 101 in ebm_scan is quite tricky since checking
the validity requires a lot of steps and needs to be matched against its algebraic
definition (valid-peb) on page 106.
2. Afterwards, a volume table is read from the PEB
volspeb = ai[VTBL_VOLID][VTBL_LEB].peb.
Obviously, it is crucial that the volume table that was in use before the reboot is
read. This follows from the fact the volspeb = volspeb0, because according to Invari-
ants (vtbl-inv) on page 112 and (ppa-inv) on page 101 the PEB volspeb0 is valid and
maximal for ⟨VTBL_VOLID, VTBL_LEB⟩ before the reboot.
The postcondition (scan-ai-post) of the previous step implies that volspeb is also a
maximal and valid PEB for ⟨VTBL_VOLID, VTBL_LEB⟩. Physical erase blocks are not
altered and maximal and valid PEBs are unambiguous for every LEB according to
Invariant (unique-sqns) on page 101, both volspeb and volspeb0 must therefore refer to
the same block.
3. The call to ebm_initialize_vol_sizes first allocates the volumes with their respective
sizes are present in the volume table read in the previous step. This step reestablishes
Invariant (vtbl-inv) on page 112.
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4. Afterwards, ebm_initialize_vol_mappings moves all mappings that are within the
bounds of existing volumes from the attachment information ai to vols. Based on
the postcondition (scan-ai-post) of the first step, this establishes Invariant (vols-inv)
on page 102. All other entries in ai are moved to the erase queue. During this process
the invariant
lebs(eraseq) ⊆ dom(ai) ∪ mapped-lebs(vols),
is maintained, where mapped-lebs is defined analogously to unmapped-lebs. The in-
variant holds initially by the first conjunct of the postcondition (scan-post) of the first
step. After ebm_initialize_vol_mappings completes with ai = ∅, maximality of the
state,
lebs(eraseq) ∩ unmapped-lebs(vols) = ∅,
follows directly.
The final call to ebm_fix_ecs only changes the cached erase counter of PEBs marked as
ERASE, which does not invalidate any invariants.
10.9 Verification of Crash-Safe Refinement
The hard part of the verification is actually establishing the invariants of the implementation,
since there are several data structures with quite a few consistency requirements between
them. In contrast, the abstraction relation has to consider the physical erase blocks apebs, the
forward mapping vols and the erase queue eraseq only. The erase queue is used to determine
whether a LEB has any valid PEBs. Equation (ebm-abs) shows the abstraction relation.
abstraction relation lebs(eraseq) ∩ erased-lebs(avols) = ∅ (ebm-abs)
∧ abs(avols, vols, apebs)
All LEBs that are marked as erased in the specification component are given by the function
erased-lebs. The invariant therefore states that none of the LEBs marked as erased have




⏐⏐ ⟨v, l⟩ ∈ avols ∧ avols[v][l] = erased }
The predicate abs states that the contents of each logical erase block correspond to the
contents of the mapped physical erase block and the number of bytes written to that PEB is
not greater than the number of bytes written to the LEB.
abs(avols, vols, apebs) ↔ dom(avols) = dom(vols)
∧ ∀v ∈ vols. abs-vol(avols[v], vols[v], apebs)
abs(avol, vol, apebs) ↔ # avol = # vol
∧ ∀l < # vol. abs-leb(avol[l], vols[l], apebs)
abs-leb(leb, ent, apebs) ↔ ( ent = unmapped↔ ¬ leb.mapped? )
∧ ( ent.mapped?→ leb.mapped? ∧ ent.peb < # apebs
∧ leb.data = apebs[ent.peb].data
∧ apebs[ent.peb].written ≤ leb.written )
Note that the abstraction relation is not functional. There are two reasons for this.
Firstly, only by observing the specification state avols it is known whether a LEB in avols is
unmapped or erased. Secondly, the number of bytes written in avols might be larger than
the corresponding number in apebs. The reason is that wear-leveling might decreases this
count by writing less bytes to the target PEB than were written to the source PEB, since
only non-EMPTY bytes are moved.
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Theorem 7 (Correctness & Crash-Safety of Erase Block Management & Wear-Leveling).
The component EBM refines the component AEBM using the forward simulation (ebm-abs),
and the component Header Serialization refines the component EBM Headers.
Proof of Thm. 7 for Normal Operations. The second part is already proven in Sec. 10.3.
The proof strategy to maintain the first conjunct of the abstraction relation (ebm-abs)
is basically to strengthen the invariant theorems of each of the operation such that the
postcondition states that lebs(eraseq′) of the post-state eraseq′ can be derived from the
pre-state eraseq in one of the following ways:
• Either the operation might add a LEB ⟨v, l⟩ to the erase queue or leave the erase queue
unchanged and then
lebs(eraseq′) ⊆ lebs(eraseq) ∪ {⟨v, l⟩}
holds. This is the case for the operations ebm_unmap, ebm_unmap, ebm_write (due to
the retry mechanism), ebm_change and ebm_wear_leveling. However, for each of these
operations the corresponding LEB in avols is no longer marked as erased afterwards
and is therefore not in the set erased-lebs(avols).
• Otherwise, the operation erases one or several PEBs. For ebm_erase_worker and the
unsuccessful case of ebm_erase it is sufficient to prove lebs(eraseq′) ⊆ lebs(eraseq).
In case of success of ebm_erase,
lebs(eraseq′) ⊆ lebs(eraseq) \ {⟨v, l⟩}
holds. And for ebm_create_volume it is proven that lebs(eraseq′) = ∅ and thus that
all LEBs of the new volume can be marked as erased in avols.
For the second conjunct of the abstraction relation (ebm-abs), observe that modification
of avols and vols usually occur at some specific LEB ⟨v, l⟩, and it is therefore useful to define
a version absv,l(avols, vols, apebs) of the abstraction predicate abs that excludes this LEB.
Then Equations (unfold-leb-a) and (unfold-leb-c) can be used to unfold the modified LEB
and then locally prove abs-leb for the modified LEB.
abs(avols[v ↦→ avols[v][l ↦→ leb]], vols, apebs) (unfold-leb-a)
↔ absv,l(avols, vols, apebs) ∧ abs-leb(leb, vols[v][l], apebs)
abs(avols, vols[v ↦→ avols[v][l ↦→ ent]], apebs) (unfold-leb-c)
↔ absv,l(avols, vols, apebs) ∧ abs-leb(avols[v][l], ent, apebs)
Modification to the LEB ⟨v, l⟩ in avols and vols then trivially sustain the predicate absv,l .
Writes to the physical erase blocks apebs are a bit more difficult, because such a write
can fall into two categories.
• A set of PEBs S unreachable by the mapping vols can be modified freely as shown by
equation (mod-unreach). This is for example the case for blocks that are being erased
or are newly allocated and not yet mapped.
absv,l(avols, vols, apebs)↔ absv,l(avols, vols, apebs′) (mod-unreach)




⏐⏐ ⟨v, l⟩ ∈ vols ∧ vols[v][l] = mapped(p) }
Note that usually the operations do not just modify one PEB, instead the retry mecha-
nisms employed in many parts of the component EBM could lead to multiple modified
PEBs. This is a complicating factor for the verification, however, such implementation
measures are necessary for a robust implementation.
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• The PEB that is mapped for the accessed LEB ⟨v, l⟩ is altered. This requires that the
mapping vols is injective as an additional precondition. Otherwise, some other LEB
might refer to the same PEB and the changes are non-local. Fortunately the mapping
is kept injective by Invariant (vols-inv) on page 102, and Equation (mod-at) can be
employed.
absv,l(avols, vols, apebs[p,_])↔ absv,l(avols, vols, apebs) (mod-at)
if vols is injective and vols[v][l] = mapped(p)
In this case the modification at PEB vols[v][l].peb needs to expressed additionally.
With the equations (unfold-leb-a), (unfold-leb-c), (mod-unreach) and (mod-at) it is es-
sentially possible to show that the abstraction relation (ebm-abs) is maintained over all
operations, based on theorems about the operations that limit the changes to the state
variables apebs, vols and eraseq sufficiently.
Proving that the outputs are the same usually involves unfolding the predicate abs-leb
for the required LEB.
Proof of Thm. 7 for Recovery. Unprimed and primed state variables refer to the state before
and after the power failure and recovery, respectively. According to Lem. 10.3 the state of
component EBM is maximal after the recovery. The state on the abstract level can be chosen
with the restriction given by the crash specification (ebm-crash) on page 95 of the component
AEBM . The new state avols′ is chosen based on the previous state avols and the maximal
state of the component EBM after recovery as
avols′ ≡ absf(avols, apebs, vols′, eraseq′)
where absf returns the same volumes and volume sizes as avols and vols′ (and vols) and for
each LEB ⟨v, l⟩ in bounds, the value
vols′[v][l] = unmapped ⊃
(









is used as absf(avols, apebs, vols′, eraseq′)[v][l]. Basically, it is attempted to mark as many
LEBs as possible as erased and to reuse the number of bytes written to the LEB for mapped
LEBs if it existed. The proof then has to establish the following facts:
• crash specification (ebm-crash) on page 95:
1. avols ⊆ absf(avols, apebs, vols′, eraseq′)
All LEBs that are mapped in avols are also mapped in vols. Since vols ⊆ vols′
by Lem. 10.2 and maximality, the same PEB is used in vols and vols′. Therefore,
each LEB in the left-hand side of the inequality is mapped in the right-hand
side and derives its data from the same PEB. If a LEB ⟨v, l⟩ is erased in avols,
then vols[v][l] = unmapped and ⟨v, l⟩ ̸∈ eraseq by the abstraction relation be-
fore the crash. It follows that there is no PEB valid for LEB ⟨v, l⟩ in apebs.
Therefore, vols′[v][l] = unmapped and by maximality of the state after recovery
Equation (maximal-state) on page 115, it follows that ⟨v, l⟩ ̸∈ eraseq′. Thus, the
right-hand side also evaluates to erased for the LEB.
2. avols-inv(absf(avols, apebs, vols′, eraseq′))
This essentially follows from avols-inv(avols) and ebm-io-inv(apebs) and the
observation that avols and vols′ have the same volumes and volume sizes.
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• abstraction relation (ebm-abs):
3. lebs(eraseq′) ∩ erased-lebs(absf(avols, apebs, vols′, eraseq′)) = ∅
This follows from the construction of absf (absf), since only those LEBs are
erased that do not have an entry in the erase queue eraseq′.
4. abs(absf(avols, apebs, vols′, eraseq′), vols′, apebs)
The data of each mapped LEB is related by construction of absf. The field
written is either related by construction of absf or by the abstraction relation
before the power failure.
Together this ensures that a run of the recovery of component EBM has an abstract run
that propagates the abstraction relation.
10.10 Quality of Wear-Leveling
This section discussed what kind of guarantees about the quality of the wear-leveling algorithm
can be given. This is especially important since flash hardware is notoriously unreliable and
error-prone.
The goal of wear-leveling is that blocks are worn out evenly. The wear of a block is usually
measured by the number of erase cycles that it went through. One measure for the evenness
of the wear on a flash device is, how far the erase counters deviate from the maximum erase
counter. In the following we will show that wear-leveling decreases the deviation from the
maximum erase counter.
The function ecs(ppa) : Array⟨PebProps⟩ → Multiset⟨N⟩ maps the wear-leveling array
to the multiset of erase counters and is defined recursively over the array by the equations
ecs([]) = ∅
ecs([wle] + ppa) = {wle.ec} ⊎ ecs(ppa)
The measure for the distribution of the erase counters is ∆ ppa and defined as the distance
or deviation of every erase counter to the maximum over all erase counters, weighted by the
number of its occurrences.
Definition 10.4 (Better Distribution). A distribution of ppa is better than the distribution









The following theorem then shows that wear-leveling improves the distribution.
Theorem 8 (Quality of Wear-Leveling). A successful run of wear-leveling leads to a better
distribution of erase counters or more precisely ∆ ppa′ < ∆ ppa where ppa′ denotes the state
after a successful execution of ebm_wear_leveling_worker with isScrubbing set to false
(Fig. 10.13 on page 109) and after the previously used PEB has been synchronously erased.7
Proof. Wear-leveling itself does not change the ppa[p].ec field for any PEB p. However,
it choses a PEB from that satisfies ppa[from].ec + WL_THRESHOLD ≤ ppa[to].ec for some
other PEB to in ebm_get_wear_leveling_pebs in Fig. 10.13 on page 109. Thus, PEB
from is not one of the PEBs with the maximum erase counter, assuming (axiomatically)
WL_THRESHOLD ̸= 0 holds.
The synchronous erase afterwards by the operation ebm_synchronous_erase_peb in
Fig. 10.15 on page 111 increases ppa[from].ec by ERASE_RETRIES at most. Assuming (again
7In the actual model wear-leveling synchronously erases the PEB at the end, since we are already in
a background operation and have spare time. However, this is omitted from Fig. 10.13 on page 109 for
simplicity.
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axiomatically) that the inequality ERASE_RETRIES ≤ WL_THRESHOLD holds, this update of
ppa[from].ec does not alter max(ecs(ppa)) in Def. 10.4 of ∆. Furthermore, max(ecs(ppa))−
ppa[from].ec decreases by the number of tries to erase and thus ∆ ppa decreases by the same
amount.
Note that the distribution of the current wear ∆ ppa is expressed over the RAM data
structure ppa. Thus, it might not correspond to the number of actual erases of the block.
The erase block manager might experience a power failure multiple times after erasing a
block but before writing the erase counter header. In these cases recovery cannot recover
an erase counter for these blocks and uses the average erase counter over all blocks with
a valid erase counter as discussed in Sec. 10.8. This problem, however, is inherent to any
wear-leveling algorithm, such as e.g. the algorithm used by UBI, that stores the erase counter
of a block in that particular block. It is not deemed critical since power failures are quite
rare and therefore the erase counters stored in RAM do not deviate significantly from the
actual number of erases.
10.11 Related Work
UBI As a blueprint for the design of the component EBM the Linux implementation of a
erase block manager called UBI [55] was taken. This ensures that the retry mechanisms and
the general handling of hardware failures are realistic and validated in principle by the UBI
implementation. Furthermore, this would facilitate other file systems, e.g. BilbyFs or UBIFS,
to run on top of the erase block manager presented in this chapter.
Finally, it was possible to transfer some of the knowledge of the verification into the Linux
implementation, i.e., the verification presented in this chapter led to the discovery of one
bug in UBI in the procedure that corresponds to ebm_write (see Fig. 10.9 on page 105).8
In the implementation of UBI the retry mechanism did not use the facility to atomically
exchange the contents of a LEB by storing the amount of data and a checksum in the header.
Instead a normal VID-header with a higher sequence number was written. This situation is
exactly the one reached by the red, crossed arrow depicted in Fig. 10.10 on page 106. In
the rare case of a power failure during this retry mechanism this could lead to data loss and
potentially to the corruption of the entire file system if a PEB that stores data structures of
the UBIFS file system is affected.
One improvement over the wear-leveling algorithm presented in this chapter is [24],
which implements a protection mechanism that avoids moving data unnecessarily. This is
accomplished by protecting recently wear-leveled and reused PEBs from being chosen for a
wear-leveling cycle just because they have a low number of erases. However, the verification
conducted in this chapter carry over easily to this setting, since basically only the choice of
blocks for wear-leveling are changed, based on some additional data structure.
Flash Translation Layers Flash Translation Layers (FTLs) [30] and some FFSs [1, 53]
similarly store information about the state of a page or block in out-of-band (OOB) data,
which allows programming of individual bits. This simplifies the recovery from power failures
during wear-leveling, since it is possible to set a validity bit after copying the data. However,
NOR flash devices do not have OOB data and some NAND devices use the whole area for
error-correction codes [131]. Therefore, our EBM implementation is more generic. FTLs that
support an operation similar to unmap (see “trim” command in Section 7.10 in [68], [79]
clarifies the semantics) also have the problem that pages re-emerge after a power failure.
Note that FTLs that either 1) update the mapping before copying the actual data during
wear-leveling or 2) assume failures that write a valid mapping but invalid data simultaneously
have to deal with re-emerging blocks or pages. In the Flashix erase block manager the inverse
8The corresponding thread in on the MTD mailing list can be found at http://lists.infradead.org/
pipermail/linux-mtd/2016-June/068022.html.
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mapping must be updated first because it is stored in the second page and the underlying
model of flash hardware enforces that pages are written sequentially. A good overview over
the techniques for FTLs is [89].
Formal Models The block manager in the Alloy models [75, 76] maps logical to physical
pages and has a similar task as the component EBM . However, storing and updating an
on-disk mapping is not treated. Power failures are only considered during writing of a sequence
of pages. Their specification of power failures and recovery is intertwined and uses auxiliary
variables for the status of a pages. It is not immediately clear, how one would disentangle
the specification in a real implementation.
In the refinement-based approach [38, 36] with Event-B, it is assumed that bookkeeping
information is stored in every page, i.e., a page knows the version of the file it belongs to and
the offset within the file. Updating the contents of one page is atomic. If two pages store the
same inverse mapping after a power failure during wear-leveling, its contents are identical
and choosing either suffices. However, this approach uses more memory for the mapping
and requires reading every page of the flash device during startup in order to rebuild the
mapping.
The BilbyFs file system [77, 11, 9] is build on top of the interface of UBI, which is identical
to the interface of the erase block manager discussed in this chapter. Thus, it would be
possible to use the EBM of Flashix as a basis for BilbyFs.
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Verified Journaling & Garbage Collection
Summary. This chapter shows how the abstract interface of a file system (Compo-
nent AFS) is refined by a journaling flash file system with an index for efficient access.
A transactional journal allows the file system to deal with power failures by recording
different versions of a file system object and replaying the most recent changes to the
file system after a reboot. In order to find the most recent version of a file system
object an index is used. Obsolete versions of file system objects are cleaned up by
garbage collection. A specific form of a journaling file system, called a log-structured
file system, is chosen to deal with the restriction to sequential writes within erase
blocks, which is an artifact of the abstraction provided by the erase block manager
of Ch. 10. The index is implemented by a wandering B+-tree and integrated into the
commit, recovery and garbage collection schemes.
Publications. The transactional journal and the interface of the persistence layer
are published in [46]. Publication [107] shows that the verification can be simplified
by using the component semantics of Ch. 4 with retractions and retry to specify the
behavior of a power failure. Sec. 11.2 is also based on previous work by Schierl [121]
and by Ernst [43, Ch. 9].
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Note that parts of this chapter, namely the component FFSC in Sec. 11.2, are based on
previous work by Schierl et al. [121], which paved the way for the Flashix file system, and by
Ernst [43, Ch. 9]. The concepts, however, need to be repeated here in order to understand the
inner workings of the Flashix file system and the contribution of this and the next chapter.
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11.1 Overview
The component FFSC (= Flash File System Core) implements the interface of a file system as
defined by the component AFS of Ch. 6 with the help of the subcomponent Index &Journal as
AFS
FFSC Index &Journal
Figure 11.1: Structure of the
Component FFSC
depicted in Fig. 11.1. The path lookup with access
checks and the segmentation of files is already per-
formed by the surrounding component VFS .
The interface of the component AFS exposes op-
erations to access three different file system objects:
inodes are identified by an inode number and store
information about files and directories, dentries de-
scribe the name and target inode of a directory entry
and pages. A page is just a segment of a file, i.e., an
array of bytes.
The FFSC component therefore has to locate
the current version of such a file system object and if modifications are requested, write a
new version of the file system object out-of-place, i.e., to a new location. Thus, already at
this stage in the component hierarchy the limitations of flash hardware—the necessity to
perform out-of-place updates—play an important role.
However, this is not the only reason why several versions of a file system object are kept.
In file system design, the concept of journaling is quite common, file systems such as ext3fs
[130] and NTFS support it. The journal stores the sequence of modifications made to file
system objects. On a recovery it is then possible to replay the journal and only apply those
modifications that were completed. The FFSC component groups modifications of multiple
file system objects accessed by the same operation in a transaction in order to guarantee
atomicity of the operation even under power failures. File creation for example writes a new
version of the parent directory inode, the directory entry and the file inode grouped into one
transaction.
Flashix is not only a journaling file system, but it is log-structured. In a log-structured file
system [116] the entries in the journal fulfill two functions: They have to record modifications
to the file system objects such as deletion of file system objects or truncation of files as well
as store the actual contents of the file system objects. For a journaling file system this is not
required. There it is sufficient to only record modifications to the file system objects in the




Figure 11.2: Structure of the Components
Transactions and B+-tree
The view on the storage medium
in the component FFSC is unstruc-
tured, i.e., it is not yet divided into sev-
eral blocks, and access to the storage
medium and the index is encapsulated
in the subcomponent Index &Journal.
The implementation Transactions of
this subcomponent introduced a block
structure on the storage device and pro-
vides facilities to perform atomic trans-
actions and internally garbage collects
obsolete versions of file system objects
based on a block structured view of the
flash device. Garbage collection is integrated with the index in order to be able to distinguish
obsolete from live objects. Fig. 11.2 shows the structure of the implementation. In a second
refinement step, namely in component B+-tree in the figure, the index is implemented by a
wandering B+-tree.
Sec. 11.2 discusses the state and operations of the component FFSC and its interaction
with its subcomponent Index &Journal. Sections 11.3 to 11.6 focus on different aspects of
the component Transactions and its correctness. Sec. 11.7 explains the integration of the
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index into the commit and recovery mechanism and garbage collection of the index.
11.2 Core Concepts of a Flash File System
RAM Index, Node Store & Log An entry in the journal is called a node. Some node
types contain actual data and some are only used to store deletion and truncations.
The FFSC component locates the current version of a file system object with an index
that maps keys to addresses of the underlying flash medium. Each type of key corresponds
to one of the three file system object types. Inode keys identify a file or directory. Data keys
identify a page of a file by its inode number and the offset of the page in the file. Dentry
keys characterize an edge in the file system tree, i.e., store the inode number of the parent
directory and the name of the directory entry.
data type NodeKey = inodekey(ino : N)
| datakey(ino : N, part : N)
| dentrykey(ino : N, name : String)
The RAM index rindex maps these keys to the address of the node that contains the most
recent version of the corresponding file system object. The structure of addresses is discussed
in Sec. 11.4 in more detail.
state rindex : NodeKey ↦→ NodeAddress
Nodes serve the dual purpose of storing the actual data and of recording modifications
such as deletion and creation. Additionally, they store the key of the file system object
they contain explicitly. This facilitates recovery from a power failure and garbage collection.
During recovery the node is replayed by updating the version of the file system object referred
in the RAM index. Garbage collection itself also reads the nodes and queries whether an
object is still live by performing a lookup of the key in the RAM index. Inode, dentry and
data nodes correspond to file system objects with the exception that a dentry node with an
ino field of 0 signifies deletion of the dentry. Inodes store the meta data, such as access rights,
and the number of entries in a directory. For a file the inode store the size and number of
hard links to the file. A truncation node does not correspond to a file system object, instead
it only records the removal of several pages and a change in the file’s size. In addition to the
key, the truncation node stores the new file size only.
data type Node = inode-node(key : NodeKey, meta : metadata, info : InodeInfo)
| dentry-node(key : NodeKey, ino : N)
| data-node(key : NodeKey, data : Array⟨Byte⟩)
| truncation-node(key : NodeKey, size : N)
where
data type InodeInfo = directory(nentries : N) | file(nlink : N, size : N)
Nodes are stored in the node store ns, which maps addresses to nodes. The log records
the sequence of modifications by storing the addresses of nodes that caused these changes.
state ns : NodeAddress ↦→ Node, log : List⟨NodeAddress⟩
Flash Index & Commit The log and node store are persistent. In contrast, updates to the
RAM index are performed in main memory only. After a power failure therefore the RAM index
is lost and needs to be recovered, essentially by replaying all modifications recorded in the nodes
of the log in order. More formally, this idea is expressed by Invariant (replay-log-tentative-1)
125
11.2. CORE CONCEPTS OF A FLASH FILE SYSTEM Chapter 11
node store
ns : NodeAddress ↦→ Node
RAM index
rindex : NodeKey ↦→ NodeAddress
flash index










Figure 11.3: Overview over the Concepts of the Flash File System Core: The node store
contains the nodes that correspond to current and old version of file system objects. The
current version of a file system object is referenced by the RAM index. During a commit
the RAM index is persisted to flash. The difference is stored as the log, which needs to be
replayed in sequence in order to derive the RAM index from the flash index during recovery.
Garbage collection moves live nodes and updates the RAM index afterwards, e.g., node2
is have been moved to adr3. Afterwards, nodes no longer referenced by the log or RAM
index may be removed, indicated by the shaded part of the node store, potentially leading to
dangling references in the flash index.
and refined in the following. Starting from an empty RAM index the changes recorded in
the log are applied in order, i.e., for each address adr ∈ log the RAM index is updated to
adr ↦→ ns[adr ].key. The final result must be equal to the current RAM index.
rindex = replay-log(log,ns) (replay-log-tentative-1)
Replaying all modifications of the file system starting from its initial state is quite expensive
and requires all old versions of file system objects to be kept. Therefore, only the modifications
since the last commit are recorded in the log. During a commit the current version of the
RAM index rindex is persisted to flash memory and the log is emptied. The flash index
findex is then the starting point for the recovery operation after a power failure or normal
reboot. The RAM index is therefore one of the commit data structures referred to in Ch. 6.
state findex : NodeKey ↦→ NodeAddress
With the flash index the above invariant is refined to Invariant (replay-log-tentative-2),
but need to be refined further at the end of this section.
rindex = replay-log(findex, log,ns) (replay-log-tentative-2)
Garbage Collection In order to remove old versions of file system objects, garbage
collection is employed. Garbage collection copies some nodes to new addresses, updates the
RAM index accordingly and then deallocates nodes from the node store. Note that this
already captures implementation details, i.e., the implementation of garbage collection selects
an entire erase block, moves all live objects and afterwards triggers an asynchronous erasure
of the block.
Fig. 11.3 depicts the above-mentioned part of the state of the component FFSC and of
the component Index &Journal. The node store is depicted as a cloud and individual nodes
126
Chapter 11 11.2. CORE CONCEPTS OF A FLASH FILE SYSTEM
contain the nodes they are referenced under in the index. The RAM and flash index and
the log refer to several of the nodes by their address. The figure also shows the situation
before and after a garbage collection run. Initially, the nodes at addresses adr1 and adr2 are
referenced by the RAM index and by the flash index and the log is empty, i.e., the initial
situation is the result of a commit. Garbage collection moves node2 to address adr3 and
updates the the RAM index so that key2 now refers to adr3, resulting in the blue arrows
in the figure. It also adds adr3 to the log. Then garbage collection can remove the shaded
part of the node store, which includes the old version of the node under adr2.
In the event of a power failure the RAM index can now be restored by loading the flash
index (red arrows) and replaying the one log entry adr3, which updates the RAM index by
replacing the entry key2 ↦→ adr2 by key2 ↦→ adr3. In general one node can lead to multiple
updates in the RAM index, e.g., truncation nodes need to delete several pages of a file from
the index. Note that the flash index might contain references to deallocated nodes, such as
adr2 in the figure, and only after the entire replay is complete the index is consistent with
the node store.
Invariants The model has several invariants, which are described in more detail in Schierl et
al. [121] and Ernst [43, Ch. 9]. They basically state that the key and node types match, i.e.,
an inode node contains an inode key and inode keys in the index only refer to inode nodes.
In order to implement path lookup it is necessary that both end points of a dentry key in the
index are also part of the index. Thus, truncation nodes are never referred to by any index,
but only by the log. Furthermore, valid inode numbers are always nonzero, and therefore
using 0 to indicate deletion of dentries is permissible. The crucial Invariants (log-cons) and
(gc-cons) states that nodes referred to by the RAM index and log are allocated and that the
mapping from keys to addresses stored in the RAM index corresponds to the mapping stored
in the node itself.
invariant log−cons(log,ns) ∧ gc−cons(rindex,ns)
defined by
log−cons(log,ns)↔ log ⊆ dom(ns) (log-cons)
gc−cons(rindex,ns)↔ ∀key ∈ rindex. rindex[key] ∈ dom(ns) (gc-cons)
∧ ns[rindex[key]].key = key
Essentially, the node store contains an inverse mapping from addresses to keys. This is
similar to the situation in the erase block manager of Ch. 10, where every erase block stores
a candidate mapping and the most recent mapping is distinguished by the highest sequence
number among the valid erase blocks. Here the most recent mapping is either already stored
in the flash index or is stored in the log and is replayed on top of the flash index.
Invariant (gc-cons) implies that the RAM index is injective. Note that (gc-cons) does not
hold for the flash index findex, because the flash index might contain dangling addresses as
shown by Fig. 11.3 where adr2 is already garbage collected but still referenced by the flash
index.
Index & Journal Subcomponent The component FFSC itself only has a set of inode
numbers rorphans that correspond to the orphaned file of the component POSIX (see Ch. 7)
as its state. The node store, log and flash index are naturally stored on the flash device and
the RAM index is implemented as a wandering B+-tree [59]. It is tightly integrated with
the flash index, because the index is loaded lazily from the flash device and only modified
subtrees of the RAM index are stored during commit. The entire state is therefore part of
the Index &Journal subcomponent depicted in Fig. 11.4.
However, not all of the invariants carry over to the subcomponent, because the recovery
of the RAM index from the flash index and the log is performed by the component FFSC .
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component Index &Journal
state ns : NodeAddress ↦→ Node, log : List⟨NodeAddress⟩
rindex,findex : NodeKey ↦→ NodeAddress, forphans : Set⟨N⟩, synced : B
initialization
index_journal_init(volsize; err)
ns := ∅, rindex := ∅, log := [], findex := ∅, forphans := ∅, synced := true
invariant
inj(rindex) ∧ inj(findex) ∧ log−cons(log,ns)
interface operations
index_journal_contains(key; exists, err)
exists := key ∈ rindex;
index_journal_lookup(key; adr , err) pre key ∈ rindex
adr := rindex[key]





rindex := rindex \ { datakey(ino′, part) | ino′ = ino ∧ size ≤ part · VFS_PAGE_SIZE };
index_journal_dentries(ino; dentries, err)
dentries := {name | dentrykey(ino,name) ∈ rindex };
index_journal_get(adr ; node, err) pre adr ∈ ns
node := ns[adr ];
index_journal_transactioni(node1, . . . ,nodei; adr1, . . . , adr i, err) for i ∈ {1, . . . , 5}
choose adr ′1, . . . adr ′i with disjoint(adr ′1, . . . , adr ′i) ∧ fresh(adr ′1, . . . , adr ′i,ns) in
adr1 := adr ′1, . . ., adr i := adr ′i;
ns := ns[adr1,node1] · · · [adr i,nodei];
log := log + adr1 + . . .+ adr i;
synced := false;
index_journal_sync(; err)
{ synced := true;err := ESUCCESS } ∨ { fail(; err) }
index_journal_commit(rorphans; err)
pre ran(rindex) ⊆ dom(ns)
choose adrset with adrset ∩ ran(rindex) = ∅ in




ns′ = ns ∧ log′ = log ∧ findex ′ = findex ∧ forphans′ = forphans
recovery
index_journal_recover(; log′, rorphans, err)
rindex := findex, rorphans := forphans, log′ := log, synced := true
Figure 11.4: Interface operations of the Component Index &Journal: Error-Handling and
Garbage Collection are omitted. In all erroneous cases the state is left unchanged.
The RAM index only satisfies the invariants of the flash index after the recovery of the
subcomponent Index &Journal. Specifically, Invariant (gc-cons) does not hold for the flash
index. It is only known that the flash index and the RAM index are injective and the
Invariant (log-cons) is satisfied by the subcomponent.
invariant inj(rindex) ∧ inj(findex) ∧ log−cons(log,ns)
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interface operations
ffsc_create(meta, parentino, dentry; err)
choose adr , adr1, adr2, adr3,newino, key1, key2, key4,node1,node2,node3 in
key1 := inodekey(parentino);
key2 := dentrykey(parentino, dentry.name);
index_journal_new_ino(; newino);
key3 := inodekey(newino);
index_journal_lookup(key1, adr ; err);
if err = ESUCCESS then
index_journal_get(adr ; node1, err);
if err = ESUCCESS then
node1.info.size :+= 1;
node2 := dentry-node(key2,newino);
node3 := inode-node(key3,meta, file(1, 0));
index_journal_transaction3(node1,node2,node3; adr1, adr2, adr3, err);




Figure 11.5: Example Operation of Component FFSC : ffsc_create (precondition omitted)
Note that injectiveness is technically not required for the verification of the Index &Journal
component, but it is necessary for the verification of its implementation as discussed in more
detail in Sec. 11.5.
The subcomponent provides access to specific keys in the index (lookup, update and
remove), an operation to remove all data keys above a certain page and an operation that
queries all directory entries of a given directory. The latter two operations are needed to
truncate a file and to get a listing of a directory.
The second set of operations provided by the subcomponent gives access to the journal
and log. It is possible to read a node at a certain address, to perform a transaction that adds
n-nodes for 1 ≤ n ≤ 5 to the node store and the log, and to synchronize the contents of the
node store and log with flash memory. A commit copies the current RAM index to the flash
index, the RAM orphans to the flash orphans, empties the log and synchronizes the state
with the flash device. The RAM orphans are also an instance of the commit data structures
introduced in Ch. 6. The commit also removes some obsolete nodes from the node store as
an additional form of garbage collection necessary for the index as discussed in Sec. 11.7.1
The recovery operation of Index &Journal restores the flash index and the flash orphans
into the RAM state and returns the RAM/flash orphans as well as the current log. Based on
this information the component FFSC replays the log and restores the previous RAM index
where all orphaned files have been removed.
The invariant of component Index &Journal are trivially maintained given the precondi-
tions of each of the operations.
Normal Operations of Component FFSC The operations of the component FFSC
first perform some lookup of addresses and nodes in the RAM index. Then they prepare new
(versions of) the nodes and write them to flash in one transaction yielding new addresses.
Afterwards, the RAM index is updated to refer to the new versions. As example Fig. 11.5
shows the ffsc_create operation, which creates a new file given the parent inode number
parentino and the new name of the file as a dentry object. First, some keys are prepared and
1Additionally, it is possible to query whether a commit is currently necessary, because the file system ran
out of space to store the log. The storage mechanism for the log is discussed in more detail in Ch. 12. If this
is the case the component FFSC can trigger a commit.
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interface operations
index_journal_gc() pre gc−cons(rindex,ns)
// Move nodes to new addresses
choose keylist : List⟨NodeKey⟩, adrlist : List⟨NodeAddress⟩
with # keylist = # adrlist ∧ ¬ dups(keylist) ∧ ¬ dups(adrlist)





// Remove obsolete nodes
choose adrset : Set⟨NodeAddress⟩ with adrset ∩ (ran(rindex) ∪ log) = ∅ in
ns := ns \ adrset;
synced := false;
Figure 11.6: Specification of Garbage Collection in the Component Index &Journal (Contin-
uation of Fig. 11.4 on page 128)
the node that corresponds to the parent directory is loaded into node1 and it’s size, which
reflects the number of entries in the directory, is increased. The other two nodes represent the
directory entry and an inode node for the new file. Finally, a transaction with three nodes is
performed and the index is adjusted accordingly.
All other interface operations are similarly implemented, except for commit, which just
calls the commit operation of the Index &Journal component, and recovery.
Recovery & Replay of the Log (FFSC) The recovery from a power failure of component
FFSC first calls the recovery of component Index &Journal, which returns the log and the flash
orphans. The flash orphans are removed from the initial RAM index. Then the individual nodes
referred to by the log are replayed one after the other in sequence. It is proven that this recovery
routine results in the same state as an algebraic version replay-log(log,ns,findex, forphans)
of it. The additional Invariant (replay-log) of the component FFSC implies the correctness
of its recovery operation.
invariant replay-log(log,ns,findex, forphans) = rindex ⊖ rorphans (replay-log)
The operation ⊖ removes all inode and data keys from the RAM index that belong to
an orphaned file. The recovery then essentially corresponds to the crash behavior of the
component POSIX of Ch. 7.
More details about the recovery proof and the proof of refinement of component AFS are
given in Ernst [43, Ch. 9].
Specification of Garbage Collection (Index &Journal) Garbage collection is an inter-
nal operation of the component FFSC and triggered similarly to wear-leveling of Ch. 10, i.e.,
by a flag that is set by the other operations. The actual implementation, however, is part of
the (implementation of the) Index &Journal component as a separate interface operation.
The specification of garbage collection is depicted in Fig. 11.6. As a precondition, the current
RAM index must be consistent with the node store, i.e., the Invariant (gc-cons) of FFSC
must be satisfied. This ensures that the inverse mapping stored in nodes is consistent with the
RAM index. Garbage collection uses this inverse mapping to distinguish live from obsolete
objects and updates the correspond entries in the RAM index afterwards. Consistency of
this inverse mapping with the RAM index guarantees that the correct mappings from keys
to addresses are updated.
In the first step, the algorithm choses the nodes that need to be moved by their keys
(variable keylist) and fresh addresses as a target for the copying (variable adrlist). Then the
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nodes that correspond to the keys are moved to the new location, their addresses added to
the log and the RAM index is updated accordingly. The lookup and update function on
maps, _[_] and _[_ ,_] respectively, are extended to lists of keys, addresses and nodes to
facilitate the specification of garbage collection as shown in the figure.
In the second step, a set of allocated addresses, that are not referenced by the log or
RAM index, are deallocated and removed from the node store. The implementation might
buffer some of the operations, therefore the synchronized flag is reset at the end.
Note that the specification of garbage collection exhibits some details of the hardware and
the implementation. In the context of just the FFSC and Index &Journal a valid approach
to garbage collection would just remove unreferenced nodes from the node store. However,
in a real implementation several nodes are stored within the same erase block and allowing
garbage collection of the erase block only after all nodes in the block are obsolete would
certainly impair proper utilization of free space. The implementation of garbage collection
therefore first has to move referenced nodes to a new location and only then the erase block
can be deallocated or unmapped.
The invariants of the component Index &Journal hold over each of the two steps indi-
vidually. The only trouble during the verification is the interplay between the extended
lookup and update functions, which do not admit easy lemmas, i.e., it is not clear how
ns[adrlist,ndlist][adr ] can be simplified without referring to complicated functions that re-
turn the index of an address in a list and lookup at an index in a list. Only in the context
that nodes are copied and an index is updated desirable lemmas are possible, such as
ns[adrlist,ns[rindex[keylist]]][rindex[keylist, adrlist][key]] = ns[rindex[key]]
under suitable preconditions that include gc−cons(rindex,ns). This lemma simplifying the
lookup at an address from the modified index in the altered node store is necessary in order
to prove the Invariant (gc-cons) in the state after garbage collection.
The Index &Journal component is implemented in two steps as shown in Fig. 11.2 on
page 124. In the first step transactions and the block structure of the flash hardware are
introduced and the index remains an abstract, partial function. In component Transactions
garbage collection is performed and the log is merged with the node store. In the second step
the index is implemented as a wandering B+-tree on top of the persistence layer. Sections 11.4
to 11.6 cover the implementation and verification of the Transactions and Index &Persistence
components. The integration of the B+-tree component into commit and recovery, and garbage
collection of the index is briefly discussed in Sec. 11.7.
11.3 Persistence of Transactional Nodes
Transactional Node Store The Transactions component encapsulates the nodes of the
journal in a transactional node TNode. A transactional node additionally contains two markers
begin and end, which signify whether this node is the beginning and end of a transaction,
respectively.2
data type TNode = tnode(node : Node, begin : B, end : B)
Nodes belonging to a transaction are written sequentially within an erase block, therefore
those two markers are sufficient to identify all nodes of a transaction and check whether a
transaction is complete by looking for the node with an end marker set. Partially written
transactions occur either due to hardware errors or a power failure.
2As an extension a transaction node could also store a sequence number in order to allow for a multi-headed
log. For example UBIFS uses a log head for normal operations and another one for garbage collection in
order to improve concurrency. Furthermore, error-correction codes could be added to transaction nodes in
order to improve robustness and reliability in the event of hardware errors.
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transactional node store

















Figure 11.7: The transactional journal component introduces the block structure to the node
store and the log and augments nodes with the details of the transaction they belong to,
depicted by the thick, colored borders. The start marker and end marker are indicated by
colored circles in the top-right and bottom-right corner, respectively. The basic operation on
the erase blocks is appending transactional nodes at the current head of the log, i.e., the last
block of the list logblocks.
The component Index &Persistence keeps these transactions nodes arranged in a block
structure in the transactional node store (= tns), which maps a block number to the sequence
of transactional nodes it contains.
state tns : N ↦→ TNodeLeb
Each individual erase block stores a list of transactional nodes tnodes and for each node its
offset in bytes in the block in the field toffs.
data type TNodeLeb = tnode-leb(tnodes : List⟨TNode⟩,
toffs : List⟨N⟩,
ref-size : N)
We tacitly assume that both lists have the same length and that the list of offsets is
always duplicate-free, in the actual model this is of course an additional invariant of the
Index &Persistence component.3 The field ref-size stores the number of bytes in the block
that are still referenced in the RAM index. It is used to find suitable blocks for garbage
collection efficiently and is explained in Sec. 11.5 further.
Fig. 11.7 depicts the transactional node store with 4 colored transactions and beginning
and end markers. The green and black transactions are only partial, since they miss a
corresponding node marking the end of the transaction in the same block.
The block structure of the tns necessitates that the node addresses of the previous section
are refined.
Node Addresses An address of a (transactional) node is defined as a tuple consisting of
the LEB number, the offset within the LEB and the size in bytes of the nodes. The size is
stored in the address for two reasons. First, it is used to correctly update the ref-size field
3Note that at this level of abstraction it is not possible to calculate the offsets of the nodes, even if the
size of a node is known as serialized-size⟨T⟩(node). The reason is that in between the byte-representations
of two transactional nodes in the block there might be padding nodes to ensure that a page-aligned write is
possible. This is discussed in more detail in Ch. 12.
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of each LEB on each update of the index as detailed in Sec. 11.5. Second, it can be used to
read the node with one I/O operation, instead of having to read a tiny header containing the
size first and reading the complete node in a second I/O operations. Using additional I/O
operations here would incur a lot of overhead and be quite expensive in terms of performance.
data type NodeAddress = address(leb : N, off : N, size : N)
The sequence of addresses of a LEB tleb with number l are given by the function
addresses : N× TNodeLeb→ List⟨NodeAddress⟩
defined by Equation (leb-addresses). The helper function addresses-h is defined structurally
recursive over the list of transactional nodes and their offsets.
addrs(l, tleb) = addrs-h(l, tleb.tnodes, tleb.toffs) (leb-addresses)
addrs-h(l, [], []) = []
addrs-h(l, tnode + tnodes, offset + offsets)
= address(l, offset, serialized-size⟨T⟩(tnode)) + addrs-h(l, tnodes, offsets)
We define two shorthands that allow us to use the transactional node store tns similarly
to the node store ns of the previous Sec. 11.2. An address adr is allocated in the transactional
node store tns, written adr ∈ tns and defined by Eqn (adr-in), if the LEB is allocated, the
offset is known in the LEB and the size of the address matches the size of the encoded
node, defined by the serialized-size function of Ch. 9. If an address adr is allocated in
tns, the lookup tns[adr ] returns the corresponding transactional node. Lookup is defined by
Eqn (at-adr).
adr ∈ tns ↔ adr .leb ∈ tns ∧ adr ∈ addrs(adr .leb, tns[adr .leb]) (adr-in)
tns[adr ] = tns[adr .leb].tnodes[index-of(adr .off, tns[adr .leb].toffs)] (at-adr)
Abstraction Relation Although we have only seen (part of) the state of component
Index &Persistence and almost nothing of the implementation Transactions, it is already
possible to understand the crucial part of the abstraction relation between the specification
component Index &Journal and the other two components. The basic idea is that the node
store can be determined by a function nodes(tns) that extracts the addresses and nodes from
the transactional node store tns as defined by Equation (nodes).
nodes(tns) =
{
adr ↦→ tns[adr ].node
⏐⏐ adr ∈ tns } (nodes)
However, there are two additional issues to tackle.
The first issue is that the result of nodes(tns) still contains partial transactions. Note that
such transactions are always at the end of a block, because we write the block sequentially
and have to discontinue writing once we have encountered a hardware failure. Note that in
such cases the erase block manager of Ch. 10 already tried to move the (old and new) data
to a new physical block and failed. Therefore, write failures are treated in components above
the erase block manager as a fatal error, and a read-only mode is entered.
The function tns↓ discards the partial transactions at the end of each block in tns and is
defined by Equations (discard-partial-transactions). The notation x[..n] denotes the prefix








valid-tnodes(tnodes + tnode) = ( tnode.end ⊃ # tnodes + 1 ; valid-tnodes(tnodes) )
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In Fig. 11.7 on page 132 this removes the green and black nodes that belong to incomplete
transactions.
The second issue is that deallocated LEBs might reappear after a power failure as discussed
in Ch. 10 and picked up again in the next Ch. 12. The reason is that the set of LEBs allocated
for the journal dom(tns) and their ref-size field are stored in a commit data structure (see
Ch. 6), called the LEB Properties Array (LPA) in Ch. 12. The set of deallocated LEBs is
modeled by the state variable invallebs of the component Index &Persistence.
state invallebs : Set⟨N⟩
With these prerequisites the abstraction relation between the node store and the transactional
node store is given by Equation (abs-node-store). First the invalid LEBs are removed, then all
partial transactions are discarded and only afterwards the addresses and nodes are extracted.
abstraction relation ns = nodes( (tns \ invallebs)↓ ) (abs-node-store)
The node store ns corresponding to the situation depicted in Fig. 11.7 on page 132 according
to the abstraction relation (abs-node-store) is
{
key1 ↦→ node1, key2 ↦→ node2, key3 ↦→ node3
}
.
The log of Sec. 11.2 is also represented differently in component Index &Persistence and
is partly merged with the transactional node store. Only the sequence of LEB numbers
logblocks, which form the log are stored explicitly.
state logblocks : List⟨N⟩
The log of the specification is recovered by the function log(logblocks, tns) defined by Equa-
tion (log).
log([], tns) = [] (log)
log(l + logblocks, tns) = addrs(l, tns[l]) + log(logblocks, tns)
In the abstraction relation partial transactions also need to be discarded as shown by
Equation (abs-log).
abstraction relation log = log(logblocks, tns↓) (abs-log)
Fig. 11.7 on page 132 depicts a situation where logblocks is the list [1, 3]. The abstrac-
tion (abs-log) yields the list [adr1, adr2, adr3] for log.
It is imperative to know that the LEBs forming the log are not invalid and Invari-
ant (loglebs-valid) holds. Furthermore, the list should be duplicate-free.
invariant logblocks ∩ invallebs = ∅ ∧ ¬ dups(logblocks) (loglebs-valid)
Note that the abstraction to the log requires that the addresses are ordered. For this
reason the data type TNodeLeb for blocks uses two lists for nodes and addresses at this level
of abstraction, instead of a partial function of the type N ↦→ TNode mapping offsets to nodes.
The latter approach would simplify lookup as defined by Equation (at-adr), but complicate
the reconstruction of the log in Equation (log) and the removal of partial transactions in
Equation (discard-partial-transactions).
Fig. 11.8 provides an overview over the complete state, the invariants and the interface
operations concerned with journaling in the Index &Persistence component. The state variable
ftns is part of the commit and recovery mechanism, explained in more detail in Sec. 11.6.
The component provides operations to query information about the log, i.e., determine
whether it is empty and how many bytes are still available in the last block in the log. All
transactions are appended to the last block in logblocks if there is enough space available.
This block is usually called the current head of the journal. If necessary the nodes in the
journal can be synchronized to disk. Finally, if no space is available the current journal head
can be moved to a newly allocated erase block.
Sections 11.4 to 11.6 explain the components Transactions and Index &Persistence and
prove that it refines the specification Index &Journal, summarized by Thm. 9.
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component Index &Persistence
state tns : N ↦→ TNodeLeb, invallebs : Set⟨N⟩, logblocks : List⟨N⟩, synced : B
ftns : N ↦→ TNodeLeb, rindex,findex : NodeKey ↦→ NodeAddress, forphans : Set⟨N⟩
invariant
logblocks ∩ invallebs = ∅ ∧ ¬ dups(logblocks) ∧ inj(rindex) ∧ inj(findex)
∧ dom(tns) ∪ invallebs = dom(ftns) ∪ logblocks (Sec. 11.6)
interface operations
index_persistence_read_tnode(adr ; tnode, err) pre adr ∈ tns \ invallebs
tnode := tns[adr ]
index_persistence_is_journal_empty(; IsEmpty)
IsEmpty := logblocks = []
index_persistence_get_journal_head_freesize(; bytes)
bytes := ?
index_persistence_journal_head_append(tnodes; adrlist, err) pre logblocks ̸= []
choose toffs with # toffs ≤ # tnodes ∧ ¬ dups(tnodes[logblocks.last].toffs + toffs) in
tns[logblocks.last].tnodes :+= tnodes[..# toffs];
tns[logblocks.last].toffs :+= toffs;
adrlist := addrs-h(logblocks.last, tnodes[..# toffs], toffs);
if # toffs = # tnodes then err := ESUCCESS else fail(; err)
index_persistence_sync(; err)
{ synced := true;err := ESUCCESS } ∨ { fail(; err) }
index_persistence_move_log_head(; err) pre synced
choose l with l /∈ dom(tns) in
tns[l] := tnode([], [], 0), logblocks :+= l, invallebs :−= l
Figure 11.8: Component Index &Persistence: State, Invariants & Journaling Operations
(error-handling omitted)
Theorem 9 (Correctness & Crash-Safety of Journaling & Garbage Collection). The compo-
nent Transactions refines the component Index &Journal using the forward simulation
ns = nodes( (tns \ invallebs)↓ ) ∧ log = log(logblocks, tns↓)
with the addition that the identically named state variables rindex,findex and forphans of
component Index &Journal and component Index &Persistence are equal.
11.4 Journaling & Transactions
The component Transactions uses the interface provided by component Index &Persistence
described in Sec. 11.3 to build transactions of TNodes and to append them to the journal
head. Fig. 11.9 shows the fundamental, auxiliary operation transactions_transaction. It
takes a list of nodes, each of which contains a file system object or a modification to it, and
atomically appends them to the journal. Note that the component Index &Persistence does
not provide the required atomicity. In the event of an error a prefix of the nodes might be
persisted by the append operation in Fig. 11.8.
In the following the verification of the operation transactions_transaction is presented
alongside the explanation of the operation itself.
First, the operation builds a list of transactional nodes via transactions_compose with
the correct transaction begin and transaction end markers set. The result is a list tnodes
that forms a complete transaction for nodes, written complete(tnodes,nodes) and defined
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component Transactions
subcomponent Index &Persistence (Fig. 11.8 on page 135)
state romode : B,
invariant
(
¬ romode → valid-journal-head(logblocks, tns)
)
∧ lebs(rindex) ⊆ dom(tns) ∧ lebs(findex) ⊆ dom(ftns) (Sec. 11.5 and 11.6)





else let tnodes, size in
transactions_compose(nodes; tnodes, size);
transactions_allocate(size; err);
if err = ESUCCESS then;
index_persistence_journal_head_append(tnodes; adrlist);
if err ̸= ESUCCESS then
romode := true // Enter read-only mode
interface operations
transactions_get(adr ; node, err)
let tnode in
index_persistence_read_tnode(adr ; tnode, err);
if err = ESUCCESS then node := tnode.node
Figure 11.9: Component Transactions: State, Invariants & Basic Operations for Journaling
by Equation (complete-transaction).
complete(tnodes,nodes) (complete-transaction)
↔ # tnodes = # nodes ∧ nodes ̸= [] ∧ tnodes.head.begin ∧ tnodes.last.end
∧
(








∀i. 0 ≤ i < # tnodes → tnodes[i].node = nodes[i]
)
A list of transactional nodes tnodes′ is a partial transaction, written partial(tnodes′) and
defined by Equation (partial-transaction), if the transaction begin marker is set appropriately,












∀i. 0 ≤ i < # tnodes → ¬ tnodes[i].end
)
Any strict prefix tnodes′ of a complete transaction tnodes is a partial transaction. If an error
occurs while persisting a complete transaction tnodes, then only a strict prefix of tnodes and
therefore a partial transaction is actually written.
Afterwards, transactions_allocate (not shown) synchronizes the journal head and
moves it to a new block if the journal is either empty or the journal head does not provide
enough space for the transaction. Note that moving the journal head appends new elements
to logblocks and allocates a new block in tns. However, the abstract view given by the
abstraction relation (abs-node-store) and (abs-log) of Sec. 11.3 are left unchanged and
Equations (allocate-pre-post) hold, where the unprimed and primed variables denote the
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state before and after the operation transactions_allocate, respectively.
nodes( (tns′ \ invallebs′)↓ ) = nodes( (tns \ invallebs)↓ ) and (allocate-pre-post)
log(logblocks′, tns′↓) = log(logblocks, tns↓)
In the next step an attempt is made to append the transactional nodes to the journal
head. If this fails, the file system switches to read-only mode, by setting the corresponding
state variable romode. If the file system is in read-only mode, then it will usually return the
error code EROFS for write operations.
state romode : B
invariant ¬ romode → valid-journal-head(logblocks, tns)
The file system can exit the read-only mode only by remounting after a reboot or power
failure. As long as the file system is not in read-only mode, the journal head is valid, written




logblocks ̸= [] ∧ tns[logblocks.last].tnodes ̸= []
→ tns[logblocks.last].tnodes.last.end
)
The last transactional node in a valid journal head, assuming there are any nodes at all, is
always marked as an end transaction node. Otherwise, the last transaction could only be
written partially and we should not continue the normal operations afterwards. Note that
the erase block manager of Ch. 10 will already have tried to move the logical erase block of
the journal head to a new physical erase block by atomically moving its contents, i.e., a lot
of attempts to recover from this situation were already made and it is better to give up in
this case. In practice, the user should run a file system check tool.
The verification basically has to prove that the writes propagate fully to the abstract
view given by the abstraction relations (abs-node-store) and (abs-log) of Sec. 11.3 in case
the operation returns successfully. In the case of a hardware failure the abstract view must
be unchanged.
If unprimed variables denote the state before the execution of transactions_transaction
and primed variables denote the state after allocation, the post-state of a successful run is
basically given by
nodes((tns′[logblocks′.last, tnode-leb(. . .+ tnodes, . . .+ toffs, . . .)] \ invallebs′)↓)
for a list of transactional nodes tnodes, which is a complete transaction for the input nodes.
The dots “. . .” stand for the previous contents of the respective field of tns′[logblocks′.last].
The following equation then proves that the write is visible on the abstract level.
nodes((tns′[logblocks′.last, tnode-leb(. . .+ tnodes, . . .+ toffs, . . .)] \ invallebs′)↓) =
(1)= nodes((tns′ \ invallebs′)[logblocks′.last, tnode-leb(. . .+ tnodes, . . .+ toffs, . . .)]↓) =
(2)= nodes((tns′ \ invallebs′)↓[logblocks′.last, tnode-leb(. . .+ tnodes, . . .+ toffs, . . .)]) =
(3)= nodes((tns′ \ invallebs′)↓)[addrs-h(logblocks′.last, tnodes, toffs),nodes] =
(4)= nodes((tns \ invallebs)↓)[adrlist,nodes]
Transformation (1) holds because logblocks′.last ̸∈ invallebs′ according to the subcomponent
Invariant (loglebs-valid) on page 134, which holds right after the allocation. In step (2)
the knowledge that a complete transaction tnodes is appended is used to show that the
write propagates over the removal of partial transactions performed by the operation ↓.
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Note that this step also requires that the journal head is valid, i.e., ended in a complete
transaction. Otherwise additional, previously filtered nodes would suddenly become visible.
Transformation (3) propagates appending transactional nodes over the operation nodes,
which extracts the addresses from toffs and the contents from the transactional nodes tnodes.
The last step (4) is correct, because moving the journal head does not change the abstract view
according to Equation (allocate-pre-post) on page 137 and the addresses that are calculated
are the same as the addresses adrlist returned by the operation.
Similarly, it can be argued that if the operation is successful then
log(logblocks′, tns′[logblocks′.last, tnode-leb(. . .+ tnodes, . . .+ toffs, . . .)↓) =
= log(logblocks, tns↓) + adrlist
also holds.
In the unsuccessful case, i.e., if only a strict prefix tnodes′ is appended to the journal
head, then tnodes′ is only a partial transaction for the initial nodes. Instead of propagating
over ↓ as in transformation (2) for a complete transaction, the nodes of a partial transaction
are removed by transformation (2′).
nodes((tns′ \ invallebs′)[logblocks′.last, tnode-leb(. . .+ tnodes′, . . .+ toffs′, . . .)]↓) =
(2′)= nodes((tns′ \ invallebs′)↓) = · · ·
With these postconditions of the operation transactions_transaction the correctness
of the journaling operations of component Transactions immediately follows.
Proof of Thm. 9 on page 135 (for Journaling Operations). The actual interface operations
index_journal_transactioni for i = 1 . . . 5 are implemented by the auxiliary operation
transactions_transaction of the Index &Journal component of Sec. 11.2 (see Fig. 11.4
on page 128) by constructing lists of nodes as an input and deconstructing lists of addresses
for the output. The refinement proofs for the interface operations directly follow from the
above postconditions of transactions_transaction.
Reading a node from the journal is straightforward as shown in Fig. 11.9 on page 136.
The address is used to read the transactional node tnode and afterwards the node itself is
extracted from tnode, which is trivially correct by considering the abstraction relation.
11.5 Garbage Collection
The out-of-place updates performed by the Flash File System Core lead to an accumulation
of different versions of each file system object. All versions that are still in use are referenced
by the RAM index rindex. All other versions are obsolete. Garbage collection attempts to
remove obsolete versions in order to free and unmap logical erase blocks. Only then they can
be re-used for the log.
From the perspective of functional correctness any LEB that is not currently part of
the log can be garbage collected. However, the choice of the block is obviously crucial for
the quality of the file system implementation. The natural choice is a block with the least
number of referenced file system objects or, more accurately, a block with the least number
of bytes that are still referenced by the RAM index.
Referenced Bytes in LEBs The Index &Persistence component provides an operation,
which returns one of the blocks with the minimum ref-size field. This is also the block with
the least amount of bytes referenced by the RAM index by Invariant (refsize-inv-rindex) of
the Transactions component.
invariant ref-size-inv(rindex, tns) (refsize-inv-rindex)
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interface operations
index_persistence_get_gc_block(; l, err)
choose l ′ with l ′ ∈ dom(tns) \ logblocks
∧ tns[l ′] = min
{
tns[l ′′].ref-size
⏐⏐ l ′′ ∈ dom(tns) \ logblocks }
in
l := l ′
index_persistence_get_refsize(l; refsize) pre l ∈ dom(tns)
refsize := tns[l].ref-size
index_persistence_set_refsize(l, refsize) pre l ∈ dom(tns)
tns[l].ref-size := refsize
index_persistence_read_leb(l; adrlist, tnodes, err) pre l ∈ dom(tns) \ invallebs
tnodes := tns[l].tnodes, adrlist := addrs(l, tns[l])
index_persistence_deallocate_leb(l; err) pre l ∈ dom(tns) \ logblocks ∧ synced
tns :−= l, invallebs :+= l




↔ ∀l ∈ dom(tns). tns[l].ref-size =
∑ {
adr .size
⏐⏐ adr ∈ ran(rindex) ∧ adr .leb = l }
The invariant states that the ref-size field of LEB l stores the sum over all size fields of
all addresses referenced by the RAM index that belong in LEB l. If all these addresses are
also allocated in the transactional node store, which is the case as long as the component is
not in the recovery phase, the size field of an address adr with adr ∈ tns corresponds to
the size of the node’s byte representation according to the Definition (adr-in) on page 133 of
adr ∈ tns.
Index Operations In order to maintain Invariant (refsize-inv-rindex) it is necessary to
adjust the ref-size field on any update to ran(rindex). If an address adr is removed from the
index, the ref-size field is decreased by adr .size, and if the address is added it is increased
by the same number. Note that maintaining this invariant requires that the index is injective,
otherwise removing or adding addresses might not immediately translate to an update of
the ref-size field if a second key still or already maps to the same address. Fortunately,
the RAM index as well as the flash index are injective on the level of the Index &Journal
component (see Fig. 11.4 on page 128) as well as on the level of the Index &Persistence
component (see Fig. 11.8 on page 135).
In order to establish the precondition l ∈ dom(tns) for calls to the Index &Persistence com-
ponent that query and update the ref-size field (see Fig. 11.10), Invariant (rindex-lebs-cons)
is necessary. It states that all LEBs of all addresses in the RAM index are also allocated in
the transactional node store.





⏐⏐ address(l,_,_) ∈ ran(rindex) }
Garbage Collection Algorithm Overview After the LEB for garbage collection is
chosen, all its nodes and addresses are read. For each address it is checked whether it is
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interface operations
transactions_gc()
pre gc−cons(rindex, nodes(tns \ invallebs↓))
let l, err , size, adrlist, tnodes,nodes in
index_persistence_get_gc_block(; l, err);
if err = ESUCCESS then
index_persistence_get_refsize(l; size);
if size ̸= 0 then {
index_persistence_read_leb(l; adrlist, tnodes, err);
if err = ESUCCESS then transactions_referenced(l; adrlist, tnodes,nodes, err);
if err = ESUCCESS then transactions_move(; nodes, err);
}
if err = ESUCCESS then index_persistence_sync(; err);
if err = ESUCCESS then index_persistence_deallocate_leb(l; err);
auxiliary operations
transactions_move(; nodes, err)
while err = ESUCCESS ∧ nodes ̸= [] do
let nodes0, adrlist0 in
. . . // Check the amount of space available at the journal head and select the
. . . // maximal prefix nodes0 of nodes that fits in the available space
transactions_transaction(nodes0; adrlist0, err);
if err = ESUCCESS then transactions_update_index(; nodes0, adrlist0);
Figure 11.11: Component Transactions: Implementation of Garbage Collection (continuation
of Fig. 11.9 on page 136)
still referenced by the index. All those nodes need to be moved to a new location, i.e., they
are appended to the journal with a transaction as in Sec. 11.4. Afterwards, the index is
updated and finally the old LEB is deallocated. All the necessary supporting operations of
the Index &Persistence component are shown in Fig. 11.10. Note that the choice of LEB for
garbage collection takes the quality criterion discussed above into account and must exclude
all LEBs that are still in the log. The reason is that all nodes in the log need to be replayed
during a recovery from power loss as discussed in Sec. 11.2. More formally, these LEBs are
needed to maintain Invariant (replay-log) on page 130.
The implementation of the garbage collection algorithm is depicted in Fig. 11.11. In
the following the correctness of the algorithm with respect to its specification as shown in
Fig. 11.6 on page 130 is discussed alongside some of the implementation details. Thm. 10 is
immediately clear from the above discussion.
Theorem 10 (Quality of Garbage Collection). The garbage collection algorithm of compo-
nent Transactions chooses a logical erase block with the least amount of bytes still referenced
by the RAM index.
Validity of the Target LEB After the choice of block, the algorithm first determines
whether there are nodes to move by checking whether the ref-size field is zero. Note that this
appears to be an optimization at first, however, actually this check establishes that the LEB
l is not invalid, i.e., that l ̸∈ invallebs holds. As discussed in Sec. 11.6 invallebs contains all
deallocated and unmapped LEBs that re-emerge after a power failure and should not be used.
If the ref-size fields is non-zero, however, it is known that there is some address in the index
which refers to the LEB. With the precondition that gc−cons(rindex, nodes(tns \ invallebs↓))
(see (gc-cons) on page 127) holds, it is known that each LEB referenced by the RAM index
is valid, since the abstraction relation removes invalid LEBs.
Only once it is established that the LEB is valid, reading its nodes and addresses is
permitted as shown by the precondition of the corresponding operation in Fig. 11.10. Reading
140
Chapter 11 11.5. GARBAGE COLLECTION
the nodes yields the result
adrlist = addrs(l, tns[l].toffs) and tnodes = tns[l].tnodes
according to the specification of the read operation. Afterwards, all nodes nodes still referenced
by the index are extracted by the operation transactions_referenced (not shown) by check-
ing whether the mapping tnodes[i].key ↦→ adrlist[i] is still currently part of the index for each i.
Note that this step also requires the precondition gc−cons(rindex, nodes(tns \ invallebs↓)),
otherwise the node could be found under a key different from tnodes[i].key. The nodes
returned by this check can be characterized as
nodes = ns[ref-addrs(addrs(l, tns[l].toffs), rindex)]
for ns ≡ nodes(tns \ invallebs↓) and where ref-addrs(adrlist, rindex) is recursively defined
and returns all addresses adr ∈ adrlist with adr ∈ ran(rindex) in the order of adrlist. Thus,
the variable nodes contains all nodes that need to be copied.
Node Migration The auxiliary operation transactions_move copies the nodes to the
journal as shown (conceptually) in Fig. 11.11. Iteratively the operation selects a prefix nodes0
of the nodes that fits the space available at the current journal head and then writes them
as a transaction as discussed in Sec. 11.4. As many nodes as possible are gathered in one
transaction in order to only perform the minimum amount of I/O operations required. After
each call to transactions_transaction the abstract view changes from
ns to ns[adrlist0,nodes0] and from log to log + adrlist0.
again for ns ≡ nodes(tns \ invallebs↓) and log ≡ log(logblocks, tns↓). Afterwards, the opera-
tion transactions_update_index updates the index for each node, i.e., the current mapping
of nodes[i].key is replaced with nodes0[i].key ↦→ adrlist0[i] for each i within bounds. The
rindex is updated from
rindex to rindex[keys(nodes0), adrlist0]
where the function keys just lifts the selector key on nodes to lists of nodes.
The entire operation transactions_move has the post-condition (move-post).
∃nodes0, adrlist0. nodes0 ⊑ nodes ∧ (err = ESUCCESS↔ nodes0 = nodes) (move-post)
∧# nodes0 = # adrlist0 ∧ ¬ dups(adrlist0) ∧ fresh(adrlist0,ns)
∧ ns′ = ns[adrlist0,nodes0] ∧ log′ = log + adrlist0
∧ rindex ′ = rindex[keys(nodes0), adrlist0]
where nodes ≡ ns[ref-addrs(addrs(l, tns[l].toffs), rindex)]
ns ≡ nodes(tns \ invallebs↓)
log ≡ log(logblocks, tns↓)
We now have the first part of the refinement proof for garbage collection.
Proof of Thm. 9 on page 135 (for Garbage Collection, Part 1). This post-condition corre-
sponds to the first choose statement of the specification of garbage collection shown in
Fig. 11.6 on page 130. A choose statement is an existential quantifier in a refinement proof
and is instantiated as follows. For the variable keylist of keys of nodes that were moved and
the resulting addresses adrlist the instance keys(nodes0) and adrlist0 is chosen, respectively.
This instantiation needs to satisfy the following two conditions:
1. keys(nodes(tns \ invallebs↓)[ref-addrs(. . . , rindex)]) ⊆ dom(rindex)
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2. ¬ dups(keys(nodes(tns \ invallebs↓)[ref-addrs(. . . , rindex)]))
Both conditions follow from the fact that the keys stored in referenced nodes correspond
to the keys they are referred to by in the RAM index according to the Invariant (gc-cons)
on page 127. Thus, these keys 1) are actually part of the index and 2) do not contain
duplicates. The assignments to the variables log and rindex of the specification in Fig. 11.6 on
page 130 then correspond to the equations of the post-condition (move-post). The assignment









= ns[adrlist0,ns[ref-addrs(. . . , rindex)]]
with the given instantiation for adrlist and keylist. Note that the double lookup of keys of
referenced nodes in the RAM index can be rewritten to just the calculation of the referenced
addresses. Again, this only holds due to the Invariant (gc-cons).
LEB Deallocation After all referenced nodes are migrated successfully to the current
journal head the garbage collection algorithm of Fig. 11.9 deallocates and unmaps the logical
erase block l.
Proof of Thm. 9 on page 135 (for Garbage Collection, Part 2). In the abstract view this re-





⏐⏐ adr ∈ dom(nodes(tns \ invallebs↓)) ∧ adr .leb = l }
are removed from the domain of the node store ns. Therefore, this is the chosen instance for
the existentially quantified variable adrset in the second choose statement of the specification
in Fig. 11.6 on page 130, which satisfies the additional condition
adrset ∩ (ran(rindex ′) ∪ log′) ≡
≡ adrset ∩
(














∪ log ∪ adrlist0
)
= adrset ∩ (log ∪ adrlist0) = ∅
of the choose statement. The last intersection is empty, because 1) l ̸∈ log holds according
to the choice of the target block and 2) the addresses adrlist0 are fresh, distinguishing them
from the addresses adrset.
Taken together this shows that the implementation of the garbage collection algorithm
refines its specification and is therefore correct.
11.6 Commit, Power Failures and Recovery
The commit persists the commit data structures—the index rindex, the orphans rorphans
and the LEB Property Array (= LPA). The LPA is managed by the implementation of the
component Index &Persistence and stores the allocation status of each LEB and its ref-size
field. Storing the LPA only during a commit, however, has an effect on the component
Transactions. More formally, during a power failure all LEBs that were deallocated since
the last commit (and not yet reallocated) re-appear and for all LEBs the ref-size field
is reset to its value at the point of the last commit. In order to express this effect the
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interface operations
index_persistence_commit(rorphans; err)
pre synced ∧ dom(tns \ unref-lebs(tns)) ∩ invallebs = ∅
tns := tns \ unref-lebs(tns), logblocks := [], invallebs := ∅;
findex := rindex, forphans := rorphans;
ftns := tns;
crash
tns′ = revert-refsize(tns, ftns, invallebs, logblocks)
∧ invallebs′ = invallebs ∧ logblocks′ = logblocks ∧ ftns′ = ftns ∧ findex ′ = findex
∧ forphans′ = forphans
recovery
index_persistence_recover(; logblocks′, forphans′, err)
rindex := findex, logblocks′ := logblocks, forphans′ := forphans, synced := true;
Figure 11.12: Component Index &Persistence: Commit, Crash & Recovery (error-handling
omitted)
component Index &Persistence memorizes the state of the transactional node store tns at
the point of the last commit in the state variable ftns.
state ftns : N ↦→ TNodeLeb
The relationship between the transactional node store tns, its version ftns of the last
commit, the log and the invalid LEBs is characterized by Invariant (lebs-inv).
invariant dom(tns) ∪ invallebs  
deallocated LEBs
without reallocation
= dom(ftns) ∪ logblocks  
allocated LEBs
(lebs-inv)
The left-hand and right-hand side of Equation (lebs-inv) both capture the total set of LEBs
allocated between the current state of the component and the last commit, just starting
from different points in time. Note that none of these union operations is necessarily disjoint,
because reallocation is possible, i.e., a block is first deallocated and afterwards allocated
again. The only other constraint is
logblocks ∩ invallebs = ∅
and is already given by Invariant (loglebs-valid) on page 134.
Power Failure Fig. 11.12 shows the specification of a power failure of Index &Persistence.
The RAM index rindex is arbitrary. For the transactional node store tns the effect of a
reversion of the commit data structures is captured by the predicate revert-refsize and
defined by Eqn. (revert-journal-refsize).
revert-refsize(tns, ftns, invallebs, logblocks) (revert-journal-refsize)
=
{
l ↦→ tnode-leb(tnodes, toffs, refsize)
⏐⏐ l ∈ dom(tns) ∪ invallebs
∧ refsize = (l ∈ dom(ftns)⊃ ftns[l].ref-size ; 0)
∧
(
l ∈ dom(tns)→ tnodes = tns[l].tnodes
∧ toffs = tns[l].toffs
) }
Note that the domain of tns after the power failure is the union of the domain prior to it and
the invalid LEBs invallebs, i.e., corresponds to all LEBs that were at some point allocated
between the last commit and the state prior to the crash.
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Commit The commit of the component Index &Persistence persists the current state of
the commit data structures as shown in Fig. 11.12. Additionally, it cleans up the remaining




⏐⏐ l ∈ dom(tns) ∧ tns[l].ref-size = 0 }
This is an overapproximation of all invalid LEBs. It is used, because the implementation of
the Index &Persistence component has no access to the set of invalid LEBs invallebs since it
is only a specification artifact.
The commit operation of the surrounding component Transactions synchronizes the
journal head to ensure that all transactions are persisted, before it calls the commit operation
of component Index &Persistence.
The commit transfers the Invariants (refsize-inv-rindex) on page 138 and (rindex-lebs-cons)
on page 139 about the RAM data structures to their corresponding persistent state. This
establishes the Invariants (refsize-inv-findex) on page 144 and (findex-lebs-cons) on page 144
of the component Transactions.
invariant
ref-size-inv(findex, ftns) (refsize-inv-findex)
∧ lebs(findex) ⊆ dom(ftns) (findex-lebs-cons)
After the recovery the Invariants (refsize-inv-findex) and (findex-lebs-cons) reestablish the
Invariants (refsize-inv-rindex) and (rindex-lebs-cons).
Proof of Thm. 9 on page 135 (for Commit). The specification of the commit in the com-
ponent Index &Journal (see Fig. 11.4 on page 128) allows for the deallocation of a set of












is chosen. The refinement proof is then straightforward and shows that the commit operation
is implemented correctly.
Recovery The recovery of the subcomponent Index &Persistence is shown in Fig. 11.12.
It restores the flash index as the current RAM index and returns the flash orphans and all
blocks that form the log logblocks′.
Fig. 11.13 depicts the recovery of the component Transactions, which restores the log of
addresses log′ from the log of LEB numbers logblocks′. The operation reads the addresses and
transactional nodes of every LEB in the order of logblocks′ and afterwards discards addresses
and nodes of partial transactions.
Proof of Thm. 9 on page 135 (for Crash & Recovery). The operation restores the version of
the log prior to the power failure according to the abstraction relation for the log (abs-log)
on page 134. The abstraction relation (abs-log) for the log and the node store (abs-node-store)
on page 134 are unaffected by the crash transition, i.e., the equations
1. log(logblocks, revert-refsize(tns, ftns, invallebs, logblocks)↓) = log(logblocks, tns↓)
2. nodes( (revert-refsize(tns, ftns, invallebs, logblocks) \ invallebs)↓ )
= nodes( (tns \ invallebs)↓ )
hold. The LEBs of logblocks are disjoint from the invalid LEBs invallebs according to
Invariant (loglebs-valid) on page 134, establishing the first equation. The second equation
follows from the insight that the abstraction removes (_ \ invallebs) all the LEBs that
re-emerge with arbitrary contents, and all other LEBs retain their original contents.
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recovery
transactions_recover(; log′, forphans′, err)
romode := false, log′ := [];
let logblocks′, adrlist,nodes in
index_persistence_recover(; logblocks′, forphans′, err);
if err = ESUCCESS then
while err = ESUCCESS ∧ logblocks′ ̸= [] do
index_persistence_read_leb(logblocks′.head; adrlist,nodes, err);
if err = ESUCCESS then
transactions_remove_partial_transactions(; adrlist,nodes);
log′ :+= adrlist, logblocks′ := logblocks′.tail;
auxiliary operations
transactions_remove_partial_transactions(; adrlist,nodes)
let done = false in




adrlist := adrlist.removelast, nodes := nodes.removelast;
Figure 11.13: Component Transactions: Recovery
As discussed in Sec. 11.2 after the recovery of the component Transactions, the log is
replayed by component FFSC . This restores the RAM index prior to the power failure
using the log and the flash index. This replay also restores the values of the field ref-size.
Afterwards, all invalid LEBs have a ref-size field of 0 and are again removed, either by the
garbage collector or at the latest by the next commit.
11.7 Index: A Wandering B+-Tree
The index is implemented as a wandering B+-tree [59, 33]. This section focuses on the
integration of the index into the commit and recovery and its garbage collection, the verification
of functional correctness is not in the scope of this thesis.
Each (in-memory) node of the B+-tree has an associated index node on flash, which stores
its contents. A non-leaf node of the tree stores an address to the index node of each child, in
addition to the usual pointer to the child node. The address of the root node froot is stored
in the superblock during the commit. The state variable rroot stores the pointer to the root
node in main memory.
state froot : NodeAddress, rroot : Ref
Fig. 11.14 shows an example of a wandering B+-tree with two pointers per node and the
underlying flash device.
The B+-tree is loaded lazily, i.e., after mounting the pointer to the root in main memory
rroot is initialized to null and only froot node is loaded. During tree traversal if the pointer
to a child node is null the corresponding index node is loaded into main memory first.
The persistent version of the tree is wandering in order to cope with the limitations of
flash hardware that overwriting an index node is not possible. Index nodes are updated
out-of-place and changed parts of the index move to new addresses at the point of the commit.
The component B+-tree uses the subcomponent Persistence to store these index nodes.
The subcomponent is similar to component Index &Persistence of Sec. 11.3, only the RAM
and flash index are replaced by an index node store, given by the state variable ins and its
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1
2 3
4 5 6 7
rroot
froot
4 1 5 2 6 7 3
Figure 11.14: Wandering B+-Tree: Black and red arrows denote pointers to main memory
and flash addresses, respectively. The state directly after a commit is depicted, where all
nodes in main memory correspond to their on-flash representation. Once a node in main
memory is updated all flash pointers up to the root become invalid and during the next
commit all nodes on the path from modified nodes to the root must be updated out-of-place.
The numbers inside flash blocks correspond to the node in main memory they currently hold.
version of the last commit fins.
state ins : N ↦→ INodeLeb, fins : N ↦→ INodeLeb
The LEB data structure INodeLeb itself is similar to the TNodeLebs of the transactional
journal, specifically there is also a field ref-size for each LEB, tracking the number of bytes
still used. During a power failure all nodes allocated since the last commit in ins are removed,
for all other nodes the field ref-size of fins is restored with the nodes of ins. The effect on
all other state variables is the same as in component Index &Persistence, indicated by the
dots.





l ↦→ inode-leb(inodes, ioffs, refsize)
⏐⏐ l ∈ dom(fins)
∧ refsize = ftns[l].ref-size
∧ inodes = ins[l].inodes ∧ ioffs = ins[l].ioffs
}
Invariant (index-crash-inv) ensures that no critical index nodes are lost. It states that each
LEB l allocated in fins is also allocated in ins and that the nodes and offsets of fins[l] are a
prefix of those in ins[l].
invariant fins ⊑ ins (index-crash-inv)
The flash index is written during each commit. In the event of a successful commit the
component Persistence removes all LEBs with an ref-size field of 0 in order to deallocate
unneeded LEBs. The effect of a commit on ins and fins is therefore essentially the two
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assignments
ins := ins \ unref-lebs(ins);
fins := ins;
Similar to Invariant (refsize-inv-rindex) for the RAM index, the ref-size field of LEB l
must correspond to the sum of all sizes of all addresses that are still in use in the LEB l.
The B+-tree abstraction (details omitted)
abs-btree(rroot, froot, ins, . . . , adrset)
calculates a set of index node addresses adrset that are currently referenced by the B+-tree.
With this set the Invariant (refsize-inv-btree) is expressible and ensures the correctness of
the ref-size field.
invariant (refsize-inv-btree)
∀l ∈ dom(ins). ins[l].ref-size =
∑ {
adr .size
⏐⏐ adr ∈ adrset ∧ adr .leb = l }
Garbage collection of the flash index can be accomplished by marking all nodes as dirty,
which ensures that the flash index is persisted completely in a new location and afterwards
triggering a commit. The commit ensures that all LEBs of the previous flash index are
deallocated, because their ref-size field is now 0.
Finally, the component Persistence has an explicit state for the current location of the
write-buffer. Either the write-buffer is not in use, or writes to the journal head or to one of
the LEBs for index nodes are buffered.
state wbufstate : WBufState
with
data type WBufState = unbuffered | journalhead | index(leb : N)
Fig. 11.15 summarizes the specification component Persistence implemented in Ch. 12.
The operations persistence_move_log_head and persistence_allocate_index_leb are
used to allocate a new LEB for the journal or index and move the write-buffer to this LEB.
11.8 Related Work
Hesselink and Lali [63] specify a garbage collector in a model that maps file identifiers to
nodes. Garbage collection removes file identifiers that are no longer reachable by a path. This
is above the level of abstraction of the component FFSC and does not consider that nodes
are stored at addresses and garbage collection might also need to move nodes.
Bilbyfs [11, 77, 9] deliberately has a slightly simpler design than UBIFS and Flashix. For
example the index and several other data structures are currently not stored on flash and
must be reconstructed during recovery by scanning the device. The focus of their research is
the verification of the step from the models towards generated C code with their tool Cogent.
The verification of the models in [9] is limited to a subset of the operations and does not
consider crash-safety.
The two other verified file system FSCQ [27, 28, 26] and Yxv6 [123] are for magnetic
disks only and do not feature garbage collection or an index, or have to consider the write
characteristics of flash hardware, i.e., they can overwrite sectors of the disk. However, both
file system employ a journal that records changes to sectors of the disk. FSCQ also groups
individual changes to sectors into transactions, which are written to a sequential journal.
Once the journal fills up, the changes are applied to the corresponding disk blocks, i.e., the
sectors are overwritten. After a power failure, the recovery procedure scans the journal and
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component Persistence
state tns, ftns : N ↦→ TNodeLeb, invallebs : Set⟨N⟩, logblocks : List⟨N⟩, synced : B
ins,fins : N ↦→ INodeLeb, froot : NodeAddress, forphans : Set⟨N⟩
wbufstate : WBufState
invariant
logblocks ∩ invallebs = ∅ ∧ ¬ dups(logblocks)
∧ dom(tns) ∪ invallebs = dom(ftns) ∪ logblocks ∧ fins ⊑ ins
interface operations
// Operations for Journaling (see Fig. 11.8 on page 135)






// Operations for Garbage Collection (see Fig. 11.10 on page 139)
persistence_get_gc_block(; l, err)




persistence_read_index_node(adr ; indexnode, err)
persistence_index_leb_append(indexnode; adr , err)
// Common Operations




tns′ = revert-refsize(tns, ftns, invallebs, logblocks) ∧ invallebs′ = invallebs
∧ ftns′ = ftns ∧ ins′ = revert-refsize(ins,fins) ∧ logblocks′ = logblocks
∧ froot′ = froot ∧ forphans′ = forphans
recovery
persistence_recover(; logblocks′, forphans′, froot′, err)
Figure 11.15: Component Persistence: State, Invariants & Interface
applies all pending writes to the actual blocks. The Yxv6 file system [123] uses a journaling
technique similar to FSCQ.
Two other developments actually connect a high-level view to the pages and blocks of
flash hardware [75, 36]. In both cases, only file content is mapped, written, and garbage
collected at the granularity of flash pages, at the expense of extra state that is kept in memory.
An encoding of the directory/file structure and the commit data structures down to flash
and write-back caching are not considered. [75] deals with crashes during a write operation
only and intertwines the recovery strategy with the implementation of the write operation.
The models [75, 36] have a page-based allocation scheme assuming additional, overwritable
bits that track the allocation status. These are not always present or might be used entirely
for error-correction codes [131]. We have to recover newly allocated blocks and deallocate
reappearing blocks after a power cut as shown by Sec. 11.6. This complicates the invariants,
but makes the approach applicable to a wider set of flash hardware. The models [75, 36] do
not consider the restriction to sequential writes within an erase block. [36] reads all pages
during mounting/recovery in order to rebuild the index.
The use of synchronized states as a specification mechanism for order-preserving write-back
caches and their use to ease the burden of specification in the context of a journaling file system
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is novel. It simplifies the specification components Index &Journal and Index &Persistence
and Persistence of this chapter significantly, as well as all components above them in the
refinement hierarchy. Otherwise, in the event of a power failure it is necessary to specify
which (transactional) nodes 1) are removed and 2) may be removed explicitly, as we initially
did in our own previous work [46].
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Write-Buffering, Node Persistence & Commit Atomicity
Summary. This chapter fills the gap between the transactional journal and index of
Ch. 11 and the erase block manager of Ch. 10. The serialization of the transactional
and index nodes must ensure that they appear to be written atomically, although the
error model of Ch. 8 permits partial writes and power failures may occur at any time
during the execution. Additionally, the specific write characteristics of flash hardware
need to be taken into consideration: writes of the byte representation are cached until
a page-aligned prefix of the data can be written. Writes must be sequential within each
erase block, too. The write-buffer is the component where retractions and synchronized
states of Ch. 4 are introduced into the refinement hierarchy with a crash refinement
of Ch. 5. Additionally, critical data structures such as the LPA (= LEB Property
Array), the sequence of log blocks and the flash orphans of Ch. 11 need to be updated
atomically during a commit.
Publications. The write-buffer and persistence layer are published in [46]. [107]
shows how the verification can be simplified by using the component semantics of
Ch. 4 with retractions and retry in order to specify the behavior of a power failure.
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12.1 Overview
Fig. 12.1 gives an overview over the components presented in this chapter. First the serializa-
tion of transactional and index nodes by the component Node Serialization is discussed in
Sec. 12.2. The component uses the write-buffer to persist the byte representation. Several
concerns must be addressed by the byte representation.
First, it must be ensured that the page-aligned partial writes, either due to I/O errors or
power failures, can be detected. It is necessary to take into account the error model of flash
hardware (see Ch. 8). The second aspect is that two kinds of access to the data must be
provided. On the one hand, given an address of a node the component must be able to read
the requested node quickly. This access pattern is used by the component FFSC of Ch. 11
when a file system object is read. On the other hand, for garbage collection and recovery it is
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Figure 12.1: Overview over the Components responsible for Data Serialization, Buffering of
Writes and Atomicity of the Commit
necessary to read all nodes and their addresses of a single erase block. The third concern is
that the component must always be able to synchronize the write-buffer at the user’s request.
However, the write-buffer can not be filled with garbage data in order to provoke a flush,
since this would prohibit reading all nodes from an erase block sequentially. The solution is
to have just enough space to the next page boundary to be able to write a padding node.
Padding nodes can be detected during reading and are just skipped.
The write-buffer component Wbuf holds a page-sized buffer and implicitly writes the
data once a page boundary is crossed. In a first step the component Wbuf is abstracted to a
specification Wbuf (State-based) with a state-based description of the effect of a power failure,
i.e., the specification only employs the crash predicate and all states are synchronized. This
is a normal data refinement. In the second step the state-based specification is abstracted to
an operations-based specification Wbuf (Op-based) as shown in the figure. Here most of the
effect of a power failure is expressed in terms of synchronized states. This step uses the crash
refinement of Ch. 5.
The last implementation component Superblock defines the disk layout for the commit
data structures and provides atomicity of the commit and atomicity for appending LEBs to
the log. The first logical block is reserved for the superblock. Directly after the superblock
there is space for two versions of the commit data structures. The remaining logical erase
blocks are exposed to the write-buffer and node serialization components for their use. The
specification and implementation is discussed in Sec. 12.4.
12.2 Persistence & Node Serialization
LEB Property Array The main data structure of the component Node Serialization is
the LEB Property Array (= LPA). It is one of the commit data structures.
state lpa : Array⟨LebProps⟩
For every logical erase block it stores its current ref-size field and its current allocation
status. A LEB is either free or in use by the journal or the index.
data type LebProps = leb-props(ref-size : N, status : LebStatus)
data type LebStatus = FREE | JOURNAL | INDEX
Based on the data structure LPA, the functions free-lebs(lpa), journal-lebs(lpa) and
index-lebs(lpa) are defined and return the set of logical erase block numbers with the
corresponding allocation status.
In order to efficiently allocate free LEBs and find a suitable block for garbage collection a
list of free LEBs freelebs and a binary heap gclebs are kept. The binary heap is represented here
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as a set, in the real models this is a separate subcomponent implemented by an array-based
binary heap.
state freelebs : List⟨N⟩, gclebs : Set⟨GCLeb⟩, ramloglebs : List⟨N⟩
data type GCLeb = gc-leb(leb : N, ref-size : N)
The binary heap is sorted by the ref-size field. This facilitates the implementation of
the persistence_get_gc_block interface operation, which just removes the block with the
minimal ref-size field from gclebs and returns it to the garbage collector of Ch. 11. The
Invariants (freelebs-inv) and (gclebs-inv) show that the auxiliary data structures freelebs and
gclebs contain the desired LEBs. Note that all LEBs of the log are already excluded from
gclebs, since these are not eligible for garbage collection.
invariant




⏐⏐ l ∈ journal-lebs(lpa) \ ramloglebs } (gclebs-inv)
In order to quickly update the gclebs data structure after a commit, i.e., when the log is
emptied, the component Node Serialization keeps the LEBs of the log ramloglebs separately
in RAM with the additional Invariant (loglebs-lpa).
invariant ramloglebs ⊆ journal-lebs(lpa) (loglebs-lpa)
Before discussing the component Node Serialization further, it is necessary to introduce
its subcomponent, namely the operations-based specification of the write-buffer.
Write-Buffer (Operations-based) The component Node Serialization interacts with
the operations-based specification Wbuf (Op-based) of the write-buffer. This specification
is depicted in Fig. 12.2. The component stores the block that is currently buffered (if any)
in the state variable bufleb. Furthermore, the component exposes one volume of the erase
block manager lebs, the current list of blocks of the log logblocks and the flash version of the
commit data structures froot, forphans and flpa.
state bufleb : Option⟨N⟩
The implementation of the interface operations is omitted for brevity and most of it should
already be clear from the state and the components that were already shown previously.
The interface and implementation of the write-buffer is independent of the partitioning into
index and journal LEBs. The component provides interface operations to move and destroy
the write-buffer, which modify the state variable bufleb only. Buffered writing appends the
new data to the current offset lebs[bufleb.get].written in the buffered LEB. Note that there
is no precondition that demands page alignment for the offset or for the number of bytes
that are written. Reading the buffered LEB is allowed, too. The operations for mapping and
unmapping of logical erase blocks of the erase block manager are exposed to the clients of the
write-buffer. The commit operation now also takes the LPA, the last commit data structure,
as an input parameter. Adding a LEB number to the list of LEBs of the log logblocks is now
an explicit operation, and either performs its task atomically or returns with an error code.
Most operations are allowed in synchronized states only, i.e., if the number of bytes written
to a LEB (field written) is aligned to one flash page, as defined by Eqn. (synchronized).
synchronized(lebs)↔ ∀l < # lebs. page-aligned(lebs[l].written) (synchronized)
The operations that are only allowed in synchronized states are only called right before
the write-buffer is moved. At this point the state is synchronized anyway. The approach
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component Wbuf (Op-based)
state bufleb : Option⟨N⟩, lebs : Array⟨Leb⟩
logblocks : List⟨N⟩, froot : NodeAddress, forphans : Set⟨N⟩,flpa : Array⟨LebProps⟩
invariant
# lebs = # flpa∧(bufleb ̸= None→ lebs[bufleb.get].mapped?)∧∀l < # lebs. leb-inv(lebs[l])
interface operations
awbuf_get_buf(; bufleb′, off ) {· · · }
awbuf_move_buf(l, off )
pre l < # lebs ∧ lebs[l].mapped? ∧ off = lebs[l].written ∧ synchronized(lebs) {· · · }
awbuf_destroy_buf()
pre synchronized(lebs) {· · · }
awbuf_write_buf(n, buf ; err)
pre bufleb ̸= None ∧ lebs[l].written + n ≤ LEB_SIZE ∧ n ≤ # buf {· · · }
awbuf_read(l, off ,n; buf , err) {· · · }
pre l < # lebs ∧ n ≤ # buf ∧ off + n ≤ LEB_SIZE ∧ lebs[l].mapped? {· · · }
awbuf_map(l; err)
pre l < # lebs ∧ ¬ lebs[l].mapped? ∧ synchronized(lebs) {· · · }
awbuf_unmap(l)
pre l < # lebs ∧ bufleb ̸= Some(l) ∧ synchronized(lebs) {· · · }
awbuf_add_log_leb(l; err)
pre l < # lebs ∧ lebs[l].mapped? ∧ synchronized(lebs)
{ logblocks :+= l; err := ESUCCESS } ∨ { fail(; err); }
awbuf_commit(flpa′, froot′, forphans′; err)




lebs ⊆ lebs′ ∧ logblocks′ = logblocks ∧ froot′ = froot ∧ forphans′ = forphans ∧ flpa′ = flpa
recovery
awbuf_recover(; logblocks′, froot′, forphans′,flpa′, err) { · · · }
Figure 12.2: Component Wbuf (Op-based)
therefore does not impose any unnecessary synchronization with flash memory. Note that
the write-buffer does not feature an operation for synchronization, since synchronized states
are only reached implicitly by appending the right amount of data via awbuf_write_buf.
With the state of the write-buffer specification the following additional invariants are
expressible. The invariant states that the copy of logblocks kept in main memory by component
Node Serialization is consistent and that the buffered block is either the current journal head





bufleb ̸= None→ (logblocks ̸= [] ∧ bufleb.get = logblocks.last)
∨ bufleb.get ∈ index-lebs(lpa)
)
Allocation of LEBs The component Node Serialization allocates new LEBs for the journal
as depicted in Fig. 12.3 (operation serialization_move_log_head). If no free LEBs are
available the operation returns the corresponding error code ENOSPC. Otherwise, a free LEB
is unmapped first, in order to ensure that it is really unmapped, since previously unmapped
LEBs might re-emerge after a power-failure (see the abstract specification of the erase block
manager in Ch. 10). The new LEB is added to the list of LEBs of the log, i.e., added to the
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component Node Serialization
subcomponent Wbuf (State-based)
state lpa : Array⟨LebProps⟩, freelebs : List⟨N⟩, gclebs : Set⟨GCLeb⟩,
ramloglebs : List⟨N⟩, romode : B
interface operations
serialization_move_log_head(; err)
if freelebs = [] then
err := ENOSPC
else let l = freelebs.head in
awbuf_unmap(l);
awbuf_map(l; err);
if err = ESUCCESS then
awbuf_add_log_leb(l; err);
if err = ESUCCESS then
awbuf_move_buf(l, 0);
freelebs := freelebs.tail, lpa[l].status := JOURNAL, ramloglebs :+= l;
Figure 12.3: Component Node Serialization: State and LEB Allocation for the Journal
state variable logblocks. Afterwards, the write-buffer is moved to the new LEB with an initial
offset of 0 for writes, and the data structures in main memory are updated accordingly. For
free LEBs it is already known that the field ref-size is 0 according to Invariant (refsize-free).
invariant ∀l ∈ free-lebs(l). lpa[l].ref-size = 0 (refsize-free)
For index LEBs the process is similar, specifically, the write-buffer is also moved to the
newly allocated LEB in the expectation that nodes of the B+-tree are written immediately
afterwards.
Byte Representation of Transactional and Index Nodes As already explained the
byte representation of nodes must fulfill several criteria: It must be possible 1) to detect that
a page-aligned suffix of the data is missing, 2) to read all nodes in a block sequentially and
distinguish them from EMPTY bytes, and 3) to flush the write-buffer.
Header Node Data Trailer
Figure 12.4: Byte Representation
of Nodes
In order to satisfy these criteria the byte
representation of transactional and index
nodes is enclosed in a header and a trailer as
depicted in Fig. 12.4. Both the header and
the trailer may not consist only of bytes of
the value EMPTY. This facilitates detection
of the existence of a node (header present)
and of a completely written node (trailer present). The trailer is just some constant sequence
of bytes node-trailer that is distinct from the sequence of EMPTY bytes and is of the fixed
size NODE_HEADER_SIZE.
constant node-trailer : Array⟨Byte⟩ (node-trailer)
axiom # node-trailer = NODE_HEADER_SIZE
axiom ¬ is-empty(node-trailer, 0, NODE_HEADER_SIZE)
In contrast, the header is the byte representation of the algebraic data type NodeHeader.
The byte representation is given by the serialization approach discussed in Ch. 9 with the
restrictions that the byte representation never consists of bytes of value EMPTY only and
that it is also of the fixed size NODE_HEADER_SIZE. The header stores whether it precedes
an actual node or a padding node, and the size of the byte representation of the (actual or
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padding) node that follows. A padding node may essentially contain arbitrary data and is
used to flush the write-buffer.
data type NodeHeader = node-header(size : N, ispadding : B)
For the transactional nodes of the journal and index nodes of the B+-tree a serialization that is
aligned to 2 · NODE_HEADER_SIZE is chosen. This ensures that the entire byte representation
shown in Fig. 12.4 is aligned to 2 · NODE_HEADER_SIZE. In the actual code the constant
NODE_HEADER_SIZE is 8, 4 bytes are needed for the field size and another 4 bytes for the
field ispadding of the type NodeHeader. A page of flash memory is usually either 512 bytes
or 2048 bytes. It is therefore realistic to assume that Axiom (node-header-size) holds, which
states that the size of a flash page is divisible by twice the size of the header of a node.
axiom PAGE_SIZE % (2 · NODE_HEADER_SIZE) = 0 (node-header-size)
axiom NODE_HEADER_SIZE ̸= 0
The axiom ensures that if the currently written nodes in a LEB are not aligned to a flash
page, then at least 2 · NODE_HEADER_SIZE bytes are available until the next page alignment,
and it is possible for the component Node Serialization to write a padding node with 0 (or
more) bytes. This write ensures that a synchronized state is reached and exacts a flush from
the write-buffer.
The byte representation of transactional nodes and index nodes is abstracted by the
predicate abs-tnodes and abs-inodes, respectively. Both abstractions work exactly the same,
therefore we focus on transactional nodes in the following.
The predicate abs-tnodes(buf , tnodes, toffs, partial) states that the array buf contains a
byte representation of the transactional nodes tnodes at offsets toffs. The flag partial denotes
whether a failure occurred during the write of the last transactional node. If the flag is
set then a partial node may be at the end of the buffer and appending additional nodes is
no longer safely possible. The definition of the predicate is based on the three predicates
abs-tnode(buf , tnode), abs-padding(buf ) and abs-partial(buf ).
The predicate abs-tnode(buf , tnode) ensures that the array buf contains the byte repre-
sentation of the transactional node tnode as depicted by Fig. 12.4. Its definition is shown in
Equation (abs-tnode), where the predicate serialized is an instantiation of the correspond-
ing predicate of Ch. 9 with the restrictions as explained above.
abs-tnode(buf , tnode) (abs-tnode)
↔ ∃buf0, buf1. buf = buf0 + buf1 + node-trailer
∧ serialized(node-header(serialized-size(tnode), false), buf0)
∧ serialized(tnode, buf1)
Predicate abs-padding(buf ) is defined similarly and asserts that the buffer contains a padding
node. A partially written node satisfies abs-partial(buf ) as defined by Eqn. (abs-partial).
abs-partial(buf ) (abs-partial)
↔ # buf % NODE_HEADER_SIZE = 0




∨ ∃ndhd. serialized(ndhd, buf0) ∧# buf1 ≤ ndhd.size
)
The definition of abs-partial ensures that either the header contains garbage data, most
likely because buf0 contains only EMPTY bytes, or that the remaining buffer is to short to
contain the trailer of the byte representation.
It is now possible to define the abstraction abs-tnodes(buf , tnodes, toffs, partial) of a list
of transactional nodes tnodes and their offsets toffs in the buffer buf recursively. The idea
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interface operations
serialization_journal_head_append(tnodes; adrlist, err)
if romode then err := EROFS
let buf , bufleb, off in
awbuf_get_buf(; bufleb, off );
serialization_serialize_tnodes(tnodes, bufleb.get, off ; buf , adrlist, err);
if err = ESUCCESS then
awbuf_write_buf(# buf , buf ; err);
if err ̸= ESUCCESS then romode := true; // Enter read-only mode
serialization_read_tnode(adr ; tnode, err)
let buf = Array⟨Byte⟩(adr .size) in
awbuf_read(adr .leb, adr .off, adr .size; buf , err);
if err = ESUCCESS then
serialization_deserialize_tnode(adr .size, buf ; tnode, err);
Figure 12.5: Component Node Serialization: Appending Nodes to the Journal and Reading
Nodes
is to break buf into a first part buf0, which satisfies either abs-tnode(buf0, tnodes.head) or
abs-padding(buf0), and a rest buf1 that contains the byte representation of the remaining
nodes and offsets. If partial is true, then the last part of the buffer may satisfy abs-partial.
The details are omitted for brevity.
Appending Nodes Fig. 12.5 shows how transactional nodes are appended to the journal.
The byte representation is performed by the operation serialization_serialize_tnodes.
Its implementation is not shown, since it just serializes each node as shown in Fig. 12.4 on
page 155. The LEB bufleb.get for the nodes and the current offset off is needed in order
to calculate the address for each node. The addresses are returned in the variable adrlist.
Afterwards, the buffer buf is appended to the journal head. Before the operation
abs-tnodes(lebs[bufleb.get].data, tnodes0, toffs0, false)
holds for some transaction nodes tnodes0 and some offsets toffs0. If appending succeeds, then
abs-tnodes(lebs[bufleb.get].data + buf , tnodes0 + tnodes, toffs0 + toffs, false)
is shown afterwards, where buf contains the serialized data of all transactional nodes tnode.
Note the last parameter false, which indicates that appends are still possible afterwards. If
appending fails on the other hand, the file system enters read-only mode and
abs-tnodes(lebs[bufleb.get].data + buf 1, tnodes0 + tnodes1, toffs0 + toffs1, true)
is shown for some prefix buf 1 of buf that is aligned to NODE_HEADER_SIZE and some prefix
tnodes1 and toffs1 of tnodes and toffs, respectively. Appending additional nodes afterwards
is no longer allowed, as indicated by the partial flag that is now set to true.
Reading Nodes A single transactional node is read as shown in Fig. 12.5. First, enough
space is allocated for the read access. Note that here the field size of the address is used. If
addresses did not carry the additional size field, several I/O operations would be needed to
read the header and only then the remainder of the node. Afterwards, the respective part of
the LEB is read and the byte representation is decoded. In order to read the transactional
nodes of an entire LEB, which is needed by the garbage collection and by the replay of the
index after a power failure, scanning of the whole block is needed. The details are omitted
here, since the operation is quite intricate and has to check that there are actually nodes and
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interface operations
serialization_sync(; err)
if romode then err := EROFS
else let bufleb, off in
awbuf_get_buf(; bufleb, off );
if bufleb ̸= None ∧ ¬ page-aligned(off ) then
let buf = Array⟨Byte⟩(PAGE_SIZE− (off % PAGE_SIZE)) in
serialization_padding_node(; buf , err);
if err = ESUCCESS then
awbuf_write_buf(# buf , buf ; err);
if err ̸= ESUCCESS then romode := true; // Enter read-only mode
serialization_commit(froot′, forphans′; err)
awbuf_destroy_buf();
awbuf_commit(lpa, froot′, forphans′; err);
if err = ESUCCESS then
. . . // Add LEBs of ramloglebs to gclebs
ramloglebs := [];
. . . // Unmap all LEBs l with lpa[l].ref-size = 0
Figure 12.6: Component Node Serialization: Synchronization & Commit
not just garbage data or EMPTY bytes. Essentially, the procedure has to reconstruct tnodes
and toffs given that for the corresponding LEB l the formula
abs-tnodes(lebs[l].data, tnodes, toffs, partial)
holds for some value of the flag partial. Padding nodes need to be skipped as well.
Synchronization Fig. 12.6 shows how synchronization is achieved. If the current offset of
the write-buffer is not aligned, then a buffer buf for a padding node is allocated. The padding
node spans the space to the next page boundary. The header and trailer of the padding node
are written to buf and the buffer is appended to the currently buffered logical erase block.
The abstraction
abs-tnodes(lebs[bufleb.get].data, tnodes, toffs, false)
ensures that there is enough space for the padding node. After a successful write of the
padding node,
abs-tnodes(lebs[bufleb.get].data + buf , tnodes, toffs, false)
is established, where buf contains the complete byte representation of the padding node. If
the write fails then
abs-tnodes(lebs[bufleb.get].data + buf 0, tnodes, toffs, true)
holds, where buf 0 is again a prefix of buf that is aligned to NODE_HEADER_SIZE.
Commit Fig. 12.6 also depicts the commit operation of the component Node Serialization.
First, the buffered block bufleb is reset to None by a call to awbuf_destroy_buf. Then a
commit of the subcomponent Wbuf (Op-based) is triggered with the current LEB Properties
Array lpa and the flash orphans forphans′ and the root of the flash index froot′. The latter
two parameters are passed on from the FFSC and B+-tree components. After the commit,
the log is empty. All LEBs that were part of the log prior to the commit need to be added to
the LEBs available for garbage collection, i.e., to the gclebs data structure. Finally, all LEBs
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recovery
serialization_recover(; logblocks′, forphans′, froot′, err)
awbuf_recover(; logblocks′, froot′, forphans′, lpa, err);
if err = ESUCCESS then
. . . // Mark all LEBs in logblocks′ as allocated for the journal
. . . // Unmap all LEBs l with lpa[l].ref-size = 0
. . . // Initialize gclebs and freelebs
ramloglebs := logblocks′, romode := false;
Figure 12.7: Component Node Serialization: Recovery
that have a field ref-size of 0 are deallocated and unmapped. This is a form of garbage
collection of the journal and index LEBs, and is especially necessary for the index LEBs.
Otherwise, the flash index will incrementally use up all LEBs of the device. With this measure
we get Thm. 11.
Theorem 11 (No Unused Nodes After Commit). After the commit of the file system, no
unused LEBs are mapped.
Proof. As shown by Fig. 12.6 the commit operation deallocates all LEBs with a field ref-size
of 0. By Invariant (refsize-inv-rindex) on page 138 and (refsize-inv-btree) on page 147 all
other LEBs are still referenced by the RAM index and contain live transactional nodes or
are referenced by the B+-tree and therefore contain live nodes of the flash index.
Recovery Fig. 12.7 depicts the recovery of the component Node Serialization. The recovery
of the write-buffer returns the commit data structures. The component Node Serialization
then marks all LEBs in the log as allocated for the journal, i.e., for all l ∈ logblocks′ the
field lpa[l].status is set to JOURNAL. Then all unreferenced LEBs are deallocated (analogous
to serialization_commit in Fig. 12.6) and the other state variables of the component are
initialized appropriately.
Abstraction Relation The essential part of the abstraction relation between the compo-
nent Node Serialization and its specification Persistence (see Fig. 11.15 on page 148) is the
correspondence between the transactional node stores tns, its commit version ftns, invalid
LEBs invallebs, the index node stores ins and its commit version fins on the one hand, and
the logical erase blocks lebs and the LEB Property Arrays lpa and flpa on the other hand.
For the transactional node store tns and invalid LEBs invallebs the abstraction rela-
tion (abs-tnode-store) is used. The abstraction relation states that exactly the LEBs that are
allocated for the journal, i.e., have the status JOURNAL in the LPA, are in the domain of the
transactional node store tns. The ref-size field in the lpa always matches the corresponding
field in tns. However, only if the LEB l is valid, i.e., if l ̸∈ invallebs holds, then the bytes in










∀l ∈ tns \ invallebs. abs-leb(l, lebs[l], tns[l].tnodes, tns[l].toffs, bufleb, romode)
)
where
abs-leb(l, leb, tnodes, toffs, bufleb, romode)
↔ leb.mapped?
∧ abs-tnodes(leb.data[0..leb.written], tnodes, toffs, bufleb ̸= Some(l) ∨ romode)
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The abstraction for individual LEBs abs-leb splits the data into the first part where the
encoded data lies and a remainder that only contains bytes with the value EMPTY.1 Note
that the abstraction only allows for appending of nodes, i.e., the last parameter partial of
abs-tnodes is true, if the LEB is buffered and the component is not in read-only mode.
The abstraction between the index node store ins, the LEB Properties Array lpa and the
logical erase blocks lebs is analogous to (abs-tnode-store).
For the commit version of the transactional node store ftns and the commit version
of the LEB Property Array flpa the abstraction relation (abs-tnode-store-commit) is used.
Only the journal LEBs with a nonzero ref-size field are part of ftns, since the operation
serialization_commit deallocates and unmaps these LEBs only after persisting the LPA
as shown in Fig. 12.6. For this reason the recovery operation (see Fig. 12.7) also has to
deallocate and unmap these LEBs after loading the flash version of the LPA. Only then is
the abstraction relation (abs-tnode-store) reestablished after a power failure.
abstraction relation (abs-tnode-store-commit)
∀l < # flpa.
(




l ∈ ftns → ftns[l].ref-size = flpa[l].ref-size
)
The abstraction relation for the commit version of the index node store fins and flpa is again
analogous.
Additionally, data refinement by Thm. 3 on page 59 must preserve synchronized states. The
refinement between Persistence and Node Serialization is the only refinement where not only
the artificial synchronized flag synced is considered, but the actual synchronization predicate
of the write-buffer. Abstraction relation (abs-synchronized) ensures that synchronized states
are preserved correctly, where synced is the state variable of the specification component
Persistence.
abstraction relation synced → synchronized(lebs) (abs-synchronized)
Finally, the state of the buffer wbufstate of Persistence must be related to the write-buffer.
This is rather trivial and omitted. We conclude with the correctness and crash-safety of the
component Node Serialization.
Theorem 12 (Correctness & Atomicity of Node Serialization). The component Persistence
is refined by the component Node Serialization.
The main difficulties during the invariant and refinement proofs are 1) handling the byte
representation of nodes and 2) again the details of the commit with garbage collection of
index LEBs and recovery.
12.3 Write-Buffer: State-Based vs. Operations-Based
The state of the component Wbuf consists of the LEB number bufleb that is being cached
and the write-buffer wbuf itself. Fig. 12.8 depicts the component structure and its state. The
write-buffer wbuf stores the a page-sized array data, the current offset off of the write-buffer
in the LEB and the number of bytes written currently cached in the write-buffer.
data type WriteBuffer = wbuf(data : Array⟨Byte⟩, off : N, written : N)
Invariants Invariant (wbuf-inv) states that the write-buffer has the size of a flash page.
Furthermore, the write-buffer is never completely filled, since then a page-aligned write is
possible, i.e., the number of bytes written to the buffer is always below the size of a flash
1The remainder only contains EMPTY bytes due to Invariant (leb-inv) on page 95, which also holds for the
subcomponent Wbuf (Op-based).
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component Wbuf
subcomponent Commit (Fig. 12.9 on page 164)
state bufleb : Option⟨N⟩,wbuf : WriteBuffer, romode : B
invariant wbuf-inv(bufleb,wbuf , lebs)
interface operations
wbuf_write_buf(n, buf ; err)
if romode then err := EROFS;
else if wbuf .written + n ≥ PAGE_SIZE then
let nwrite = align↓(wbuf .written + n, PAGE_SIZE) in
let nbuf = nwrite − wbuf .written in
let nrest = (wbuf .written + n) % PAGE_SIZE in
let buf0 = Array⟨Byte⟩(nwrite) in
buf0 := copy(wbuf .data, 0, buf0, 0,wbuf .written);
buf0 := copy(buf , 0, buf0,wbuf .written,nbuf );
commit_write(bufleb.get,wbuf .off, 0,nwrite, buf0; err);
if err = ESUCCESS then
wbuf .data := copy(buf ,nbuf ,wbuf .data, 0,nrest);
wbuf .off :+= nwrite;




wbuf .data := copy(buf , 0,wbuf .data,wbuf .written,n);
wbuf .written :+= n;
err := ESUCCESS;
Figure 12.8: Component Wbuf
page. Finally, if the component is not in read-only mode, then the offset wbuf .off stored in
main memory corresponds to the current number of bytes written to the buffered LEB, i.e.,
it corresponds to lebs[bufleb.get].written. This ensures that component actually writes the
data sequentially.
invariant wbuf-inv(bufleb,wbuf , lebs) (wbuf-inv)
where
wbuf-inv(bufleb,wbuf , lebs)
↔ # wbuf .data = PAGE_SIZE ∧ wbuf .written < PAGE_SIZE
∧
(
bufleb ̸= None→ bufleb.get < # lebs ∧ lebs[bufleb.get].mapped?
∧ (¬ romode → lebs[bufleb.get].written = wbuf .off)
)
Buffered Writing The main operations of the component Wbuf is reading and writing.
All other operations just modify the data structures in main memory accordingly, or are
passed through to the subcomponent Commit. Fig. 12.8 shows the operation wbuf_write. If
a page-aligned write is possible, then the component assembles a new buffer buf0 and writes
all nwrite bytes in a single I/O operation. The remaining nrest bytes are copied into the
write-buffer wbuf afterwards and the offset of the buffer is shifted accordingly. In case of a
write failure a switch to read-only mode is performed. If no page-aligned write is possible,
then the bytes of the input buffer buf are just cached by appending them to the write-buffer
wbuf .
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The read operation essentially just reads the requested LEB. If the LEB is buffered, then
the read operation potentially needs to copy the corresponding part of the write-buffer to
the output buffer.
State-Based Specification The state-based specification Wbuf (State-based) of the write-
buffer is the same as the operations-based specification seen in Fig. 12.2 on page 154 only
the synchronized and crash predicate are given by (wbuf-crash-state-based). All states of
component Wbuf (State-based) are synchronized and according to the crash predicate a
partially written page of every LEB is removed by a power failure. This corresponds to the




lebs′ ↓ lebs ∧ logblocks′ = logblocks ∧ froot′ = froot ∧ forphans′ = forphans ∧ flpa′ = flpa
where
lebs′ ↓ lebs ↔ # lebs′ = # lebs ∧ ∀l < # lebs. lebs′[l] ↓ lebs[l]
leb′ ↓ leb ↔
(




leb.erased?→ leb′ = leb
)
buf ↓ ≡ buf [0..align↓(# buf , PAGE_SIZE)]
Abstraction Relation With the abstraction relation (abs-wbuf) a data refinement be-
tween the component Wbuf and the state-based specification Wbuf (State-based) is proven,
where lebsa and lebsc denote the corresponding state variables of component Commit
and Wbuf (State-based), respectively.2 The abstraction relation essentially copies the write-
buffer over the buffered LEB.
abstraction relation (abs-wbuf)
# lebsa = # lebsc
∧ ∀l < # lebsc.
(




bufleb = Some(l)→ lebsa[l] = mapped(copy(wbuf .data, 0,
lebsc[l].data,wbuf .off,
wbuf .written),
lebsc[l].written + wbuf .written)
)
Thm. 13 shows that the write-buffer is correct and crash-safe with respect to the state-
based specification.
Theorem 13 (Correctness & Crash-Safety of the Write-Buffer). The component Wbuf
refines the component Wbuf (State-based).
Operations-Based Specification As already shown in Fig. 12.2 on page 154, the syn-
chronized and crash predicate of the operations-based specification of the write-buffer are
given by (wbuf-crash-operations-based). The definition of synchronized(lebs) is given by
Equation (synchronized) on page 153 and states that in synchronized states all LEBs are
written up to a page-aligned offset.3 The domain of the crash predicate encompasses only the
2Note that some details about the write-buffer in read-only mode are omitted here for clarity.
3The formula lebs ⊆ lebs′ is defined in Sec. 10.1.
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synchronized states, i.e., the operations-based specification considers crashes only in states




synchronized(lebs) ∧ lebs ⊆ lebs′
∧ logblocks′ = logblocks ∧ froot′ = froot ∧ forphans′ = forphans ∧ flpa′ = flpa
A crash refinement between both specification by Thm. 4 on page 61 shows that we can
switch from the state-based specification to the operations-based specification. This removes
the effect of the write-buffer during a power failure completely from the crash predicate
and instead employs the synchronized states as a specification mechanism. This facilitates
the implicit propagation of the effect upwards all other data refinements until the top-level
specification POSIX is reached.
Theorem 14 (State-Based & Operations-Based Interpretation of the Write-Buffer). The
component Wbuf (State-based) is a crash refinement of the component Wbuf (Op-based).
Proof. First of all, note that most operations of the components are only allowed in synchro-
nized states and that these operations always yield synchronized states. Therefore, finding a re-
traction or re-execution is limited to the awbuf_get_buf, awbuf_read and awbuf_write_buf.
The first two operations are obviously retractable, since they do not modify the persistent
state.
The implementation of awbuf_write_buf is essentially the same as aebm_write in
Fig. 10.2 on page 94, just that the LEB and the offset are implicitly given by the write-buffer.
All executions of awbuf_write_buf that did not cross the last page boundary are retractable.
All other executions are completable in such a way that they write exactly up to the page
boundary and yield a synchronized state. A visualization of the situation is already given
by Fig. 6.2 on page 70 where write W5 is retracted and write W4 is re-executed up to the
respective page boundary.
12.4 Superblock, Commit Atomicity & Flash Layout
The remaining gap between the write-buffer of the previous section and the erase block
manager of Ch. 10 is filled by the component Superblock. Note that several invariants
are omitted for brevity and only described informally. Fig. 12.9 depicts its specification
component Commit.
Specification (Component Commit) It exposes only one volume to its clients captured
by the state variable lebs. The other state variables correspond to the version of the commit
data structures stored at the point of the last successful commit. The specification exposes a
commit operation, which if successful persists the commit data structures. If unsuccessful no
change in the state is visible, i.e., the commit data structures remain intact. Furthermore,
logical erase block number can be appended to the log. Here again, atomicity is crucial. A
power failure leaves the commit data structures and the log unchanged. Only unmapped
LEBs may re-emerge, which is essentially the behavior of the erase block manager of Ch. 10.
The remainder of this section explains the implementation of the specification Commit.
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component Commit
state lebs : Array⟨Leb⟩, logblocks : List⟨N⟩,
froot : NodeAddress, forphans : Set⟨N⟩,flpa : Array⟨LebProps⟩
invariant
# lebs = # flpa ∧ ∀l < # lebs. leb-inv(lebs[l])
interface operations
commit_commit(froot′, forphans′,flpa′; err)
{ logblocks := [], froot := froot′, forphans := forphans′, flpa := flpa′, err := ESUCCESS }




{ logblocks :+= l;err := ESUCCESS } ∨ { fail(; err) }
// operations for reading, writing and (un)mapping of LEBs of component AEBM
crash
lebs ⊆ lebs′ ∧ logblocks′ = logblocks ∧ froot′ = froot ∧ forphans′ = forphans ∧ flpa′ = flpa
recovery
commit_recover(; logblocks′, froot′, forphans′,flpa′, err) { · · · }
Figure 12.9: Specification Component Commit: The component provides an operation to
reliably and atomically persist the commit data structures froot, forphans and flpa and recover
them after a power failure. The other important operation is appending new LEBs to the log
atomically.
Flash Layout Fig. 12.10 depicts the layout that the component Superblock imposes on
the flash device. Note that here the rectangles denote entire logical erase block, not just a
single page of flash memory. The superblock is stored in the first logical erase block of the
volume. For each of the commit data structures space for two versions is provisioned. The
superblock stores the LEB numbers of the current location of the list of LEBs of the log and
of each of the data structures, except for the flash address of the root node of the B+-tree of
Ch. 11, which is directly kept in the superblock data structure. Additionally, the superblock
stores the LEB number of the first erase block that is usable by the client. These pointers
are depicted as solid red arrows.
The component keeps the current version of the superblock in main memory for easy
access to the LEB numbers.
state sb : Superblock
data type Superblock = superblock(froot : NodeAddress, logleb : N,
orphansleb : N, lpaleb : N, mainleb : N)
The field mainleb denotes the number of the first LEB exposed to the write-buffer component.
The component uses a constant default volume identifier v as its volume for the interaction
with the erase block manager. For the superblock and for the flash orphans an encoding
that is aligned to the size of a flash page is chosen as discussed in Ch. 9. The LEB of the
superblock is always mapped according to Invariant (superblock-inv), which also ensures
that its data is unchanged by a power failure of the erase block manager.
invariant (superblock-inv)




∃ logblocks. serialized⟨List⟨N⟩⟩(logblocks, avols[v][sb.logleb].data)
)
∧ · · ·
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Superblock Log1 Log2 Orphans1 Orphans2 LPA1 LPA2 · · ·
main area
Figure 12.10: Component Superblock: Flash Layout of the Superblock and Commit Data
Structures. Solid red arrows denote the current state and dotted red arrows the state after
the next commit. Gray erase blocks are currently not mapped.
The LEBs of the log are serialized explicitly, because the byte representation of each entry
must match an entire flash page exactly, in order to be able to append one entry at a time
atomically to the log, and may not just contain bytes with the value EMPTY.4 The LPA is
also serialized explicitly in order to guarantee a fixed size. A complicating factor for the LPA
is that multiple LEBs are necessary to store it.
An additional invariant (omitted here) asserts that the LEB numbers stored in the
superblock sb used for the serialized data structures correspond to either one of their possible
locations shown in Fig. 12.10. The field mainleb must be calculated, because the size of the
LPA depends on the size of the volume volsize that is exposed to the client. Initially, the
client of the file system can choose volsize.
invariant sb.mainleb = 5 + 2 · lpalebs(volsize) (main-area-inv)
The function lpalebs in Invariant (main-area-inv) calculates the number of LEBs necessary
to store a LEB Properties Array lpa with # lpa = volsize.
LEBs of the Log For the LEB that holds the log an additional offset logoff is kept in
main memory with invariant (logoff-inv) that the offset corresponds to the number of bytes
already written to the LEB.
state logoff : N
invariant logoff ̸= LEB_SIZE→ avols[v][sb.logleb].written = logoff (logoff-inv)
Fig. 12.11 depicts the implementation of appending a LEB number l to the log. If the write
fails or if the space is exhausted, i.e., once logoff = LEB_SIZE holds the component signals
to its client that a commit is required. Clients can also proactively check that there is enough
space for another entry in the log. Appending entries to the log is atomic, because the error
model of the flash hardware of Ch. 8 either completely writes a page or does not write the
page at all.
Commit & Recovery The commit operation is depicted schematically Fig. 12.11. First
the new superblock is calculated, i.e., the pointer of the log and the commit data structures
is moved to their other location denoted by the function switch. Afterwards, the LEBs that
correspond to this location are unmapped and mapped anew, since they may have reemerged
4Note that this could be improved upon by allocating more than one LEB for the journal at once and
using them in sequence.
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component Superblock
subcomponent AEBM (Fig. 10.2 on page 94)
state sb : Superblock, logoff : N
invariant (superblock-inv) ∧ (logoff-inv) ∧ (main-area-inv)
interface operations
superblock_log_add_leb(l; err)
if LEB_SIZE < logoff + PAGE_SIZE then err := ECOMMIT
else let buf = Array⟨Byte⟩(PAGE_SIZE), size then
serialize⟨T⟩(N, 0; buf , size, err);
if err = ESUCCESS then
aebm_write(v, sb.logleb, logoff , 0, PAGE_SIZE, buf ; err);
if err = ESUCCESS then logoff :+= PAGE_SIZE else logoff := PAGE_SIZE
superblock_is_commit_required(; doCommit)
doCommit := logoff = LEB_SIZE
superblock_commit(froot′, forphans′,flpa′; err)
let sb′ = switch(sb, froot′, volsize), buf in
. . . // Unmap and map the LEBs for the new log and for lpa′ and forphans′
. . . // Write lpa′ and forphans′
. . . // Serialize sb′ to buf
aebm_change(v, 0,# buf , buf ; err); // Unmap other LEBs
Figure 12.11: Component Superblock: Appending LEBs to the Log and Commit (error-
handling omitted for commit)
after a power failure due to the crash behavior of the erase block manager. This ensures
that the new log is empty and all other data structures are writable. In the next step the
new versions of the flash orphans forphans′ and the LPA lpa′ are written. Afterwards, the
superblock is exchanged atomically with the help of the erase block manager’s operation
aebm_change. Finally, the LEBs holding the old versions of the data structures may be
unmapped and are thereby free for reuse to the erase block manager.
The recovery from a power failure needs to read the superblock and afterwards the current
version of the log, the flash orphans and the LPA. These data structures are then returned
to the client components’ recovery operations.
All other operations that access logical erase block l just call the corresponding operation
of the subcomponent AEBM with the volume identifier v and the LEB sb.mainleb + l.
Theorem 15 (Correctness & Crash-Safety of Commit). The component Superblock refines
the specification Commit.
Proof. The abstraction relation between the component Superblock with its subcompo-
nent AEBM and the specification component Commit essentially states that the values for
the existential quantifiers of Invariant (superblock-inv) correspond to the state variables of
the component Commit of the same name.
abstraction relation (superblock-abs)
# lebs + sb.mainleb = # avols[v] ∧ lebs = avols[v][sb.mainleb..]
∧ serialized⟨List⟨N⟩⟩(logblocks, avols[v][sb.logleb].data)
∧ · · ·
The abstraction relation (superblock-abs) additionally ensures that the contents of the volume
after the LEB sb.mainleb are exposed to the client. Note that the behavior during a power
failure just propagates upwards from component AEBM to component Commit. The main
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difficulty during the invariant and refinement proofs is ensuring that changes to one data
structure do not invalidate any other data structure.
For the refinement proof of commit it has to be shown that failure leads to no change in
the abstract state. This is guaranteed since all writes before the aebm_change operation on
the superblock are performed on the non-active version of the data structures. If the exchange
of the superblock fails, the old version of the superblock and all other data structures are still
intact. Otherwise, the new superblock is written correctly and the new versions are visible to
the client.
12.5 Related Work
The file system Bilbyfs [77, 11, 9] uses a write-buffer similar to the one considered in this
thesis. Bilbyfs ensures that only sequential writes are performed by the file system. The
verification of crash-safety and the correctness of recovery still remains future work. It is,
however, proven that iget and sync are functionally correct with respect to a specification
of AFS similar to the one of Flashix. In order to specify the correctness of write-back caching
on the level of AFS, Amani [9] stores a list of higher-order state transformers that capture
each of the AFS operations explicitly.
The verified file system FSCQ [27, 28, 26] features a journal that caches writes across
several POSIX operations, too. Their model of a hard disk is more general than our model of
flash hardware with respect to power failures. It allows the magnetic disk to asynchronously
write sectors and to re-order the writes. The effect of these caches is modeled explicitly in
FSCQ, too.
Flashix employs the write-buffer primarily to cope with the limitations of flash hardware.
The write-buffer caches until a page-aligned write is possible, i.e., the purpose of the write-
buffer in Flashix is not necessarily to achieve better performance. In order to improve the
performance, the write-back caches of VFS should be used in the future by Flashix. These
write-back caches are, however, not in the scope of this thesis, but are currently being
modeled and proven correct. The operations-based view of the write-buffer in Flashix has the
advantage that it propagates upwards the entire refinement hierarchy implicitly and that the
specification mechanism is easier to understand and to validate than an explicit, state-based
specification of a crash.
FSCQ uses two allocators, one for disk blocks and one for inodes, which are stored on
the hard disk. This is similar to the LPA data structure of Flashix. However, it is possible
to overwrite the on-disk version of the data structure when modifications are performed. In
Flashix these data structures are write-back cached due to the limitations of flash hardware.
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13
Concurrent, Crash-Aware Components & Refinement
Summary. This chapter first revisits Lipton’s theory of reductions on a simple
lock-based example. Lipton reductions facilitate composing atomic blocks by proving
commutations about individual program parts of a concurrent system. The resulting
system has the same observable and termination behavior as the original system.
This approach integrates well with atomicity refinement of sequential components of
Ch. 5, where only atomicity with respect to power failures is considered. This chapter
extends atomicity refinement to non-retracting, concurrent components by leveraging
Lipton reductions. In practice, most of the commutations are inferred automatically by
providing a set of ownership annotations and proving that the ownership discipline is
adhered to. An ownership annotation for (part of) a data structure essentially states,
which locks must be held in order to access it. After a component is abstracted with
an atomicity refinement based on ownership annotations, it consists mostly of atomic
blocks as shown for the erase block manager in Ch. 14. The resulting system has
stronger invariants and for the remaining non-atomic operations and the recovery
operation a direct proof of linearizability with respect to an abstract specification
becomes feasible.
Publications. This chapter extends our previous work on crashes [107, 47] by
integrating atomicity refinement of Ch. 5 with Lipton reductions.
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13.1 Approach
The general approach for the development of a concurrent, crash-aware system is similar to
that of a sequential, crash-aware system as shown by Fig. 13.1.
We start out with a concurrent component C . We incrementally increase the atomicity
with respect to power failures and concurrency via an atomicity refinement integrated with
Lipton reductions. This yields a component C ′. Opportunities for Lipton reductions are
inferred mostly automatically based on annotations of ownership. The annotations lead to
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Figure 13.1: Refinement Approach for
Concurrent, Crash-Aware Components
assertions in the program that are proven
by a rely/guarantee as shown in Sec. 4.6.
The rely/guarantee proof also establishes
divergence-freedom of the component.
Divergence-freedom is a necessary con-
dition in order to increase the atomicity
with respect to power failures, because
crash-introducibility of Ch. 5 requires the
existence of a terminating execution with
a final state that subsumes the crash be-
havior of an intermediate state.
Afterwards, a proof of linearizability,
or, in the case where all operations are
already atomic, data refinement becomes
possible, because the invariants are now
strong enough to prove a commuting dia-
gram for the reset transition of the com-
ponent.
The implementation of ownership annotations, Lipton reductions and the inference of
atomic sections was implemented as part of this thesis in the interactive proof assistant KIV
and constitutes part of the contribution of this thesis.
This chapter is structured as follows. Sec. 13.2 first provides an example of a concurrent
component and applies standard Lipton reductions to it. Sec. 13.3 extends Lipton reductions
with additional proof obligations ensuring that atomicity with respect to power failures is
also guaranteed. Sec. 13.4 shows how ownership annotations gives opportunities for applying
Lipton reductions automatically for lock-based concurrency. Annotations of ownership are
also employed to provide synchronization across the boundaries of components. This decreases
the need for additional locks in subcomponents, when the client component already takes
care of synchronization.
13.2 A Concurrent Counter & Lipton Reductions
Fig. 13.2 shows how mutexes and reader/writer locks are modeled with the help of atomic
blocks. The mutex data structure itself stores the thread identifier of the thread owning the
mutex. This facilitates the expression of relies and invariants for the verification. The figure
shows the standard interface of mutexes with a procedure for locking and one for unlocking.
The lock procedure waits until the mutex is free and then locks it atomically. For unlocking
we have to ensure that the mutex is actually locked by the current thread and afterwards
the mutex is set to free. The assertion ensures compatibility with the POSIX standard [3].
Reader/writer locks are specified similarly in the figure with the additional function readers,
which returns the set of threads that have acquired read access, and includes a writer if one
is present. The predicate _.readers? returns true if the reader/writer lock is constructed by
the constructor readers. A writer has exclusive access, i.e., the thread may always read and
write.
Fig. 13.4 shows a concurrent counter (left-hand side) implemented as a concurrent
component. The increment operations returns the new value of the counter to the caller.
The operation is protected from interference of other threads with a simple mutex. The
thread identifier is implicitly given as an additional read-only state variable for concurrent
components. The right-hand side of the figure shows the same counter after applying Lipton’s
theory of reductions. The increment operation consists of one atomic block that blocks until
the mutex is free and afterwards the entire operation is performed in one indivisible step.
Note that in this component the invariant that the mutex is free always holds, since the
single step of the operation inc starts and ends in a state where the mutex is free. Therefore,
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data type mutex = free | locked(Tid : ThreadId)
mutex_lock(Tid; Mut)
atomic Mut = free { Mut := locked(Tid) }
mutex_unlock(Tid; Mut)
assert Mut = locked(Tid); Mut := free
data type rwlock = readers(tids : Set⟨ThreadId⟩) | writer(Tid : ThreadId)
rwlock_rlock(Tid; Rwl)
atomic Rwl.readers? { Rwl := readers(Rwl.readers ++ Tid) }
rwlock_wlock(Tid; Rwl)
atomic Rwl = readers(∅) { Rwl := writer(Tid) }
rwlock_runlock(Tid; Rwl)
atomic Rwl.readers? ∧ Tid ∈ Rwl.readers { Rwl := readers(Rwl.readers -- Tid) }
rwlock_wunlock(Tid; Rwl)
assert Rwl = writer(Tid);Rwl := readers(∅)
Figure 13.2: Mutex and Reader/Writer-Lock Specification with Atomic Blocks
the implementation can be simplified further by removing the guard of the atomic block. The
component Counter ′ is a specification component in the sense that every operation takes
exactly one atomic step. Thus, sequential reasoning is applicable to show for example that
Counter ′ refines another component with a data refinement or crash refinement of Ch. 5.
Lipton [87] developed conditions, which are sufficient to combine several statements into
one atomic block. The idea is that statements of one thread may be reordered in the global
interleaving of the component, if they commute with all other statements of all other threads.
Lipton distinguished statements that commute to the left, right and in both directions, and
called them left-, right- and both-mover accordingly. Acquiring a mutex or reader/writer lock
is a right-mover and releasing is a left-mover. If locks are used correctly then all statements in
the critical section are both-movers. If in a program { p; q } the statement p is a right-mover,
then it is always possible to construct an execution of all threads with the property that the
transitions of p are directly adjacent to the first transition of q.








atomic { p; q }
Figure 13.3: Program p commutes
to the right of p′ and q′
Fig. 13.3 shows an example with two
threads. The first executes { p; q } and is
depicted in red in the figure. The other
thread executes { p′; q′ }. The figure shows
an interleaving I = (s0, s1, s2, s3, s4) of
the entire system at the bottom. The
first thread is scheduled for the first and
last transition. If p is a right-mover,
then the alternative interleaving I ′ =
(s0, s′1, s′2, s3, s4) shown in the figure also
exists. Note that the alternative scheduling
reaches the same final state, and each of the statements p′, q′ and p has the same effect (due
to commutation), just in a different order. Thus, the observable behavior of both interleav-
ings is the same. Interestingly, the alternative interleaving, or more precisely the interval
I ′′ = (s0, s′1, s′2, s4), is an interleaving of another system, namely the system where the first
thread executes the program atomic { p; q }. Note that this contraction of two transitions
into one also preserves observable behavior. The knowledge that a statement is a mover in a
certain direction allows us to systematically reduce the set of interleavings that need to be
considered during verification.
In order to prove that a program p commutes to the right, the proof obligation (right mover)
must be shown for all statements p′ of other threads where x are the free variables of p and
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concurrent component Counter








concurrent component Counter ′
state Cnt : N,Mut : mutex
invariant Mut = free
interface operations
inc(; Cnt0)







Figure 13.4: A Concurrent Counter before (left) and after (right) Applying Lipton Reductions
p′.
⟨p; p′⟩ x = x1 ⊢ ⟨p′; p⟩ x = x1 (right mover)
The proof obligation omits several details discussed in Sec. 13.3.
For lock-based programs oftentimes it is not necessary to prove that the alternative inter-
leaving I ′ and I ′′ exists for the initial interleaving I, but that the initial interleaving does not
inc(; Cnt0)
mutex_lock(Tid; Mut);
assert Mut = locked(Tid); Cnt0 := Cnt;
assert Mut = locked(Tid); Cnt0 :+= 1;
assert Mut = locked(Tid); Cnt := Cnt0;
mutex_unlock(Tid; Mut);
Figure 13.5: Assertions for the
Component Counter
exist in the first place and we can there-
fore safely assume that parts of the pro-
gram are executed atomically. More for-
mally, we will usually show that the an-
tecedent of proof obligation (right mover)
already evaluates to false. The basic idea
is to use assertions φ and ψ that hold
before the execution of p and p′, respec-
tively, and to show that if assertion φ
holds in an initial state s and p is exe-
cuted, then the resulting state can not
satisfy the assertion ψ, too.
Now reconsider the example of a concurrent counter in Fig. 13.4. The component annotated
with assertions is shown in Fig. 13.5. We first show with the invariant proofs of Ch. 4 that
the assertions hold. Afterwards, we prove that all statements in the critical section are
both-movers.
More formally, we prove that each of the programs1
p0 ≡ {assert mut = locked(tid0); cnt0 := cnt; },
p1 ≡ {assert mut = locked(tid0); cnt0 :+= 1; }, and
p2 ≡ {assert mut = locked(tid0); cnt := cnt0; }
executed by the first thread commutes in both directions with every program
p′0 ≡ {assert mut = locked(tid1); cnt′0 := cnt; },
p′1 ≡ {assert mut = locked(tid1); cnt′0 :+= 1; }, and
p′2 ≡ {assert mut = locked(tid1); cnt := cnt′0; }
executed by some other thread. Note that the thread identifier tid1 used in the programs
p′0, p
′
1 and p′2 is distinct from the thread identifier tid0, and that local variables, such as cnt0,
1Note that lower case, static variables are used, because dynamic logic only proof obligations only use
static variables
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are renamed properly. With these programs proof obligation (right mover) is trivial, since
the antecedent is inconsistent. It is not possible to satisfy the formula
mut = locked(tid0) ∧mut = locked(tid1)
given tid0 ̸= tid1. Note that p0, p1 and p2 trivially commute over the calls to mutex_lock
and mutex_unlock, because the assigned variables are disjoint.
inc(; Cnt0)
mutex_lock(Tid; Mut) : R;
Cnt0 := Cnt : B;
Cnt0 :+= 1: B;
Cnt := Cnt0 : B;
mutex_unlock(Tid; Mut) : L;
Figure 13.6: Mover Annotations
for the Component Counter
After these proofs, we annotate statements
and programs p with the their mover type, i.e., we
write p : L, p : R and p : B if we have proven that
p is a left-, right- and both-mover, respectively.
If we do not yet know whether p commutes at
all, but it is a statement executed atomically, we
write p : A. Fig. 13.6 shows this for the example of
the concurrent counter. Lipton observed that a se-
quence { p : R; q : R; q′ : L } can be replaced by an
atomic section with the blocking condition of the
atomic section p, if the statements q and q′ do not
block. This step yields the component Counter ′
shown in Fig. 13.4 on page 174, i.e., we have reached a specification component for the
example.
13.3 Atomicity Refinement with Lipton Reductions
The approach of Lipton [87] facilitates composing blocks that are atomic with respect to
concurrency, i.e., it shows that the input/output behavior of a concurrent component does
not change when several successive statements executed by one thread are replaced by an
atomic block consisting of those statements. However, it does not show that the behavior
during a power failure is preserved. In this section we integrate Lipton reductions in the
calculus for atomicity refinement of Ch. 5, in order to increase the atomicity of concurrent
components, until we have reached a specification component or are at least close to one.
First, let us revisit the argument of commuting program steps of different threads in
the context of power failures and a non-retracting component (see Def. 4.4 on page 28).
Fig. 13.7 shows the initial execution I = (s0, . . . , si, si+1, . . . , sn, sn+1) at the bottom. The
first thread executes the program { p; q } and is again depicted in red. Other threads execute
the statements p′. Assume that we have already proven that p is a right-mover and that q
is a left-mover. We are now trying to find an argument why we may replace the program
{ p; q } by atomic { p; q }. Since p is a right-mover, a state s′n−1 exists with the property that
it is reached from si by the statements q′ of the other threads and afterwards the program
p again yields state sn. The question now is why it is permissible to either remove p from
the execution before the reset transition or add q to the execution, i.e., why the dashed
arrows in the figure exist. Otherwise, we have not constructed the necessary execution of
atomic { p; q } and are therefore not allowed to replace { p; q } with an atomic block. However,
we have already seen criteria that ensure the existence of alternative executions in Ch. 5. If p
is crash-recover-retractable (see Def. 5.9 on page 54), then the transition s′n−1
Reset sn+1





In the following, we will formalize this insight and derive a calculus with Lipton reductions
for concurrent, crash-aware components. First, we need to define the set of programs p and q
where commutation is possible.2
2Lower case, static variables are used in Def. 13.1, because the programs are used in dynamic logic proof
obligations.
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Figure 13.7: Lipton Reductions & Crashes
Definition 13.1 (Atoms of Programs & Components). The set of atoms of a regular,
sequential program p, written At(p), contains a program with its associated assertion for
every non-stuttering transition of the program p, i.e., for every I |= p and every i < # I there
is a program q with I[i..i+1] |= q and q ∈ At(p) for every non-stuttering transition I[i..i+1].3
The set of atoms is defined by the equations
At(assert φ; x := t) =
{
assert φ; x := t
}
At(assert φ; if ψ then p else q) =
{
assert φ; b := ψ
}
∪At(p) ∪At(q)
At(assert φ; while ψ do { p; assert φ′ }) =
{
assert φ ∨ φ′; b := ψ
}
∪At(p)
At(assert φ; Proc(t; x)) =
{
assert φ; y′ := t
}
∪At(p{z ↦→ x})
At(assert φ; atomic ψ { p }) =
{
assert φ; atomic ψ { p }
}
At(assert φ; choose x with φ in p ifnone q) = At(p{x ↦→ y′}) ∪At(q) ∪
∪
{
choose* y′ with φy
′
x in y′′ := y′, b := true ifnone b := false
}
At(p; q) = At(p) ∪At(q)
for non-recursive procedures Proc with declaration Proc(y; z) { p } and globally fresh variables
b, b′ and y′. If the definition is not applicable to a program p we add an assertion of true,
i.e., At(p) is defined as At(assert true; p) in this case.
The atoms of a component C , written At(C ) is the union of the sets of atoms for the
program of every interface and internal operation.
Def. 13.1 makes tests and choices visible by assigning a globally fresh variable b accordingly.
For the program construct choose the variables need to be renamed in order to avoid clashes
and the choice of variables y′ is now observable, because the (free) variables y′′ carry their
value afterwards. Stuttering transitions, such as assertion failures or blocking, are omitted in
the atoms of a program, because other programs trivially commute over these steps.
Next we define the calculus to determine whether a program p with p ∈ At(C ) is a left-,
right-, both- or none-mover. Fig. 13.8 shows the rules of this calculus. The variables x are
the state variables of the component C and all its subcomponents. In contrast, y denotes
all free variables of p and q. The first premise asserts the criterion for crash atomicity. The
second premise of each of the rules is a dynamic logic proof obligation which ensures that
the program p commutes in the desired direction. The predicate R again denotes the crash
and subsequent recovery of component C , see (R-is-crash-recover) on page 50.




R as separate judgments, because
they do not compose sequentially, i.e., in a program { p; q } where inv ⊢ p :
↷
R and inv ⊢ q :
↶
R
holds, the entire program is atomic with respect to concurrency, however not atomic with
3More precisely, the program q must satisfy I[i..i+1] |= choose x in { q } , where x are the variables, which
are locally bound by choose-statements or procedure calls around p.
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inv ⊢ p :↷R
for all q ∈ At(C ):
tid ̸= tid ′, inv(x̂), ⟨q{tid ↦→ tid ′}; p⟩ y′ = y
⊢ ⟨p; q{tid ↦→ tid ′}⟩ y′ = y
L-Mover,
p ∈ At(C )inv ⊢ p :L
inv ⊢ p :↷R
for all q ∈ At(C ):
tid ̸= tid ′, inv(x̂), ⟨p; q{tid ↦→ tid ′}⟩ y′ = y
⊢ ⟨q{tid ↦→ tid ′}; p⟩ y′ = y ↷
R-Mover,
p ∈ At(C )inv ⊢ p :
↷
R
inv ⊢ p :↶R
for all q ∈ At(C ):
tid ̸= tid ′, inv(x̂), ⟨p; q{tid ↦→ tid ′}⟩ y′ = y
⊢ ⟨q{tid ↦→ tid ′}; p⟩ y′ = y ↶
R-Mover,
p ∈ At(C )inv ⊢ p :
↶
R




inv ⊢ p :B
φ, inv ⊢ x := t :↷R A-Assign
inv ⊢ {assert φ; x := t } :A
φ, inv ⊢ atomic { p } :↷R A-Atomic, if component C
of p divergence-freeinv ⊢ {assert φ; atomic { p } } :A
for all q ∈ At(p): inv ⊢ q : † †-Mover, for p ̸∈ At(C ),






inv ⊢ p : †
Figure 13.8: Calculus for Left/Right/Both/None-Movers
respect to crashes, since we may neither retract p nor introduce q in an execution where only
p is executed before the crash.
The rules for atomic none-movers (A) just show that a program is executed in one atomic
step, which is the case if it is an assignment or an atomic statement without guard in a
component C that is proven to be divergence-free, i.e., does not have any infinite computations.
For programs that are not executed in one atomic step, the rule †-Mover lifts the judgment
to regular, sequential programs p.
As we have already seen in Ch. 6, we prove that all steps of a component are crash-
recover-introducible, which immediately proves the first premise for any judgment inv ⊢ p :L,
inv ⊢ p :
↷
R and inv ⊢ p :A.
Def. 13.2 defines the sequences of statements that may be combined into an atomic block.
Definition 13.2 (Reducible Program). A program p is reducible if every finite sequence
of atoms p0; . . . ; pn it executes can be split into a (possibly empty) prefix p0, . . . , pi and a
(possibly empty) suffix pi+1, . . . pn that satisfy (1.) to (4.).
1. inv ⊢ { p1; · · · ; pi } :
↷
R or inv ⊢ { p1; · · · ; pi } :
↶
R holds, and
2. inv ⊢ pi+1 :A or inv ⊢ pi+1 :L holds, and
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3. inv ⊢ { pi+2; · · · ; qn } :L holds, and
4. the atoms pi for 2 ≤ i ≤ n never block
Several examples should illustrate the concept of a reducible program. The program
p ≡ p1; p2 ≡ atomic φ { x := 1 } :
↷
R; x := 2: L
is reducible, because the only sequence of atoms is given by p1; p2 itself, the sequence obviously
has a corresponding split into a prefix and suffix p2 never blocks. More interesting is the case
of an if-statement where one branch is a none-mover. For example the program




y := 2: A;
else
x := 3: L;
x := 4: L;
is also reducible assuming b := φ :
↷
R holds. The program has the sequence
atomic φ { x := 1 } :
↷
R; b := φ :
↷
R; y := 2: A
and the sequence
atomic φ { x := 1 } :
↷
R; b := φ :
↷
R; x := 3: L; x := 4: L;
as the only possible sequences of atoms. Each sequence admits a split that satisfies Def. 13.2.
Thm. 16 extends the atomicity refinement of Ch. 5 to non-retracting, concurrent compo-
nents.
Theorem 16 (Atomicity Refinement of Retraction-Free, Concurrent Components). Given a
reducible program p of a non-retracting and divergence-free component C with concurrent
invariant inv, then
C{p ↦→ atomic φ { p }} ⊑ C
holds, where φ is the guard of the first statement of p if it is an atomic block or φ ≡ true
if the first statement is not an atomic block, and C{p ↦→ atomic φ { p }} is divergence-free
with invariant inv.
Proof. Divergence-freedom of C ensures that we may assume that every execution of p
reachable in C terminates.
Given a finite execution I of the concurrent component C . The proof considers two cases.
First, assume inv ⊢ { p1; · · · ; pi } :
↷
R holds where i is chosen according to Def. 13.2. For all
partial executions of p we add a crash-recover-subsuming execution, which is guaranteed by
the definition of crash-recover-introducibility (Def. 5.10 on page 54), for the remaining steps
of p, either at the end of I if no reset transition follows or before the next reset transitions,
and get an interval I ′. By the choice of the additional steps, the reset transitions remain
valid. We then commute the programs in the corresponding directions towards pi+1 until
they are executed in direct sequence. A contraction of these transitions into one yields the
final interval I ′′ that is a run of the component C{p ↦→ atomic φ { p }}.
Now consider the case where inv ⊢ { p1; · · · ; pi } :
↶
R holds. Here we commute all partial
executions where pi+1 was never reached towards the next reset transition (or at the end
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of the interval). We then remove these steps from the interval and get an interval I ′. The
reset transitions still remain valid, because all pj with 0 ≤ j ≤ i are crash-recover-retractable.
Afterwards, we continue as in the first case.
For infinite executions I we may assume that there are no partial executions of p after the
last reset transition, because we assume weak-fair scheduling as the semantics of concurrent
components. Partial executions before the last reset are treated similarly as in the finite
case.
Note that Thm. 16 does not yet cover retracting components. However, it is possible to
extend the proof obligations in future work as explained in the following. Two issues need to
be addressed. First, commutations may not introduce additional synchronized states into the
run. Take Fig. 13.3 on page 173 where program p is a right-mover as an example. We need to
ensure that state s′1 is only synchronized if s2 is and that state s′2 is only synchronized if state
s3 is. Then all retraction possible in the original run in the figure are also possible in the
alternative run, with an additional retraction of the operation p. Basically, right-movers may
be re-ordered to the right of synchronized states. For left-movers it needs to be shown that
they are never re-ordered to the left of a synchronized state. Second, if additional transitions
are added to the run, then they may not add synchronized states, i.e., the definition crash-
recover-introducible needs to be amended by also showing that the crash-recover-subsuming
execution only “weakens” synchronization, and therefore that in the example of Fig. 13.7 on
page 176 the additional transition of q does not introduce an additional synchronized state
s′n, if sn is not synchronized. This extension is, however, not in the scope of this thesis.
The theorem ensures that the innermost lock mut can be replaced by an atomic section
with a guard mut = free. The resulting component usually has the invariant mut = free, if
locks are nested properly. With Lem. 13.3 we can remove this guard entirely without altering
the semantics.
Lemma 13.3 (Removal of Atomic Guards). If component C has a concurrent invariant inv
with inv(x̂) ⊢ φ, then C{atomic φ { p } ↦→ atomic { p }} ⊑ C holds.
Afterwards, the atomic section atomic { p } is an atomic none-mover (A) and further
applications of Thm. 16 are possible with q′ of the theorem chosen as q′ ≡ atomic { p }.
13.4 Ownership Annotations & Invariant Expressions
In practice, adding assertions to a large component and proving commutations is rather
cumbersome. We automate this process by adding an ownership annotation to the entire com-
ponent. In the example of the concurrent counter Sec. 13.2 the annotation (ownership-counter)
is added.
Cnt owned by Mut.ownership (ownership-counter)
The general form of the annotation is shown in (ownership), where the free variables of the
left-hand side a are the state variables X of the component and some additional variables y.
a(X , y) owned by o(X , y) (ownership)
The expression a(X , y) must be a readable and writable location, i.e., it must be allowed as
a left-hand side of an assignment. Equation (accessor-form) gives a grammar for the allowed
expressions. Essentially, a variable x , access to a field a.field of an instance a of a data type,
access to the element a[n] of an array a, and access to the value a[key] of a map a under the
key key is allowed.
a := x | a.field | a[n] | a[key] (accessor-form)
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Another example for a potential left-hand side is the access to the mapping of the erase block
manager of Ch. 10. There Vols[v][l] is used to access the physical erase block number of the
logical erase block ⟨v, l⟩.
The right-hand side o(X , y) of the ownership annotation (ownership) may only use the
state variables X and the variables y bound by the left-hand side of the ownership annotation.
Furthermore, the type of expression o(X , y) must be the type Owner.
We call the right-hand side the owner expression of the field on the left-hand side. The
idea is that the owner expression stores, which thread currently has access privileges for the
field. A thread with identifier may only read or write the field if the owner expression of the
field grants access.
data type Owner = readers(tids : Set⟨ThreadId⟩) | writer(tid : ThreadId)
Owner expressions allow only a single writer and multiple readers concurrently, by definition.
We write read?(Tid, o) and write?(Tid, o), if the owner expression o grants thread Tid read
and write access, respectively.
read?(Tid, o) ↔
{
Tid ∈ tids if o = readers(tids)
Tid = Tid ′ if o = writer(Tid ′)
write?(Tid, o)↔ o = writer(Tid)
Mutex and reader/writer locks are the standard way to acquire and release ownership.
We therefore define a canonical way to derive an owner expression from a mutex mut and
reader/writer lock rwl with the function ownership.
mut.ownership =
{
readers(∅) if mut = free
writer(Tid) if mut = locked(Tid)
rwl.ownership =
{
readers(tids) if rwl = readers(tids)
writer(Tid) if rwl = writer(Tid)
Consider the example of the concurrent counter of Fig. 13.4 on page 174 and its ownership
annotation (ownership-counter) from above. The ownership annotation states that if the
mutex is locked, then the thread holding the mutex has acquired read and write ownership for
the state variable cnt. Conversely, once a thread releases the mutex, the thread relinquishes
its ownership, too.
The annotations are leveraged in three ways. First, they allow for canonical assertions
that ensure that for each access of a field of a thread, the thread has the required ownership.
Second, two canonical rely conditions are implied by the annotations, namely if a thread
has read access for a field, then the field is unchanged, and that other threads Tid ′ may not
change the ownership the thread Tid has. Third, if a program p only accesses fields with an
owner expression (and does not change the value of the owner expression), local variables
or the input and output variables to an operation, then the program is immediately a both
mover, i.e., inv ⊢ p : B holds (assuming that p is also introducible). Another advantage of
ownership annotations is that they imply that the program is data-race free, i.e., that there
are no two concurrent writers to a field, which can not directly be proven directly with the
rely/guarantee calculus, since the calculus can not detect assignments of the form x := x.
Ownership Assertions We first discuss briefly the process of adding ownership assertions
based on an ownership annotation of the form (ownership) for regular, sequential programs. For
each read access a(X , t), where t is a substitution for y of the ownership annotation (ownership)
in conditions and guards of if -, while- and choose statements, an assertion of the form
assert read?(Tid, o(X , t))
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is added in front of the statement itself and as the first statement in its body, i.e., for
if -statements the assertion is added in the if-branch and in the else-branch. For while-loops
the assertion is also added at the end of the body. The guard of atomic statements may not
contain fields with an owner expression. And choose-statements may not quantify over fields
with an owner expression. For example the statement
choose v, l with Vols[v][l] = . . . in { p }
is disallowed, if there is an owner expression for Vols[v][l], since it is not possible to find
out for which fields Vols[v][l] access is required. For assignments a(X , t) := t′ where the
left-hand side has an owner expression, the assertion
assert write?(Tid, o(X , t))
is added before and after the assignment. Additional assertions are added for read accesses
in a(X , t) and t′. For calls Proc(t; X , z) where X are the state variables of the component C
and the call is within the component C , assertions for read accesses in t are added. Note that
z can not contain a field with an ownership expression, since it can not contain any state
variables of the component. For calls Proc(t; Y , z) to a subcomponent A with state variables
Y , the output parameters z may contain state variables of C with an owner expression and
an assertion for write access is added, additionally a proof obligation is generated, which
ensures that the write access is maintained throughout the entire call.
Assertions are also added to the body of atomic sections and atomic sections with a body
that modifies an ownership expression is disallowed. Note that the restrictions introduced here
are usually given in implementation components, and therefore do not limit the approach.
Rely Condition The canonical rely condition associated with an ownership annota-
tion (ownership) is given by formula (ownership-rely). The formula states that if the thread
has read access for a field, then the field is unchanged over the steps of other threads. Similarly,
other threads do neither add nor remove read or write access privileges from a thread.(









∀y. write?(o(X ′, y),Tid ′)↔ write?(o(X ′′, y),Tid ′)
)
Both-Mover Once the invariant proofs of Ch. 4 are completed and the above assertions
hold, all programs p that only access fields with an owner expression, local variables or the
input/output parameters of the operation are both-movers, i.e., inv ⊢ p :B holds, assuming
that φ, inv ⊢ p :↷ is already proven.4 The reason is that the assertions prove that before
and after every step each thread has the necessary permissions to access the fields. If steps of
separate threads are adjacent in the global interleaving then they must both be readers of all
the fields. Then the two steps obviously commute.
In the example of the counter of Fig. 13.5 on page 174, it only needs to be shown explicitly
that the judgments
mutex_lock(Tid; mut) : R and mutex_unlock(Tid; mut) : L
hold. The final component Counter ′ shown in Fig. 13.4 on page 174 is then inferred auto-
matically.
4Note that allocation and deallocation of fields is omitted from the discussion and these operations are
not automatically both-movers. In concurrent components these operations need to be marked as such. Then
only ownership directly after the allocation and directly before the deallocation is asserted, and it is not
automatically inferred that the statement is a both-mover.
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13.5 Related Work
Refinement and abstraction of atomicity is quite common for concurrent systems. Thm. 16 is
essentially an extension of Lipton reductions [87] to crash-aware, concurrent systems. The
refinement calculus of Back [14] uses the opposite direction. It starts out with an atomic
program and splits it into smaller actions in refinement steps.
The calculus of atomic actions due to Elmas et al. [42] is also an extension of Lipton’s
approach for highly concurrent, linearizable programs. The calculus does not consider crashes.
However, it provides a more incremental verification methodology than the calculus of
this chapter for highly concurrent systems. The assertions and invariants are incrementally
validated in [42], whereas here a rely/guarantee proof is used to validate them before applying
any reductions. The reason is that for the lock-based concurrency considered in this thesis,
a more automated approach that automatically detects both-movers based on ownership
annotations, is preferable to the fine-grained approach of the calculus of atomic actions. The
latter is more geared towards highly concurrent algorithms and data structures. Several rules
of the calculus in [42] do not preserve liveness. However, liveness is critical for the existence
of the crash-recover-subsuming execution used in Ch. 5 and Ch. 13 to increase the atomicity
with respect to power failures. A combination of the incremental approach of the calculus
of atomic actions and the additional criteria for reductions as discussed in this thesis is an
interesting avenue for future research. This is especially relevant with respect to the emerging
technology of byte-addressable Non-volatile Random Access Memory (= NVRAM). NVRAM
allows algorithms with the high degree of concurrency of traditional linearizable and lock-free
data structures to operate on persistent memory.
In the context of algorithms and data structures for NVRAM, in [69] the correctness
criterion (buffered) durable linearizability is introduced. It is proven that any non-blocking
data-race free program can be transformed into a program that is buffered durably linearizable.
A proof method of persist points, similar to linearization points, is proposed and proven
correct in [69], too. The method proposed in this thesis to increase the atomicity is orthogonal
to a direct proof of (buffered) durable linearizability with persist points.
Rely/Guarantee reasoning has the advantage that only linearly many proof obligations
need to be shown whereas for a direct proof of commutation in the calculus of atomic actions
or the Owicki-Gries-Method [104, 105] a proof of quadratically many proof obligations is
necessary.
Ownership annotations are used in the C verifier VCC [32] and Spec# [70] in order to
ensure data-race freedom of the code. Fractional permissions [19] in concurrent versions of





Summary. This Chapter applies the specification and proof methodology of Ch. 13
to the model of the erase block manager of Ch. 10. Ownership annotations and
additional rely conditions for the specification components AEBM and EBM Headers
are discussed. The implementation of the erase block manager is augmented with
locks to guarantee correct synchronization between threads. It is proven that atomicity
refinement of Ch. 13 with Lipton reductions yields a component that is almost atomic
and where a standard forward simulation is applicable to prove refinement. In summary,
this allows the Flashix file system to perform wear-leveling and asynchronous erasure
in a separate thread, concurrently to read and write requests.
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14.1 Specification of a Concurrent Erase Block Manager
The specification of a concurrent erase block manager is given by the component AEBM
augmented with ownership annotations. Fig. 14.1 depicts the state and invariants of the
component.
As an additional ghost state variable ovols is added, which stores the ownership information
for each erase block by (ownership-AEBM ), i.e., which thread currently has read or write
access privileges.
avols[v][l] owned by ovols[v][l] (ownership-AEBM )
Ghost state is omitted during code generation and only used for the verification. The only
restriction for ghost state is that it may not influence the control flow of the component and
the data stored in the “normal” state. In the case of component hierarchies ghost state is used
to propagate synchronization performed by a client component to the subcomponent. For
example, a client of the erase block manager has to ensure that no two writes are performed
on the same erase block concurrently. The reason is the limitation to sequential writes only.
More formally, it is necessary to ensure that preconditions are stable over steps of other
threads. Write access has the precondition that the offset of the write is above the field
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concurrent component AEBM
state avols : V ↦→ Array⟨Leb⟩
ghost state ovols : V ↦→ Array⟨Owner⟩
ownership
avols[v][l] owned by ovols[v][l]
concurrent invariant
avols-inv(avols) ∧ dom(ovols) = dom(avols) ∧ ∀v. # avols[v] = # ovols[v]
rely
dom(avols′′) = dom(avols′) ∧ ∀v. # avols′′[v] = # avols′[v]
interface operations
aebm_rlock(v, l)
pre ⟨v, l⟩ ∈ ovols
if ovols[v][l].readers? then ovols[v][l] := readers(ovols[v][l].tids ++ tid);
aebm_wlock(v, l)
pre ⟨v, l⟩ ∈ ovols
if ovols[v][l] = readers(∅) then ovols[v][l] := writer(tid);
aebm_unlock(v, l)
pre ⟨v, l⟩ ∈ ovols
if tid ∈ ovols[v][l].readers then ovols[v][l] := unlock(ovols[v][l], tid);
aebm_read(v, l, poff , boff , len; buf , err)
pre ⟨v, l⟩ ∈ avols ∧ poff + len ≤ LEB_SIZE ∧ boff + len ≤ # buf ∧ read?(ovols[v][l], tid)
{ buf := copy(avols[v][l].data, poff , buf , boff , len), err := ESUCCESS }
∨ { fail(; err) }
aebm_write(v, l, poff , boff , len, buf ; err)
pre ⟨v, l⟩ ∈ avols ∧ avols[v][l].mapped? ∧ poff + len ≤ LEB_SIZE ∧ boff + len ≤ # buf
∧ page-aligned(poff ) ∧ page-aligned(len) ∧ avols[v][l].written ≤ poff
∧ write?(ovols[v][l], tid)
{ avols[v][l] := mapped(avols[v][l].data[0..poff ] + buf [boff ..(boff + len)]
+ empty-array(LEB_SIZE− (poff + len)), poff + len);
err := ESUCCESS }
∨ { choose len0 with len0 = 0 ∨ len0 < len ∧ page-aligned(len0) in
if len0 ̸= 0 then
avols[v][l] := mapped(avols[v][l].data[0..poff ] + buf [boff ..(boff + len0)]
+ empty-array(LEB_SIZE− (poff + len0)), poff + len0);
fail(; err) }
...
Figure 14.1: Abstract Specification of a Concurrent Erase Block Manager
written of the logical erase block. This precondition is stable only if other write accesses are
not issued by the client concurrently.
In order to acquire access to a logical erase block the additional operations aebm_rlock,
aebm_wlock, aebm_unlock are added to the interface operations. Note that ownership is only
acquired by a thread calling aebm_rlock and aebm_wlock if, in the context of the client,
it can be shown that the condition ovols[v][l].readers? and ovols[v][l] = readers(∅) of the
if -statement hold at the time of the call, respectively. A similar case is discussed for the
erase block manager in Sec. 14.3. The algebraic function unlock(o, tid) removes the thread
identifier tid as a reader or writer of the ownership field o.
The operations to read, write, map, unmap and erase a logical erase block then have as
additional precondition that the calling thread has the required ownership. For example for
the operation aebm_read read access for the logical erase block is needed and ensured by the
184
Chapter 14 14.2. SPECIFICATION OF CONCURRENT HEADER SERIALIZATION
concurrent component EBM Headers
state apebs : Array⟨APeb⟩
ghost state opebs : Array⟨Owner⟩, oheaders : Owner
ownership
apebs[p].echdr owned by oheaders
apebs[p].vidhdr owned by oheaders
apebs[p].bad owned by oheaders
apebs[p].data owned by opebs[p]
apebs[p].written owned by opebs[p]
concurrent invariant
ebm-io-inv(apebs) ∧# apebs = # opebs
rely
# apebs′′ = # apebs′
∧ ∀p. read?(tid, opebs′[p])→ apebs′′[p].bad = apebs′[p].bad
∧ apebs′′[p].echdr = apebs′[p].echdr
∧ apebs′′[p].vidhdr = apebs′[p].vidhdr
interface operations
ebm_io_read_echeader(p; aehdr , isbflip, err)
pre p < # apebs ∧ ¬ apebs[p].bad ∧ read?(tid, oheaders)
ebm_io_write_echeader(p, aehdr ; err)
pre p < # apebs ∧ ¬ apebs[p].bad ∧ apebs[p].echdr = empty
∧ write?(tid, oheaders) ∧ write?(tid, opebs[p])
ebm_io_read_data(p, poff , boff , len; buf , isbflip, err))
pre p < # apebs ∧ ¬ apebs[p].bad ∧ . . . ∧ read?(tid, oheaders)
ebm_io_write_data(p, poff , boff , len, buf ; err)
pre p < # apebs ∧ ¬ apebs[p].bad ∧ apebs[p].echdr.valid? ∧ apebs[p].vidhdr.valid?
∧ . . . ∧ write?(tid, oheaders) ∧ write?(tid, opebs[p])
...
Figure 14.2: Concurrent Component EBM Headers
additional precondition read?(ovols[v][l], tid).
The only simplification to the interface, compared to the sequential version in Fig. 10.2
on page 94, is that currently volume creation is performed in the initialization, which
matches the usage in the Flashix file system. The rely condition (rely-AEBM ) together
with the canonical rely (ownership-rely) on page 181 associated with the ownership annota-
tion (ownership-AEBM ) make a proof of stability of the preconditions and a proof of the
invariant possible (see Lem. 4.31 on page 43 for the proof obligations).
dom(avols′′) = dom(avols′) ∧ ∀v. # avols′′[v] = # avols′[v] (rely-AEBM )
14.2 Specification of Concurrent Header Serialization
The erase block manager uses the subcomponent EBM Headers to write the EC- and VID-
header of each erase block. The component EBM Headers uses ownership annotations and
ghost state to profit from the synchronization provided by the erase block manager. However,
the ownership model is more complicated as shown in Fig. 14.2. The general idea is that
access to the EC- and VID-header and the flag bad is only performed by a single thread of
the client component EBM , whereas the data pages of an erase block may be accessed by
several threads concurrently.
The fields echdr, vidhdr and bad of each physical erase block are owned by the global
owner oheaders, whereas all other fields of the PEB p are owned by opebs[p]. An access to
the fields data and written for reading and writing therefore need to acquire ownership of
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concurrent component EBM
subcomponent EBM Headers (see Fig. 14.2 on page 185)
state vols : V ↦→ Array⟨PebMapping⟩, ppa : Array⟨PebProps⟩,
eraseq : List⟨EraseInfo⟩, sqnum : N, bflips : Set⟨N⟩, doWl : B
volspeb : N, free : Set⟨TreeEntry⟩, used : Set⟨TreeEntry⟩
glock : mutex, vollocks : V ↦→ Array⟨Rwl⟩
ghost state ovols : V ↦→ Array⟨Owner⟩
ownership
vols[v][l] owned by vollocks[v][l].ownership
ppa, eraseq, sqnum, bflips, doWl, volspeb, free, used owned by glock.ownership
rely
dom(vols′′) = dom(vols′) ∧
(








dom(vols) = dom(vollocks) = dom(ovols) ∧ (∀v. # vollocks[v] = # vols[v] = # ovols[v])
∧ inj(vols) ∧ (mapped-peb-valid) ∧ (ownership-transfer) ∧ (seq-inv)
Figure 14.3: Concurrent Component EBM : State, Invariants and Rely Conditions
the single PEB p via opebs[p] only. A read access to the headers and the flag bad requires
access granted by the global owner oheaders. For write access to those fields of a PEB p,
access granted by both oheaders and opebs[p] are required.
The rely condition given in Fig. 14.2 and the canonical rely condition (ownership-rely)
on page 181 associated with the ownership annotations of the figure again ensure that the
preconditions of all operations are stable over the steps of other threads and that the invariant
holds.
14.3 Concurrent Wear-Leveling
The erase block manager essentially uses two types of locks. One global mutex glock that
must be acquired if
• one of the state variables of the component EBM is written, or
• one of the unmapped physical erase blocks is written, or
• one of the headers or the flag bad of any physical erase block is read or written.
The second type of lock is a reader/writer lock vollocks[v][l] per logical erase block, which
guards reads and writes to the data pages of the mapped erase block. The order of locking is
that vollocks[v][l] is acquired before glock, in the case both locks need to be acquired.
Fig. 14.3 shows the state variables, invariants and rely conditions of the component. The
invariants and rely conditions ensure that for each logical erase block there always exists a
corresponding lock in vollocks. Technically, ownership of vols[v][l] is acquired by the lock
vollocks[v][l], however, write access is only performed when glock is also held. Therefore the
rely states that the entire forward mapping is unmodified if the mutex glock is held by the
thread. Note that interference is still possible, but essentially restricted to the physical erase
blocks when the lock glock is held.
The state variable ovols is inherited by the specification AEBM of the erase block manager
(Fig. 14.1 on page 184). It serves the same purpose, i.e., clients of the erase block manager
first acquire read and write access to a logical erase block before the corresponding read and
write operations may be called. Fig. 14.4 shows the implementation of each of the operations.
The figure also shows a simplified, concurrent version of the write operation. The green
parts of the code are added. First, the reader/writer lock for the logical erase block is acquired.
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interface operations
ebm_rlock(v, l)
pre ⟨v, l⟩ ∈ ovols
if* ovols[v][l].readers? then ovols[v][l] := readers(ovols[v][l].tids ++ tid);
ebm_wlock(v, l)
pre ⟨v, l⟩ ∈ ovols
if* ovols[v][l] = readers(∅) then ovols[v][l] := writer(tid);
ebm_unlock(v, l)
pre ⟨v, l⟩ ∈ ovols
if* tid ∈ ovols[v][l].readers then ovols[v][l] := unlock(ovols[v][l], tid);
ebm_write(v, l, poff , boff , len, buf ; err)
pre ⟨v, l⟩ ∈ vols ∧ vols[v][l].mapped? ∧ poff + len ≤ LEB_SIZE ∧ boff + len ≤ # buf
∧ page-aligned(poff ) ∧ page-aligned(len) ∧ vols[v][l].written ≤ poff
∧ tid ∈ ovols[l][v].writers
rwlock_wlock(tid; vollocks[v][l]) : R;
let p = vols[v][l].peb in
assert opebs[p] = readers(∅);
aebm_io_wlock(p) : R;
aebm_io_write_data(p, poff , boff , len, buf ; err);
assert opebs[p] = writer(tid);
aebm_io_unlock(p) : L;
rwlock_unlock(tid; vollocks[v][l]) : L;
Figure 14.4: Concurrent Component EBM : Acquiring and Releasing Ownership and Writing
to a Logical Erase Block
Afterwards, the mapping is read and ownership for the physical erase block is acquired. After
the actual write, ownership to the physical erase block is relinquished and the reader/writer
lock is released at the end. The precondition of the call to aebm_io_write_data is ensured
by Invariant (mapped-peb-valid).
concurrent invariant (mapped-peb-valid)
∀⟨v, l⟩ ∈ vols. vols[v][l] ̸= unmapped→ ¬ apebs[vols[v][l].peb].bad
∧ apebs[vols[v][l].peb].echdr.valid?
∧ apebs[vols[v][l].peb].vidhdr.valid?
As highlighted in the figure, before write may be called ownership to the logical erase block
has to be acquired via ebm_wlock. This ensures that the rest of the precondition of write is
stable over the steps of other threads, as shown next.
The rely condition associated with the ownership of a logical erase block in the compo-
nent EBM is given by (LEB-ownership). This ensures that if a client thread has acquired
read access to a logical erase block, then the mapped PEB may be changed, but whether or
not a mapping exists remains unchanged. This ensures that the precondition of ebm_map (see
Fig. 14.5 below) is stable over the steps of other threads. Additionally, the number of bytes
written to the currently mapped PEB may only decrease (due to wear-leveling), but may
never increase. This ensures that the precondition of ebm_write (see Fig. 14.4) is also stable.
rely (LEB-ownership)
∀⟨v, l⟩ ∈ vols′. tid ′ ∈ readers(ovols′[v][l])
→
(








14.3. CONCURRENT WEAR-LEVELING Chapter 14
interface operations
ebm_map(v, l; err)
pre ⟨v, l⟩ ∈ vols ∧ ¬ vols[v][l].mapped? ∧ tid ∈ ovols[l][v].writers
rwlock_wlock(tid; vollocks[v][l]) : R;
mutex_lock(tid; glock) : R;
let p = 0 in
ebm_allocate_peb(; p, err);
if err = ESUCCESS then
assert opebs[p] = readers(∅);
aebm_io_wlock(p) : R;
assert oheaders = readers(∅);
aebm_io_header_lock() : R;
aebm_io_write_vidheader(p, mkavidhdr(v, l, sqnum, 0, 0); err);
sqnum := sqnum + 1;
if err = ESUCCESS then
vols[v][l] := mapped(p), ppa[p].state := USED, used :+= tree-entry(p, ppa[p].ec);
else
ebm_asynchronous_erase(p, None);
assert oheaders = writer(tid);
aebm_io_header_unlock() : L;
assert opebs[p] = writer(tid);
aebm_io_unlock(p) : L;
mutex_unlock(tid; glock) : L;
rwlock_unlock(tid; vollocks[v][l]) : L;
Figure 14.5: Concurrent Component EBM : Mapping a Logical Erase Block
The only steps that change vols[v][l] are in during mapping, unmapping and wear-leveling.
During mapping and unmapping the thread that changes vols[v][l] holds write ownership to
ovols[v][l] and no other thread can hold read access and (LEB-ownership) becomes vacuous.
For wear-leveling the mapping is changed, but it is shown that the number of written bytes
does not increase (see Sec. 10.5). All other writes to a PEB p do not affect the mapped PEB
vols[v][l].peb, because 1) the forward mapping vols is always kept injective and therefore no
other concurrent write operation of a client modifies vols[v][l].peb, and 2) all internal writes
of the component only affect unmapped PEBs.
concurrent invariant inj(vols)
The operation ebm_read is analogous to ebm_write. The operation ebm_map is shown in
Fig. 14.5. It acquires both locks in order to gain access to all the internal data structures:
The PEB is allocate from the free tree free, its status is set USED in the PEB Property Array,
it is added to the used tree used or to the erase queue. In order to write the VID-header,
access to all headers is acquired via a call to aebm_io_header_lock and to the PEB p via
aebm_io_wlock.
Figures 14.5 and 14.4 depict the additional, user-supplied assertions and mover anno-
tation, too. The assertions hold when the execution reaches them, due to the additional
Invariant (ownership-transfer). The invariant ensures that the corresponding locks are taken
before access to the corresponding data pages of a PEB or the headers is requested.
concurrent invariant (ownership-transfer)
oheaders ⊆ glock.ownership
∧ ∀l ∈ unmapped-pebs(vols). opebs[l] ⊆ glock.ownership
∧ ∀⟨v, l⟩ ∈ vols. vols[v][l] ̸= unmapped→ opebs[vols[v][l].peb] ⊆ vollocks[v][l].ownership
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let from, avhdr , isbflip, err , isScrubbing in
mutex_lock(tid; glock) : R;
ebm_get_wear_leveling_source_peb(; from; err , isScrubbing);
if err = ESUCCESS then
assert oheaders = readers(∅);
aebm_io_header_lock() : R;
aebm_io_read_vidheader(from; avhdr , isbflip, err);
assert oheaders = writer(tid);
aebm_io_header_unlock() : L;
mutex_unlock(tid; glock) : L;
if err = ESUCCESS then
rwlock_wlock(tid; vollocks[avhdr .vol][avhdr .leb]) : R;
mutex_lock(tid; glock) : R;
...
mutex_unlock(tid; glock) : L;
rwlock_unlock(tid; vollocks[avhdr .vol][avhdr .leb]) : L;
Figure 14.6: Concurrent Component EBM : Wear-Leveling
where o0 ⊆ o1 is defined by
readers(tids0) ⊆ o1 ↔ tids0 = ∅ ∨ ∃tids1. tids0 ⊆ tids1 ∧ o1 = readers(tids1)
writer(tid0) ⊆ o1 ↔ o1 = writer(tid0)
The assertions ensure that the annotated mover type can be proven in a separate proof
obligation. For all other statements a both-mover is automatically inferred, since they only
use input/output parameters, local variables or state variables with ownership expression.
The other operations of the component are extended similarly. The only difficult operation
is wear-leveling as shown by Fig. 14.6. In order to read the VID-header of the source PEB,
it is necessary to take the global lock. After the mapping is read, the lock must first be
released. Then the lock of the mapping and the global lock are acquired, in this order to
ensure deadlock-freedom. Afterwards, it is checked that the mapping still points to the PEB
from, since an unmap operation could already have removed the PEB’s mapping. Only then
the actual wear-leveling is performed.
After atomicity refinement the wear-leveling operation essentially essentially consists of
two atomic blocks. The first block just reads some state and the core of wear-leveling is
performed in the second atomic block.
The Invariants (seq-inv) of the sequential verification of Ch. 10 still hold, however, only
if the global lock glock is free.1
concurrent invariant (seq-inv)
glock = free→ (ppa-inv) ∧ (unique-sqns) ∧ (vols-inv) ∧ (bflips-inv) ∧ (eraseq-no-dups)
∧ (eraseq-ppa-inv) ∧ (eraseq-mapping) ∧ (used-inv) ∧ (free-inv)
∧ (sqnum-inv) ∧ (vtbl-inv)
Note that this invariant is too weak for a direct proof of refinement for the reset transition. An
atomicity refinement, however, ensures that once the critical section protected by the global
1Note that additional rely conditions are necessary to ensure that PEB validity and maximality of
mapped PEBs is maintained by concurrent writers. It is also possible to use weaker invariants that omit the
inverse mapping entirely for the rely/guarantee proofs and establish the strong invariants after the atomicity
refinement with a sequential verification.
189
14.4. RELATED WORK Chapter 14
lock glock is atomic, the additional invariant glock = free holds and a proof of refinement of
the reset transition becomes possible.
Theorem 17 (Correctness & Crash-Safety of Concurrent Wear-Leveling). The concurrent
component EBM refines the concurrent component AEBM .
Proof. A proof of the obligations of Lem. 4.31 on page 43 implies that the invariants and
assertions hold, and that the component is divergence-free. Afterwards, a more atomic
component EBM ’ is extracted from component EBM by applying the Lipton reduction of
Thm. 16 on page 178 twice. In the first step the inner mutex glock yields atomic sections.
Afterwards, glock = free is an invariant and the guards of the atomic section can be
removed by Lem. 13.3 on page 179. A second application of Thm. 16 on page 178 yields the
component EBM ’ where all operations, except wear-leveling, are atomic and wear-leveling
essentially consists of two steps. By the theorem EBM ⊑ EBM ′ holds. The component EBM ′
then has the invariants that all locks vollocks[v][l] are free and the invariants of the sequential
component EBM of Ch. 10.
With the forward simulation (ebm-abs) on page 117 and the invariants inv of the se-
quential component EBM of Ch. 10 and the rely conditions of this chapter, we proof that
EBM ′ ⊑ AEBM holds. For all operations except wear-leveling we prove the standard data
refinement proof obligations of Thm. 3 on page 59. For wear-leveling we prove a commuting
diagram with the proof obligation (wl-refine), where CS denotes the combined state of compo-
nents EBM and EBM Headers, and AS is the state of the specification component AEBM .
□
(
inv(CS) ∧ inv(CS ′)
)
,□ rely(Tid ′,CS ′,CS ′′), abs(AS ,CS), (wl-refine)
□AS ′ = AS ,□Tid ′′ = Tid ′
⊢ ⟨abs(AS ′,CS ′)→ abs(AS ′′,CS ′′), abs(AS ,CS)→ abs(AS ′,CS ′),
true, false, ebm_wear_leveling(; CS)⟩CS,Tid true
The proof obligation shows that each of the steps of wear-leveling refines a skip step on the
abstract level and propagates the abstract relation forward.
14.4 Related Work
The flash file system by Damchoom et al. [39, 37, 36] has concurrent wear-leveling. The
synchronization between threads is implicitly performed by the semantics of Event-B models,
i.e., an event in an Event-B model is always executed atomically, and not explicitly via locks
or other synchronization primitives. This makes the step to actual running code more difficult
and less straightforward. The erase block management of this chapter is also more general,
because it does not use additional bits of out-of-band data of an erase block and all data
structures are stored on flash and recovered after a power failure.
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Summary, Lessons Learned & Outlook
Summary. This chapter summarizes the contributions of this thesis and the current
state of the Flashix project. Several lessons learned during the formal development of
Flashix are presented and discussed. The chapter concludes with an outlook for the
Flashix file system.
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15.1 Summary
This thesis contributes a novel semantics for concurrent, crash-aware components with
Def. 4.19 on page 34. The formalism integrates the state-based and operations-based inter-
pretation of a power failure. The state-based view is specified by a crash predicate, whereas
the operations-based view is characterized by synchronized states given by a synchronized
predicate.
Thm. 1 on page 42 shows that the semantics is compositional and refinement is preserved
by substitution under the condition of strong admissibility.
Theorem 1 (Compositionality). Given a non-retracting component C that is totally correct
with respect to a specification component A, i.e., A ⊑ C is satisfied, and a strongly admissible
component M with subcomponent A, then M ⊑ M{A ↦→ C} holds.
Compositionality is fundamental for a large-scale verification effort, because it facilitates
modular and scalable reasoning. It allows for a decomposition of the complete system into
smaller individual refinement steps, as shown in Fig. 6.1 on page 66 for the Flashix file
system.
Three distinct types of refinement are considered and applied in this thesis: atomicity
refinement, data refinement and crash refinement.
This thesis contributes a hierarchy of criteria, namely crash-recover-atomicity, crash-
recover-retractability, crash-recover-introducibility and crash-recover-neutrality, ensuring
that (part of) a component can be considered atomic with respect to power failures. The
corresponding notion of refinement is given by atomicity refinement and proven correct by
Thm. 2 on page 52 for sequential, crash-aware components.
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Theorem 2 (Atomicity Refinement of Sequential Components). If the program p is crash-
recover-atomic in the context of a component C, then C{p ↦→ atomic { p }} ⊑ C holds.
Atomicity refinement is extended to retraction-free, concurrent components by Thm. 16
on page 178, which combines the criteria for atomicity with respect to crashes with Lipton
reductions, a criterion for atomicity with respect to concurrent threads.
Theorem 16 (Atomicity Refinement of Retraction-Free, Concurrent Components). Given a
reducible program p of a non-retracting and divergence-free component C , then
C{p ↦→ atomic φ { p }} ⊑ C
holds, where φ is the guard of the first statement of p if it is an atomic block or φ ≡ true if
the first statement is not an atomic block.
The integration of Lipton reductions and ownership annotations to sufficiently automate
the approach of Thm. 16 into the tool KIV constitutes a contribution of this thesis, too.
Ownership annotations are used to automatically generate assertions, which are proven to
hold in a rely/guarantee proof. The assertions ensure that certain types of statements are
automatically classified as both-movers. A sequence of right- and left-movers can be combined
into an atomic section while maintaining liveness. The concept of movers is extended with
the atomicity criteria of Ch. 5 to ensure atomicity with respect to concurrent threads as well
as power failures. The increase in atomicity has the effect that stronger invariants can be
established afterwards. This makes a proof of data refinement possible. Especially the proof
obligation for the transition of the power failure and subsequent recovery only refines an
abstract specification given very strong invariants, as shown for the example of the erase
block manager in Ch. 10 and Ch. 14.
It is also proven by Thm. 3 on page 59 that standard data refinement carries over to
specification components with the novel semantics. Two additional proof obligations are
necessary. The first proof obligation ensures that a power failure with subsequent recovery
refines the abstract specification. The second proof obligation shows that synchronized
states are respected. The latter proof obligation is trivial to prove, but ensures that the
operations-based interpretation of power failure propagates over an entire component hierarchy
implicitly.
Theorem 3 (Data Refinement). A refinement A ⊑ C of two specification components A and
C is implied by a forward simulation abs(xA, xC ) satisfying the conditions (1.) to (5.).
...
4. syncA(xA) ∧ abs(xA, xC )→ syncC (xC )
5. abs(xA0 , xC0 ) ∧ crash
C (xC0 , xC1 )
→ ⟨|recoverC (; xC1 )|⟩
(
∃xA1 . crash
A(xA0 , xA1 ) ∧ ⟨recoverA(; xA1 )⟩ abs(xA1 , xC1 )
)
The operations-based interpretation is introduced into a component hierarchy by a novel
type of refinement named crash refinement. Thm. 4 on page 61 gives sufficient conditions
when (part of) the effect of the crash predicate can be reinterpreted in terms of synchronized
states characterized by the synchronized predicate.
Theorem 4 (Crash Refinement). Given two specification components A and C that only differ
in their crash and synchronized predicates. Then A ⊑ C is implied by the proof obligations






∧ crashC (x0, x1)→ crash
A(x0, x1)
2. syncA(x)→ syncC (x)
3. ⟨OpC (in; x0, out)⟩ crash
C (x0, x1)
→ crashC (x0, x1) ∨
(
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This thesis also contributes a novel correctness criterion (Def. 7.1 on page 81) for the
POSIX specification, termed quasi-sequential crash-consistency in the style of Bornholt et
al. [18].
The theory is applied to the Flashix file system. The component hierarchy of Flashix
is shown in Fig. 6.1 on page 66. For the entire file system two reductions given by Thm. 5
on page 72 and Thm. 6 on page 73 are used, which ensure that all components are crash-
introducible by a simple proof obligation about the specification subcomponents. Both
theorems extend previous work by the author’s colleague Ernst [43] by applying the more
general calculus for crash-atomicity presented in Ch. 5.
Theorem 5 (RAM Components & Atomicity). All operations of a RAM component M with
subcomponent A are crash-introducible (and thereby crash-atomic) if all operations of A are
crash-introducible.
Theorem 6 (Crash-Introducible Specification Components). An operation OpAi of a specifica-
tion component A with state x , precondition pre(in, x), invariant inv(x) and crash predicate
crash(x, x ′) is crash-introducible if the proof obligation
pre(in, x) ∧ inv(x) ∧ crash(x, x ′)→ ⟨OpAi (in; x, out)⟩ crash(x, x ′)
holds.
With respect to the Flashix file system, several of the components (see Fig. 6.1 on page 66
for an overview over the components) and their proof of correctness and crash-safety are
contributed by this thesis.
Thm. 7 on page 118 and Thm. 8 on page 120 show that the erase block manager is correct
and that wear-leveling improves the distribution of erase cycles across the flash device.
Theorem 7 (Correctness & Crash-Safety of Erase Block Management & Wear-Leveling). The
component EBM refines the component AEBM , and the component Header Serialization
refines the component EBM Headers.
Theorem 8 (Quality of Wear-Leveling). A successful run of wear-leveling leads to a better
distribution of erase counters.
Thm. 9 on page 135 shows that transactions are implemented correctly and are atomic
with respect to power failures, and that garbage collection is correct. Thm. 10 on page 140
proves that garbage collection chooses a reasonable block.
Theorem 9 (Correctness & Crash-Safety of Journaling & Garbage Collection). The compo-
nent Transactions refines the component Index &Journal.
Theorem 10 (Quality of Garbage Collection). The garbage collection algorithm of compo-
nent Transactions chooses a logical erase block with the least amount of bytes still referenced
by the RAM index.
Not only garbage collection of the journal is performed. The LEBs allocated for the index
are also garbage collected by the component Node Serialization and Thm. 11 on page 159.
Theorem 11 (No Unused Nodes After Commit). After the commit of the file system, no
unused LEBs are mapped.
The serialization of individual nodes is atomic with respect to crashes by Thm. 12 on
page 160.
Theorem 12 (Correctness & Atomicity of Node Serialization). The component Persistence is
refined by the component Node Serialization.
The write-buffer is also correct by Thm. 13 on page 162. Furthermore, Thm. 14 on
page 163 ensures the correctness of the switch from the state-based interpretation of the
crash behavior of the write-buffer to the operations-based interpretation.
Theorem 13 (Correctness & Crash-Safety of the Write-Buffer). The component Wbuf refines
the component Wbuf (State-based).
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Theorem 14 (State-Based & Operations-Based Interpretation of the Write-Buffer). The
component Wbuf (State-based) is a crash refinement of the component Wbuf (Op-based).
The operations-based interpretation is then the lever to propagate the effect of the crash
behavior of the write-buffer implicitly upwards the entire refinement hierarchy. This simplified
the specification and verification of all components above the write-buffer significantly. For
the two abstractions directly above the write-buffer (Persistence and Transactions) there is
a decrease of 40% resp. 17% of user interactions in the proofs (from 500 to 300 and from
1270 to 1050). Those are the only levels of abstraction where a verification without the
component semantics with implicit retractions was attempted. Note that at both levels it
was still naturally possible to express the effect of a power failure with the state-based view.
For all components above the component Transactions this is no longer possible, and it is
reasonable to expect a much larger saving with respect to specification and verification for
these components.
Thm. 15 on page 166 proves that the commit of the file system is atomic with respect to
crashes and functionally correct.
Theorem 15 (Correctness & Crash-Safety of Commit). The commit is performed atomically,
i.e., the component Superblock refines the specification Commit.
Finally, the theory of atomicity refinement of concurrent components is applied to the
erase block manager and shows that wear-leveling and asynchronous erasure can be performed
concurrently in the background by Thm. 17 on page 190.
Theorem 17 (Correctness & Crash-Safety of Concurrent Wear-Leveling). The concurrent
component EBM refines the concurrent component AEBM .
15.2 Lessons Learned
Data Abstraction & Refinement One general lesson throughout the specification and
verification of Flashix is that data abstraction and refinement are key ingredients for the
development of large software systems with formal methods. One issue with refinement and
abstraction, however, is the choice of the right “size” of steps.
On the one hand, a too small step might lead to a lot more specification that needs to be
maintained. One major factor in the development of Flashix is keeping all models and proofs
consistent throughout a large hierarchy of components. A similar observation is also made
in [88], which classifies patches for Linux file systems across several metrics, where around
half of the patches are classified as maintenance patches. An example encountered in the
Flashix project is that previous iterations had an additional component called LogFS between
component AFS and FFSC in Fig. 6.1 on page 66. The component introduced an abstract
recovery mechanism based on a log into the AFS model. However, this did not simplify
the verification significantly enough to justify the effort of keeping its interface operations
and their inputs and outputs consistent with AFS and of maintaining the invariant and
refinement proofs.
On the other hand, if the steps become too large, then the complexity in the interac-
tive verification increases drastically, because “obvious” facts become clouded by too much
noise due to the inadequate level of abstraction. One example in Flashix is the compo-
nent Header Serialization of Ch. 10, which provides the (de-)serialization of the EC- and
VID-header for the erase block manager. This component was introduced, because reasoning
about subranges of the physical erase block turned out to be a lot more pervasive than
initially assumed. Without this component additional subranges for the first page, the second
page and the data pages are necessary in the invariants of the erase block manager. This
would complicate the verification significantly, because validity of physical erase blocks as
described in Sec. 10.5 in more detail depends on both headers and the data pages. This
evolved to a generally beneficial pattern for Flashix where most of the (de-)serialization of
the various data structures is performed in a separate component with an interface that
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only refers to the algebraic data structures, sometimes with an additional value for empty or
garbage data.
It is especially hard to find the right level of abstraction when additional concerns, such as
power failures, play a role across component boundaries. At several points in the component
hierarchy of Flashix the “natural” state of components is augmented with additional informa-
tion, just to be able to express the effect of a power failure. This is prevalent in the middle
of the hierarchy where the commit data structures are needed in several adjacent models
in order to handle and recover from power failures. However, the theory with synchronized
states and the implicit propagation of effects of the write-buffer during a power failure already
significantly simplifies the specification and proofs as shown in the previous section.
In summary, the size of the steps is not only determined by the conceptual gap, but
also by the project management cost and the difficulty and challenges in specification and
verification. This is usually not a trade-off that is obvious or known ahead of time. Thus, the
component structure of the system evolves over time, when superfluous steps are eliminated
and additional steps introduced.
Maintenance & Tool Support There are several factors that lower the cost of main-
tenance and also simplify the initial verification. First, specification mechanisms such as
components with crash and synchronized predicates, invariants, rely conditions, ownership
annotations, etc. need to be first-class citizens in the tooling. This facilitates the automatic
generation of proof obligations and lowers the cost of maintenance. It increases the confidence
in refactorings of components as well. Another important aspect is the cost of replaying
proofs. There it has proven extremely beneficial to add invariants for while-loops directly
in the code for example.1 This increases the ease of redoing a proof significantly, because
it is no longer necessary to amend or modify the invariant by hand during the proof when
variable names change for example.
Polymorphic Type System One way to simplify the expression of several invariants and
abstraction relations presented in this thesis is a polymorphic type system. Currently, KIV
has a heavy-weight, static mechanism for instantiating polymorphic types such as sets and
maps. This discourages the use of higher-order operations such as map, fold and filter,
since in general several instantiations of the polymorphic types are used in their declaration.
However, in the verification of the erase block manager of Ch. 10 for example invariants
expressible with these constructs are pervasive. There a truly polymorphic type system could
greatly aid at least in specification. With respect to the verification, stronger simplification
of higher-order lambda expressions, e.g., the predicate of a filter expression needs to be
evaluated for a given element, might be necessary in practice.
Predicate Subtyping Another related feature is that in a large system such as Flashix
usually data structures have additional constraints not expressible just by defining them as
a free data type. For example physical and logical erase blocks have a fixed-size array as a
field. Furthermore, they are empty above the index of the last write. In a type system with
predicate subtyping such as PVS [117] it is possible to define a subtype of the original, free
data type with additional constraints given by a predicate. This would save a lot of additional
preconditions for lemmas, because some of them are then already implied by the type.
15.3 Outlook
Re-ordering, Write-Back Caches The semantics of components with implicit retrac-
tions for the operations-based interpretation of power failures facilitates expression of the
crash behavior in terms of the history of the component for order-preserving write-back
1This is a feature that was previously not supported by the tool KIV.
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caches. Potentially re-ordering caches can only be specified with the state-based approach. A
generalization of the semantics to such caches while maintaining the compositionality of the
semantics is currently being researched. The semantics of components in this thesis allow for
the retry of one operation per thread only, after retraction of several operations. Two ideas
are to allow a) re-execution of several operations and b) retractions of operations in between
re-executed operations. This could be useful e.g. to support multiple write-buffers, one for
normal operations and one for garbage collection. This could improve the performance of a
concurrent garbage collector.
Concurrent Garbage Collection & Tree Traversal With respect to concurrency the
next step for the Flashix file system is concurrency in the components below the transactional
journal. Afterwards, garbage collection can be performed in the background by a concurrent
thread. The final step is allowing concurrent calls to the POSIX interface. Here the challenge
is the verification of the tree traversal of the Virtual File System Switch component.
Verified C-Code A step in a different direction is the verification of the generated C
code. Here initial experiments were already performed for the sequential C code. Essentially,
it is necessary to abstract C’s representation of data as structures, unions and pointers to
algebraic data types via a data refinement. Most likely most of the abstractions and proofs
can be automatically added during the process of code generation. An interesting extension
would be to reuse the ownership annotations of Ch. 13 within a C code verifier in order to
prove data race freedom of the C code. VeriFast [71] as well as VCC [32] support fractional
permissions and an ownership model, which ensures data race freedom.
Byte-Addressable Non-Volatile Random Access Memory An interesting and novel
application of the theory developed in this thesis could be byte-addressable Non-volatile
Random Access Memory (= NVRAM). This new memory technology promises to surpass
the speed and longevity of flash memory and combines it with the random-access of each
byte location of traditional volatile memory. Due to the more fine-grained write-access, it can
be used to implement traditional highly concurrent data structures, such as Treiber’s stack
[128] and the Michael-Scott queue [94] in a persistent fashion. Initial results for the queue
[52] and for two hash maps [122, 98] exist. There is also a (potentially inefficient) universal
construction [69] that derives a persistent and linearizable data structure from a linearizable
one for this kind of memory technology. There are also implementations of persistent objects
with transactional semantics [31] and more recently entire file systems [34, 136, 137] specifically
targeting NVRAM. An interesting question for future research is whether and how atomicity
refinement of Ch. 5 and Ch. 13 is applicable to this emerging technology.
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